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As the world becomes increasingly globalized, the question of economy, of who hinders 
it or allows it to blossom, has become a point of contention that has led to many acts of 
violence. This research utilizes globalization as an economic theory as the underlying 
factor that causes these violent conflicts and imminent mass movements of migration. In 
using this lens, I emphasize that economically fueled violent conflict leads to the 
migration of populations and their ultimate elimination. Thus, the purpose of this study is 
to investigate and draw data from major violent conflicts in different nation-states and 
perform a quantitative analysis that demonstrates that economics is indeed the root cause 
of conflict. I also seek to prove that economics is the driving force of mass-migration. 
The central research questions of this study are: what is the relationship between 
globalization and violent conflict and what is the main cause of mass migration? Here, 
we will be examining population, GDP, and structural balance (economic infrastructure) 
are the variables in correlational calculations. In using quantitative methods and nation 
state and its economic stability in relation to conflict and migration can be used as 







The question of economy, of who hinders it or allows it to blossom has been 
around for centuries and has been a point of contention that started many acts of violence, 
including war. As our world has become more internationally integrated, the concept of 
globalization (to explain economy in an interconnected world) naturally came to light in 
order to dissect the new fear that nations have as a whole – the fear of coming up short. 
Because of this, it appears as though there have been more acts of violence in the last 
century than there ever was; and with acts of violence come large movements of people. 
Thus, this research analyzes and provides an assessment that concludes that globalization 
is an underlying factor that causes violent conflict and the imminent mass movement or 
eliminations of populations. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the background of 
the problem, outline vital research questions, and present the significance of the study as 
it relates to modern theories and conflict research. 
Background 
At its core, globalization is an economic phenomenon whose implications are 
largely bound to a state’s welfare (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 283). The state’s 
welfare, in turn is associated and affected by the flows of goods for economic 
advancement, largely cross-border flows that turn domestic transactions into international 
ones (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 285). In utilizing globalization as an economic 
theory, I emphasize that economically fueled violent conflict leads to the migration of 
populations. In doing so, we can begin to understand the push and pull factors of 




the 21st century; how to deal with international migration. International migration (people 
moving across national borders) is a global challenge that has been made prevalent in the 
Obama administration. In fact, if the world’s migrants were in one place, they would be 
in the top ten most populous countries, among the likes of China, India, or Brazil (Martin 
and Widgren, 2002, p. 1). The presence of international migrants has raised major 
socioeconomic issues in both their countries of origin and destination, and the major 
question asked is why do so many people across national borders. In the United States, 
1.1 million migrants are admitted each year (this number is not inclusive of the migrants 
who arrive undocumented or migrants that have overstayed their visas).  This was not 
always the case. US immigration occurred in waves, the first of which was mostly 
English speakers from the British Isles that started in 1820. The Germans and Irish 
dominated the second wave in the 1840s through the 1850s. The third wave brought 20 
million European immigrants in a 35-year period reaching through 1914, followed by a 
brief pause during the depression (Martin, 2013, p. 6). Immigration increased in the mid-
20th century and has been admitting over 1 million every year since 1990. Considering 
the staggering jump in numbers in a short period of time, debates arose in relation to the 
education and welfare systems that are in place and have continued to cause heat in the 
political arena for nearly four decades. While unauthorized migration is a primary 
concern for public policy, it is still important to consider the implications behind all 
migratory movements. 
As it relates to violent conflict, large migratory movements are essentially one of 
the consequences that occur after a major act of violence, particularly one in which the 




never been a scholarly study to explain the nexus between the two. In doing so a 
comprehensive pre and post war analysis will be performed in order to prove that 
economic infrastructures is the primary thread behind violent conflict, thus a principal 
factor behind mass migration. 
Violent Conflict: An Overview 
It has been said that since the beginning of man, conflict in any of its forms, has 
existed. As such, a myriad of theories has developed in order to explain the rationale 
behind it. Scientists have come up with psychological theories that claim man is 
inherently violent, and in large part because we are of the same genes as chimpanzees.  
Interestingly, chimpanzees have been studied for several years and under observation will 
go to war with each other. More modern-day theorists pose that violent conflicts occur 
because it is a matter of territory that they are trying to protect; although this was counter-
posed with the idea that man was even in conflict 12,000 years ago, when territory was 
not a matter of scarcity. Regardless of what theory has been confirmed or debunked, it is 
clear that conflict is caused by human beings and given the growth of the modern-day 
state system, it is important to understand the factors behind conflict in today’s world so 
that it can be avoided tomorrow. 
Before we look at what causes violent conflict, we must have a working definition 
of what violent conflict is. Violent conflict is often a term that is used loosely to define an 
act of war or maybe an act of genocide.  However, these are not mutually exclusive to 
violent conflict, but rather are in categories of their own right (due to their detrimental 
nature as it relates to death tolls and other varying factors). As per the Payson Conflict 




parties, of which are grouped into three categories: minor armed conflicts, in which the 
battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict are below 1,000; intermediate 
conflicts, in which there are more than 1,000 battle-related deaths recorded during the 
course of the conflict, and in which between 25 and 1,000 deaths have occurred during a 
particular year; and wars, in which there are more than 1,000 battle-related deaths during 
one particular year. The two latter categories are sometimes referred to as major armed 
conflicts.” Under this definition, war falls under the category of a major armed conflict. 
That said, international violent conflict is the type of conflict that involves more 
than two nation states. These conflicts generally fall under one of three categories. The 
first is that of structural systemic conflict, which usually takes the shape of competition 
for power, alliances, and resource appropriation. The second is dyadic conflict, which 
involves territorial contingencies, geographic proximity, and historical grievances. The 
third is unit-level conflict, a top down, elite generated conflict. This study does not 
examine international violent conflict per se, it is important to understand the concept of 
a systemic conflict, as it stems from inequality in resources. A systemic conflict is most 
clearly grasped in a cause and effect model in varying stages, “if X, then Y.” The first 
stage is if there is resource inequality, then once of the parties will undoubtedly face 
resource scarcity. The second stage is if there is resource scarcity, then alliances will 
begin to form in order to retain those resources from the opposing party. The third stage 
is if there are alliances that form, then there will be an overlap of opposing parties (i.e., if 
A and B are having a conflict, and C joins A, then B and C have a conflict). The fourth 
stage notes that if there is an overlap in opposing parties, then there will be a change in 




The former Yugoslavia is a perfect example of this.  One of the primary 
arguments that have been presented to cause the fall of Yugoslavia is that of ethnic 
hatred; and while that is an important catalyst of the problem, the economic argument 
needs to be further explored. A major point of contention was the high unemployment 
rate (impart due to a myriad of factors that will be examined in more detail later this this 
study). In applying this aspect in the model of systemic conflict, one can deduce that the 
resource of employment was scarce; therefore, opposing parties (both political and 
otherwise) saw the opportunity to form alliances and change the balance of power. This 
imbalance of power, thus, led to the dissolution of what we now know as Bosnia, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia, and Montenegro (Yarashevich and Karneyeva, 2003, p. 3). 
Statement of the Problem 
In a world that has become increasingly globalized, the fear of losing resources 
and the opportunity to gain financial power has become greater; particularly with 
countries that are competing in the same geographic region. The question of nationalistic 
survival is one of the haves versus the have-nots, and those who have more, will 
ultimately survive. Scholarly research has only begun to scratch the surface where 
globalization and violent conflict come together. In fact, more the more recent analyses 
of violent conflict are often indicated to stem from terrorism or acts of terror, when in 
fact not all acts of violence are necessarily related to politics. 
There is an undeniable gap in the connection between the economic performance 
of a nation to its resulting upheavals that are often followed with violence. Thus, it is 
critical to conduct a thorough historical analysis of a nation’s economic infrastructure as 




detrimental to humanity, as it has led to the movements of large populations. As such, it 
is vital to understand the causes behind violent conflict in order to foresee and deter the 
possibility of mass movements that have had intrastate impacts. 
Purpose and Goals of Study 
While globalization is considered a modern theory in international relations, its 
essence has been present since the beginning of man. In other words, when man is 
suffering economically there will be a point in which man must find a solution in order to 
overcome their economic dilemma, and should there be something or someone in the way 
of that, man will find any means by which to eliminate the impediment. In order to 
demonstrate that conflict increases when a country’s economic welfare is impacted, I 
utilize data that will provide concrete deductions where poor economic infrastructures 
inevitably lead to conflict in any nation. With this paradigm, I outline the related 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks that support the notion that conflict, and economy 
are perpetually connected. Thus, the purpose of this study is to investigate and draw data 
from major violent conflicts in different nations and perform a quantitative analysis to 
demonstrate that economic is inherently the root cause of conflict. In doing so, I exhibit 
real data that it is economics is also the driving force behind mass migration. Here there 
are two independent variables, conflict and a nation’s economy and one dependent 
variable, the population index. In using quantitative methods, a nation’s economic 
stability in relation to conflict and migration is quantified, which, in turn, can be used as 
predictions to deter or prevent devastating consequences for the future. 
In examining academic work, much of the studies that have been done are related 




economic perspective. For instance, let us consider the case of Colombia. Colombia has 
one of the largest displaced populations in the world (Ibanez and Velez, 2008, p. 2); and 
this displacement is largely due to internal violent conflict. While the writers note that 
armed groups deliberately targeted civilian populations in order to migrate, it is not 
clearly evidenced as to why it was the case.  This further explains the need to perform 
this study in order to bridge gaps. 
More specifically, the goals of this study are: 
• To engage in a historical study of the economics in nations that have been 
affected by violent conflict, which include Rwanda, Colombia, [former] 
Yugoslavia, Nazi Germany, and Cambodia 
• To highlight and provide concrete data that economic breakdown and violent 
conflict are indeed related 
• To debunk the argument that violent conflict is politically fueled 
• To explore new territories of conflict prevention  
• To explain the relationship between violent conflict and mass migration 
• To develop a quantitative tool which can be utilized in practice by conflict 
resolutionists  
Considering the lack of scholarship on this subject, this study involves exploring 
the economic state of several countries pre and post violent conflict. In doing so, it will 
provide a context that explains the phenomenon that we are largely faced with today – 
international migration. This historical examination provides numerical patterns that 
allow scholars to see if history repeats itself, and if it does, what are the conditions in 




Significance of Study 
The lack of accountability of a nation’s economic infrastructure is the driving 
force behind this study. Completely rejecting the notion that economics does not have an 
impact on violent conflict and its consequences is what will continue to push large 
populations into foreign countries, further fueling political administrations to take a stand 
on more restrictive immigration policies as opposed to providing aid in a person’s darkest 
hour. It is difficult to imagine that thousands of migrants have a burning desire to move 
to a foreign country to which they have no ties with, along with their families, only to 
start from the beginning. It is even more difficult to believe that the nation that 
“welcomes” these migrants does so without rejection or criticism from the citizens 
within, that they themselves have fears of economic stability. 
While there is literature on economics pulling migrants towards a nation that 
would be economically wealthier, there are virtually no studies that demonstrate that 
economics pushes migrants. The only real hypotheses that have been studied are those 
involving violent conflict and political uprisings causing a migrant to “voluntarily” move 
from one country to the next. Therefore, this study is an attempt to bridge that gap and 
demonstrate the nexus between economics and movements of populations. 
Theoretically, the foundation of this study is based on a more modern approach to 
international relations. I did not develop a new theory; however, I did examine current 
theories with a critical eye to redirect the root of the problem, which would contribute a 
working tool in the field of conflict resolution. The ever-changing dynamics of our world 
has been increasingly difficult to follow; therefore, academia has lost its footing on 




In that respect, I employed an analysis to determine the conditions that would lead 
to violent conflict. By using data pre and post violent conflict along with modern 
theoretical framework, the study will explain the pivotal breaking point that drove that 
nation to violent conflict and what can be done to prevent not only the conflict, but also 
mass migration. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The central research question that this study is aimed to answer is, what is the 
relationship between globalization and violent conflict? One of the most dominant 
findings in literature is that economic conditions, such as low income, slow growth, and 
severe economic downturn are the drivers that are directly related to the outbreak of 
violent conflict (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). In fact, empirical studies have found 
that poor economic performance is associated with higher incidence of conflict (Ibid, p. 
32). 
The study also examines what roles resources play in the power of a nation. The 
power of a nation state is what allows it to define itself in the international realm. These 
days, while the more dominant powers are prone to have a pseudo big brother keeping 
checks and balances, they are also more likely to have more leverage in dealings related 
to foreign policy and international trade. The power of a state that be separated into three 
categories. The first is that of resources or capabilities, which are frequently material and 
include (but are not exclusive to) agriculture, technology, energy, and environmental 
resources (Treverton and Jones, 2005, p. ix). The second is how that power is converted 
through national processes, and the third I which state prevails within specific scenarios 




most important. In assessing world powers, Strategic Assessment Groups used metrics in 
gross domestic product, which was then summed as a percentage of a total world power. 
In doing so, it demonstrated that the US holds about 20% of global power, the highest 
percentage among 164 countries (Treverton and Jones, 2005, p. 3). The assessment also 
examined the most likely locations for future conflict and Asia was noted as the most 
dangerous region, and not coincidentally with six (of eight) conflict prone situations 
involving China, which holds the second highest percentage of 14 (Id.). This asserts that 
power begets power, and for a nation such as China to gain more strength, it must flex its 
muscles and often clash with conflict amongst its neighbors. 
Finally, this study takes an in depth look at the global implications of continuous 
violent conflict, as it relates to large migratory movements of populations. Since the 
1990’s there has been a substantial increase in the number of intrastate violent conflict 
around the world. In fact, in the last two decades there have been more than 125 violent 
conflicts resulting in 7 million deaths (Smith, 2013). As it relates to globalization, 
economic shocks caused by violent conflict can be dangerous because their impacts can 
be long-lived, particularly in developing countries (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 29). 
Continuous violent conflict may transform itself into a regenerating cycle, which destroys 
the physical, social, and human capital (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 29). Studies have 
shown that once there has been a conflict (either inter or intrastate) the probability of it 
reoccurring is high (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 29).  This means that those nation-
states will be in a constant state of social, political, and economic vulnerability. Thus, 
violent conflict is a major threat to human development. If a country has low levels of 




productivity and potential growth. In turn, lower growth rates heighten the risk of 
conflict, potentially trapping a country in a loop.” (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). As 
a country becomes more and more defined by its reoccurring cycle of conflict, its citizens 
begin to realize that it is no longer a place in which they can thrive as human beings; thus 
giving them the opportunity, or rather reason, to move elsewhere and seek economic 
stability and growth there. Therefore, the overarching hypothesis examined here is: if 
there is a causal link between economics and violent conflict, then we can make 
assessments on the emigration and immigration of international populations. More 
specifically, if violent conflict is economically driven, then we can conclude that mass 
migration is inevitable. 
Philosophical Assumptions 
In its most classic of forms, international relations as a theory has focused on the 
analysis of cause and effect between war and peace. (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 
2). More contemporary scholars pose several other questions outside of that analysis, 
including what are the limits and possibilities in tackling urgent world problems? 
Urgency, of course, is subjective, and among those urgent problems are economic crisis, 
violent conflict, and migration. While policymakers can describe the urgent situation that 
they are in, their question often is ‘how did we get here?’ And, in explaining it, they are 
thrown into the realm of theory (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 3). “Theories offer 
accounts of why things happened (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 3),” in this research 
social theory and Marxism is offered as theoretical perspectives as to the cause and effect 
between economy and violent conflict. In addition, globalization, which is under the 




importance of a stable economy in a nation state. Finally, social movement theories (as it 
relates to the escalation of violent conflict) is briefly examined as theoretical perspectives 
behind human conduct. 
Violent conflict, even in the most historical sense has never been an expression of 
inherent aggression, but rather serves as a tool of social destruction and economic 
construction. It is used as an attempt to settle disputes over power, money, and resources 
with violent means (Stewart, 2002, p. 345). This attempt is used so frequently that “8 out 
of 10 of the world’s poorest countries are suffering or have recently suffered from large 
scale violent conflict” (Stewart, 2002, p. 342). Economic factors which predispose 
countries to war are separated into four categories: group motivation, private motivation, 
failure of the social contract, and environmental degradation. The hypothesis of group 
motivation stems from the groups that are deprived (relative to their geographic location) 
and seek economic equality; and where politically it is not possible, a violent course of 
action often follows (Stewart, 2002, p. 323). The hypothesis of private motivation is 
when the possibility of enrichment through violent conflict lures those who are 
uneducated and unemployment to follow.  This often leads to an enduring conflict if the 
recruitment is substantial. The failure of social contract stems from the proverbial 
contract between the state and its people, whereas the state delivers reasonable economic 
conditions so that the people accept its authority. When there is economic decline, the 
power of the contract (and the state) weakens, giving the people a purpose to react. 
Finally, as it relates to environmental degradation, the scarcity of resources is notorious 
for provoking conflict in that people will fight to protect their security of having food and 




While violent conflict has been widely recognized as a matter of international 
concern for a number of years, it was not until around 15 years ago that migration was 
recognized as an important phenomenon in international relations, and more recently 
capturing attention as it relates to violent conflict, and not just as a by-product (Mitchell, 
2011, p. 125). In revisiting the categories of economic factors predisposing countries to 
war, migration may be a strategic economic response. For instance, in the case of linking 
conflict to the scarcity of resources, (forced) migration of populations would be necessary 
in order to secure a reasonable volume of resources for the state. This, in turn, is linked 
with the failure of the social contract, in which the state did not deliver reasonable 
economic conditions for every citizen, thus weakening the state and provoking violent 
conflict. In provoking the violent conflict, the hypotheses of group and private motivation 
emerge in that groups begin to feel the deprivation and in turn seek personal enrichment 
through the participation of violent conflict.  Migration and violent conflict, therefore, 
have an undeniable cyclical relationship that scholars have only begun to examine. 
The first assumption is that this study largely utilized archival data based on 
previously examined violent conflicts that were prominent over the last century. This 
analysis relies heavily on literature published by other authors; thus, the data comes from 
secondary sources. Scholars that have written on these matters are both native and non-
natives of the countries that are presented as case studies; therefore, while some 
information was skewed, the data extracted was numerical in nature and was objective 
and neutral. 
It is also important to consider the assumption that globalization, as a theory is not 




necessarily capture the economic piece that will be presented in this study. This study 
only examines the economic piece of globalization as a theory and does not take into 
consideration its other well-known components such as communications. To that end, the 
assumption here is that while globalization is not limited to its economic drivers, it is 
only those drivers that have the direct impact on violent conflict and mass migration. 
Limitations 
One of the limitations of the study is the lack of primary sources that would 
support my theory in bridging the gap between globalization, violent conflict, and mass 
migration of vulnerable populations. I believe that this is largely because the idea of 
placing vulnerable populations (i.e., refugees) in the same category as an economic 
migrant would de-bunk the idea of a refugee as an immigration status and cause the 
major breakdown of the UNHCR – who was in fact formed to protect refugees (and 
rightly). It is critical to emphasize that while my purpose here is not, in any way, to 
diminish the circumstances by which the immigrants arrived and remained in their 
country of resettlement, it sheds light to a more pure meaning of what cause their 
movement in the first place. 
Another limitation of the study is that a large part of the data is extracted from 
historical events. That is, I used economic figures of a country pre and post violent 
conflict, which would render more recent events moot, as the data would not be available. 
My intention here was to collect data from countries that have suffered violent conflict 
from different regions of the world. In doing so I believe this approach can be treated as a 
global phenomenon whose projections can be applied at an international level and used as 




with criticism, but the hope is to provide hard information that can be utilized in 
conjunction with contemporary theories of international relations.  
The delimitations contained within this research helped in condensing what could 
have been an exhaustive study in terms of analyzing any and all countries that have 
experienced an act of violent conflict. In terms of what countries were presented as case 
studies, I attempted to capture a large framework using a limited number of case studies. 
In doing so, I performed an in-depth quantitative analysis that would also be supported by 
the literature that is published on those case studies. That said, I have not limited myself 
to a specific region of the world, but rather used case studies from all areas so that 
generalizations would be avoided. 
In terms of theoretical perspectives, I used scholarship from theories whose 
orientations were pre-globalization and those that have been developed in more recent 
years. The reason behind this is to demonstrate that the theme of economics being a 
driving force behind [violent] conflict has existed since the beginning of man. In paying 
close attention to the language in the varying theories, one begins to see a pattern that the 
overall survival of man depends on his economic well-being.  
Structure of the Dissertation 
The structure of my dissertation has been established in order to provide a 
thorough understanding of globalization as the phenomenon behind mass migration of 
vulnerable populations. In Chapter One, I present the background on globalization and 
international migration, with a small piece on violent conflict, the scope and significance 




includes definitions that would clarify open questions, in addition to assumptions, 
limitations, and delimitations. 
Chapter Two provides a literature review, which includes major theoretical 
perspectives used as the foundation for my premise. This involves an in-depth 
examination of international relations theory and social theory. Theories that stem from 
these that are also included in the literature review are those of globalization and 
Marxism.  Relative Deprivation as a social movement theory will also be examined as it 
relates to the escalation of violent conflict. In addition, Chapter Two provides a literature 
of the conceptual framework of the study namely that of globalization and violent 
conflict. Finally, Chapter Two provides an overview of the case studies that will be 
utilized as a basis for the analysis. 
Chapter Three includes the methodology and philosophical paradigm used to 
examine the nexus between globalization and the mass migration of vulnerable 
populations. It also provides the empirical analysis to highlight the relationship between 
the variables and establish concrete measures that would facilitate projections.  
Chapter Four lays the groundwork for this research by way of presenting case 
studies for five different countries that over the last century have endured violent conflict. 
These overviews include the economic transformations that transpired post conflict, the 
state of affairs in which these nations were left in, and what it all means for the future of 
our global impact. 
Finally, Chapter Five provides some of my concluding thoughts and implication 







Globalization is frequently confused with internationalization, but they are two 
different animals. Internationalization “refers to the increasing importance of 
international trade, international relations, treaties, alliances, etc.…among nations” (Daly, 
2004, p. 41). Globalization is a theory within international relations that can be applied 
socially and economically, both of which involve an integration of many to form one. 
Economic globalization is comprised of two components; the first is that of flows of trade 
and the second is that of policy restrictions of the trade measured by tariffs and capital 
controls (Heckleman and Young, 2013, p. 5). For the purposes of this study I will largely 
focus on the former, which would essentially represent the outcome of the economic 
game (Ibid) -- in this case large population movement.  Hashimov describes economic 
globalization as “the increasing interdependence among economies…with the effect of 
expanding international trade of goods and services…” (Heckleman and Young, 2013, p. 
2). In other words, economic globalization implies the free movements of goods, 
services, and capital in the global economy (Heckleman and Young, 2013, p. 2). What we 
must consider here is that not all nation-states can provide (or purchase) goods and 
services at the same economic level. Therefore, if economic globalization means the 







Often utilized to uncover social inequities as it relates to resources, privileges or 
control, socio-economic status is the social standing of an individual or group in relation 
to others based on income, education, and occupation. 
Migrants 
Migrants are people who move from one place to another; not to be confused with 
immigrants who are people who leave their home country to permanently reside in 
another. Based on definition alone, both migrants and immigrants considered to be people 
who move voluntarily. 
Economic Migrant 
Economic Migrants are those who travel from their home country to another in 
order to improve their socio-economic status. 
Refugee 
Someone who has a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group of political opinion, is 
outside his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country” (1951 Refugee Convention). 
Asylee 
An alien in a foreign port of entry who is found unable or unwilling to return to 
their home country, or to seek the protection of that country because of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion. Unlike refugees, asylees must seek approval to remain in the country in which 





Economic, social, and physical motives behind why people migrate or emigrate. 
Violent Conflict 
The use of armed force by two parties, of which at least one is the government of 
a state, that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (Payson Conflict Study 
Group, 2001). The use of armed force is considered to occur when a party in an active 
conflict uses arms against the other party. However, it is important to note that the use of 
arms does not necessarily result in death. 
Arms 
Anything material other than corporal strength – this can include weapons of mass 
destruction, firearms, or even sticks and stones (www.pcr.uu.se, 2016). 
Armed Conflict 
A. Conflict between two or more parties, but usually between the state and an 
anti-state group or groups using weapons on a sustained basis (Payson 
Conflict Study Group, 2001). 
B. Combat between forces that both possess weapons. Hostilities of a kind, 
which breach or threaten to breach, international peace and security, such as 
invasions, interventions, border clashes and incursions, and civil strife with 
some external dimension. Most commonly, this dimension would involve 
either support from external patrons, or the threat of spillover effects in 






Balance of Power 
Conflict management method in international relations counter-balancing the 
hegemonic tendencies of any single power by an alliance or realignment among other 
states. A balance of an interstate power system is generally considered stable if no single 
state achieves a dominant position, the independence of the great powers is assured, and 
major wars are avoided (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001). 
Basic Needs 
Minimum requirements of a community for a decent standard of life: adequate 
food, shelter, and clothing plus some household equipment and furniture. They also 
include essential services provided by and for the community-at-large such as safe 
drinking water, sanitation, health and education facilities, protection against human rights 
violations and gainful employment (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001). 
Conflict 
Conflict is commonly defined as two or more parties that have or perceive 
incompatible goals (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 16). 
A. The struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in 
which the aims of the groups or individuals involved are to neutralize, injure 
or eliminate rivals (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001). 
B. Two or more parties with incompatible interests who express hostile attitudes 
or pursue their interests through actions that damage the other(s). Parties may 
be individuals, small or large groups or countries. Interests can diverge in 
many ways, such as over access to and distribution of resources (e.g. territory, 




decision making; identity, (cultural, social and political communities); status; 
or values, particularly those embodied in systems of government, religion, or 
ideology (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001). 
Dynamic Variables 
Short-term, often sudden, political, economic, or other developments or 
perceptions that impact a country’s stability. These variables must be traced to assess 
whether a country is moving toward or away from violent conflict (Payson Conflict 
Study Group, 2001). 
Economic Infrastructure 
The underlying amount of physical and financial capital embodied in roads, 
railways, waterways, airways, and other forms of transportation and communication plus 
water supplies, financial institutions, electricity, and public services such as health and 
education. The level of infrastructural development in a country is a crucial factor 
determining the pace and diversity of economic development (Payson Conflict Study 
Group, 2001). 
Nation 
A large group of people bound together by common tradition and culture and 
usually language. Sometimes used synonymously with state, but this can be misleading, 
since one state may contain many nations. For example, Great Britain is a state, but 
contains the English, Scottish, Welsh, and part of the Irish nations (Payson Conflict Study 
Group, 2001). 
Nation-state 




when the whole population of a state feels itself to belong to the same nation. 
This is certainly more the case now than it was in the nineteenth century and 
earlier, when large empires, such as Austria-Hungary, were states but 
contained many nations. But many states today still contain many nations 
(partly because of the arbitrary way that the borders of states were redrawn 
after both World Wars, and by the colonial powers as they withdrew from 
Asia and Africa), and with the rise of nationalism that has followed the fall of 
communism, this has been one of the main reasons for instability in states 
such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Payson Conflict Study Group, 
2001). 
B. The definition of the nation-state is really a combination of the nation and the 
state. It is a special form of state with people seeing themselves as belonging 
to a nation. This state has the legal right to enforce its power in a defined 
piece of territory with the aim of uniting the people through a shared or 
common culture (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001). 
Revolution 
Forcible, pervasive, and often violent change of a social, political, or economic 
order. Revolution is the most extreme political option of a dissenting group, a course 
taken generally when more moderate attempts to achieve reform have failed. A 
revolution is distinguished from a coup d’état, which is a sudden seizure of state power 
by a small faction that does not necessarily change the social system, and a revolt or 
rebellion, which may be either a failed attempt at revolution or a violent expression of 






The complexity of violent conflict and the rationale behind its occurrence 
deserves a comprehensive analysis, which will provide objective data to scholars. As 
such, it is important to understand that one of the primary driving forces of violent 
conflict is that of economics. Current literature provides brief explanations as to why 
economics and violent conflict are connected, further blurring things by simply stating 
the interplay between economics and conflict is complex and providing no substantial 
rationale behind this logic. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an in depth look at theoretical 
perspectives that lay the foundation to this study; in addition, it provides a general 
understanding of violent conflict and a synopsis of the countries from which the data will 
be extracted. In order to develop a thorough understanding of the relationship between 
globalization as an economic theory and violent conflict, my primary focus will be to 
examine violent conflict through an economic lens. In doing so, I will be able to explain 
the dynamics of violent conflict and its outcomes as it relates to large population 
movements. Using the historical data of countries pre and post violent conflict, I will 
provide the groundwork that will allow scholars in the field of conflict resolution to really 
understand how much of an impact economics truly has on violent conflict. Furthermore, 
it will provide, by design, an assessment of international migration that has previously 
not been developed. As a result, the literature review in this chapter provide a 




will be used to set up the general framework of the explanation between globalization, 
violent conflict, and its consequences.  
A Brief Explanation of International Migration 
The history of migration begins with mankind, where colonization and expansion 
depended on migration (Koser, 2007, p. 2). In more recent history, international 
migration is what allowed for economic growth in “new worlds” that needed cheap and 
expedited labor. And, while migration did not carry the stigma that it does today, it 
continues to rise every year – more than doubling in the last 25 years (Koser, 2007, p. 5). 
There is a myriad of perspectives on the notion of international migration. More 
specifically, it has been widely seen that the consensus falls under two categories; one of 
which supports free movement of people with programs that would assist migrants with 
the full integration of their new home country.  The other one that would place heavy 
restrictions on the movement of people and would go out of their way to extradite 
migrants who have been settled for several decades but have no legal documents that 
would permit them to stay. Considering this, the scholarly work that is readily available is 
largely based on those notions (either for or against) and is often times accompanied with 
push-pull factors that do not really address movements of mass populations. For instance, 
Martin and Widgren argue that international migration is a decision that is carefully 
considered and the factors that encourage a migrant to move are grouped into three 
categories: demand-pull, supply-push, and network factors (Martin and Widgren, 2002, p. 
8). In further explaining these categories they use examples that would classify all 
migrants in what we know now as economic migrants, leaving migrants with no 




concludes that all migrants must be economic migrants, which is not the case, and therein 
lays the belly of the problem. 
There are three main categories of international migrants. The first is that of 
forced migrants, which are usually described as refugees, but are not exclusive of that. 
Forced migrants are those who are forced to leave their own country due to conflict, 
persecutions, or environmental reasons such as draught or famine (Koser, 2007, p. 16). 
The second category of international migrant is a voluntary migrant, which are what 
people often identify as economic migrants as described above. The most common type 
of voluntary migrants are the spouses and children of those individuals who were able to 
obtain work and will be joining them abroad through the process of family reunification. 
As of 2007, 190 million migrants were voluntary. The final category, and most 
controversial, is that of irregular migrants. Irregular (undocumented) migrants are those 
who enter a country without documents or with forged documents, or those who enter a 
country with documents and overstay their visa or permit (Koser, 2007, p. 17). 
Irregular migration is often depicted as one of the threats to state sovereignty, 
where a state has the right to control their borders and allowing irregular migration to 
occur undermines the control of the state that is trying to assert their sovereignty. In the 
United States irregular migration has also been perceived as a threat to national security.  
This suggests that migration is a channel for terrorists to enter; and while there have been 
more recent cases of this seen in national news, the actual rate of occurrence is extremely 
low. Another widespread sentiment related to irregular migration is the fear of job 
security.  Following the mindset that large corporations would rather pay unskilled 




for the same result. While the more prevalent topic that involves migration are those 
individuals who fall under the category of irregular migrants, it is imperative to 
understand that the number of legal migrants far exceeds the number of irregular 
migrants both within and outside the United States. 
However, the types of migrants that exist are not as distinct as their categories. 
For instance, a migrant can legally enter a country on a work visa, overstay, and suddenly 
become an irregular migrant. On the same token, an individual can return to their home 
country, a war has occurred, and then they become an involuntary or forced migrant. 
Regardless of the migrant category that an individual fall under, it is critical to remember 
that the lives of these individuals are no less important than ours. 
Controlling Immigration 
At it has been previously noted, international migration has been around for an 
extensive period, and largely due to the need and demand of labor in advanced economies 
or economies that are attempting to catch up to the superpowers of today’s world. And, 
while there is a consistent need for affordable labor, governments continue to impose 
restrictive limits on immigration that have been difficult to enforce.  
One of the reasons why this is happening is because foreign workers have been 
embedded in the structure of some nations for decades (Cornelius, et. al., 2004, p. 9). 
This means that the economic structure of those nations is dependent on those 
immigrants, not only because of they provide a work force, but also because their 
families (in turn) give back to the local economy simply by residing there (paying rent, 
purchasing essentials for the family, etc.). If a government were to impose laws that 




longer existent if their families have resided in that foreign country for several 
generations), they would essentially be uprooting millions of dollars and forcing 
thousands of people to become part of a society that is foreign to them.  For example, in 
the United States our current presidential administration has come to the realization that 
the immigration system is not only broken, but a detriment to our national growth.  
In response an immigration reform was previously formulated to streamline the 
system. In order to ensure the reform is successful, it has been larger based on four 
legislative pillars: (1) creating a path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants already 
residing in the United States; (2) reforming the immigration system so that will build the 
American economy; (3) creating an effective employment verification system; and (4) 
established an improved system for accepting future workers (www.whitehouse.gov, 
2016). Creating a path to citizenship does not automatically mean that every one of the 11 
million undocumented individuals will be eligible for US citizenship. Individuals must be 
able to pass a criminal background check, must come current with their tax payments, 
and will have to pay the fees associated with their application prior to going through the 
process of naturalization. 
Another reason that governments have been finding it difficult to implement 
measures of restrictive immigration are due in part to the international pressures that 
advocate for human rights. While there is not an international convention that would 
protect the rights of a migrant (whether legal or irregular), there are organizations that 
argue that all individuals have the freedom of movement and are free to leave any 
country as per the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The departure from one 




contributing to the difficulty that has become of implementing measures to control 
immigration. 
Finally, and likely the most controversial of why policies are difficult to enforce is 
that of the actual policies’ ambiguity (Corneluis, et. al., 2004, p. 14). In other words, the 
declarations of the immigration policies are not always what they intend. This is usually 
because societies have the tendency to turn the other way, particularly when they are 
beneficiaries to what they are turning away from. For instance, in the states that border 
Mexico, there are several local businesses that are willing to pay cash to a migrant worker 
as opposed to paying minimum wage to a person that is authorized to work in the United 
States. 
Conflict: An Expanded Overview 
Generally speaking the structure of conflict can be divided into three components: 
(1) conflict situation (which is the actual conflict); (2) conflict behavior (the way that the 
opposing parties act and react to the conflict): and (3) conflict attitudes and perceptions 
(those attitudes, emotions, and perceptions that arise from a conflict situation) (Mitchell, 
1981, 26). As defined in Chapter One, conflict is commonly defined as two or more 
parties that have or perceive incompatible goals (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, p. 16). It involves 
two or more parties with incompatible interests who express hostile attitudes or pursue 
their interests through actions that damage the other(s). Parties may be individuals, small 
or large groups or countries. Interests can diverge in many ways, such as over access to 
and distribution of resources (e.g. territory, money, energy sources, food); control of 




political communities); status; or values, particularly those embodied in systems of 
government, religion, or ideology (Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001). 
Understanding the Phases of Conflict 
Scholars believe that the foundation for conflict in general lies in the relationship 
between the opposing parties. While this may be true as an overall assumption, for the 
purposes of this study it would be the inequalities in [economic] resources that cause 
friction between the adversaries (Young, 2010, p. 400). With, violent conflict is generally 
not one that occurs from one day to the next. Rather it is the type of conflict that usually 
stems from a series of economic inequalities that have developed over an extended 
period. Often when violent conflict erupts, the international community appears to be in 
astonished, as if they were unaware of the internal turmoil that the nation(s) were facing.   
Considering this, it is crucial to understand the phases of conflict because it has 
been understood that conflicts move through theses phases and eventually form a 
recurrent outcome. This provides for a framework, which allows for an in-depth analysis 
and possibly determines the juncture in which conflict transforms into a violent and 
largely catastrophic event (Young, 2010, p. 400). 
1. Emergence: In this phase, there is the initial overt manifestation of the 
conflict. Essentially this is where the ‘argument’ would begin but violent acts 
are not taking place at this point.  
2. Escalation: Young writes that conflict at this phase begin to grow in two 
dimensions. The first is that of scope, where conflict increase is indicated by 




engage in the conflict. The second dimension is that of intensity, which is 
commonly indicated by the growing violence. 
There is a de-facto transitional phase that occurs between escalation and de-
escalation that generally results from a change from one (or more) of the 
parties in the conflict; or in the case of [international] violent conflict, when 
external parties begin to intervene as the death tolls rise.  
3. De-Escalation: When the scope and intensity of the conflict subside, the 
conflict enters the phase of de-escalation. De-escalation is not necessarily a 
joint movement by the adversaries but is often the case for violent conflict, 
particularly because the adversaries are multiple individuals that have to 
undergo serious crisis management when the resulting deaths are catastrophic.  
4. Termination: The termination phase, like conflict itself, is a process and likely 
the most time consuming of all phases in conflict. In most conflicts, the 
adversaries decrease their demands or alter their expectations so that they 
meet at a middle ground in order to settle their differences, at least 
temporarily. In some extreme cases where violent conflict is concerned, the 
termination phase can occur when one of the adversaries is no longer present 
to engage in conflict with.  
5. Post-Termination: Scholars have varying opinions as to whether conflicts ever 
fully resolve, or the parties involved simply negotiate terms until the next 
disruption occurs (only to bring in the issues of the previous conflict). 




continue in a non-destructive manner and involve a third party that participate 
in mediation and peace-building efforts. 
It is important to note that these phases are not limited to time and space. In other 
words, different conflicts can and will spend varying times within each phase, and 
sometimes will move forward in one phase only to return to the previous phase sometime 
later. Due to the erratic nature of violent conflict it would be difficult to discern how long 
a conflict would remain in a stage. Therefore, it would be almost impossible to quantify 
when a violent conflict would move on to the next phase (i.e., from escalation to de-
escalation) in order to assist and possibility alleviate the countries that have been through 
a violent conflict. However, this study will demonstrate that the juncture in which a 
conflict transforms itself into a violent conflict is indeed quantifiable through the analysis 
of the factors that contribute to the development of such conflict. 
The phases of conflict are best examined through the lens of the violent conflict 
that occurred in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Where violent conflict 
moves from one phase to another, but not necessarily in a particular order. To provide 
some context, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (which will be further discussed in Chapter 
Four) was said to be carried out primarily the Rwandan elite who were vastly richer and 
better established than the masses, was a conscious effort to keep people in order and 
keep themselves in power (Rayner, 1999, p. 8).  After the death of an estimated one 
million people (at the astounding rate of 5 lives per minute), the Congolese military saw 
good reason to fight back when the Rwandan army entered.  
In the case of the war between Congo and Rwanda, it would appear as though the 




Congo to destroy Hutu refugee camps in 1996, which continued for a period of two years. 
During this time the conflict escalated, and the Congolese military fought back 
(escalation); primarily for two reasons. The first was to protect the Tutsi group from 
discrimination and violence, and the second was to prevent genocide from happening 
within their borders (Cohen, Herman J., 1999, p. 33). While the Rwandan forces were 
present, they also controlled the major provinces in Kivu, which had extensive mineral 
and timber resources for the Congolese. Thus, in 1998 The Rwandan forces were asked to 
leave, to which they complied (de-escalation), but then returned for a second time 
(escalation), and grew to what is known as the Great of War of Africa, which involved 
Congolese forces supported by Angola, Nambia, and Zimbabwe against the soldiers of 
Rwanda and Uganda (www.enoughproject.org, 2011). After four years, the invading 
troops ultimately pulled out (de-escalation) and peace deals soon followed (termination). 
As of 2006, Congo has seen a successful democratic transition (post-termination), and the 
Kivu province as been economically integrated into Rwanda, accounting for 50% of their 
GDP (Cohen, Herman J. 1999, p. 34). 
International Conflict 
International conflict is the type of conflict that involves more than two nation 
states and can include violence, usually unfolding due to a crisis with identity. These 
conflicts generally fall under one of three categories. The first is that of structural 
systemic conflict, which usually takes the shape of competition for power, alliance (how 
it affects balance of power), and resource appropriation. A systemic war is described in 
stages by an “if X, then Y” model. The first stage notes that when there is multipolarity, 




multipolar setting, then inequality in resource distribution increases. The second stage 
states that where there is resource inequality, then alliances will form because as 
inequality in resource distribution increase, then less-favored actors seek stronger allies to 
attain resources. The third stage notes that once there is alliance formation, the there is an 
overlap in conflict structures, which means that in forming alliances each nation-state 
assumes both the good and the bad of the other state.  For example, if nation-states A and 
B unite and B has a conflict with C, then A will have a conflict with C. The fourth stage 
says that once there is an overlap in conflict structures, then there will be an inevitable 
change in the balance of power. Once the conflict reaches this stage, it becomes the point 
of no return. The fifth and final stage of this model is that once that change in balance of 
power occurs it will result on systemic war. Systemic wars are few and far between, as 
they usually involve a high number of deaths and last for an extended period in light of 
the fact that it is multipolarity. 
One of the most notable examples of systemic war is World War II (of which 
Nazi Germany will be further examined later in Chapter Five). Here, the first stage really 
occurred pre-World War II, after the Treaty of Versailles was signed to end the state war 
between Germany and the Allied Powers. Due to its financially punitive provisions Italy 
and Germany fell by the wayside, creating their notion of resource inequality. The second 
stage of systemic war in relation to alliance building occurred early in the mid 1930’s, 
when the Rome-Berlin axis was formed, followed by a pact signed by Japan and 
Germany (Dickson, 2008, p. 38). The United States issued warnings as the war entered its 
third stage and conflict structures began to overlap. In 1938 Germany announces that it is 




Union (Dickson, 2008, 41). Soon after, Great Britain and Poland sign a treat of mutual 
assistance and are later allied with France, China, and the United States (Dickson, 2008, 
p. 43). As we are all well aware, several outbreaks of war throughout Europe, Asia, and 
the Mediterranean follow for several years after, which encapsulated the fourth stage of 
systemic war and inevitably bled into the fifth stage where there were surges of shifting 
powers across the globe. 
The second is dyadic conflict, which involves territorial contingencies, 
geographic proximity, and historical grievances. Dyadic conflict is directly correlated 
with democracy and democratization. It is important to note the following premises; (a) 
democracy is different from democratization, as democracy is something that is 
actualized and democratization is a process that has the potential to be actualized (in fact 
most nations only want democratization and not full blown democracy of their state), (b) 
democracies do not wage war against each other, and because of this the idea of 
spreading democracy emerged, and (c) democratization is a principle source of ethno-
political conflict. Because of the nature of democratization, which is to take over a nation 
state and implement regulations that may not be sought after, there are several conditions 
that should be avoided. The first is that of identifying the regime with a specific ethnic 
group, this is because the entire population will then turn against that ethnic group during 
democratization resulting in the failure of the democracy process. The second is to avoid 
any reference to historical grievances, because that would only add fuel to the fire and 
skew the public’s perspective. References to historical grievances can develop a 
precondition for ethnic strife and it would serve to ignite tensions between groups and 




to avoid any manipulation of ethnic mix. The fourth is to avoid conflating democracy 
with liberal democracy as liberal democracy is usually not the intended goal.  
Since the end of World War II, 236 conflicts have been active in 150 locations, 
many of which are dyadic conflicts (Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen, 2008, p. 697).  
One dyadic conflict that will be discussed in Chapter Six is that of the Colombian 
government and its struggle with FARC (Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia). It is 
claimed that Colombia has one of the largest displaced populations in the world, largely 
due to internal violent conflict over a ten-year period (Ibanez, A.M. and Velez, C. E. 
2008, p. 2). As with dyadic conflict, it can be deduced that the conflict in Colombia was 
highly influenced by territorial grievances. High populations were forced to migrate in 
light of the need for land in order to produce, among other things, illegal drugs, that 
would be a primary financial stream for the Colombian elite for several decades, and in 
some instances in present day. 
The third is unit-level conflict, a top down, elite generated conflict. The root cause 
of international conflict, as mentioned previously, is usually identity as it relates to 
ethnicity. It is the collective cultural identity of the ethnic community. There are six 
elements of collective identity that should be noted: (1) the notion of identity is not using 
biological or genetic means, (2) collective identity is not static or a fixed state of affairs, 
it refers to stories passed from generation to generation, (3) language is a key identifier in 
distinguishing groups, (4) territorial attachments and descendants from common land or 
region play heavily in international war, (5) ethnic community exists through the 
recognition of communal actions that are usually contingent on literacy, transportation, 




Elite generated conflict is said to be concentrated within the military regime itself, 
rather than between the masses and rulers. In particular it can be expected that, for elites 
that have a monopoly on power and resources in countries with low government 
constraints, non-institutional means of asserting control and authority (such as violent 
conflict) will be utilized (Carment and James, 1997, p. 202). Again, to put this type of 
conflict in less abstract terms the genocide in Rwanda is a prime example of elite-
generated conflict. Whereas the Belgian Troops (the elite in this case) took full advantage 
of their power and manipulated the Hutus to believe that they were different than the 
Tutsis in order to main their control over the mineral resources. The most compelling 
factor of this conflict is that both the Hutus and Tutsis met most, if not all, of the factors 
that would classify both tribes as a collective identity, and a foreign nation was able to 
make them believe otherwise. 
Violent Conflict 
As with conflict, violent conflict is the struggle over values or claims to status, 
power, and scare resources, in which the goal of one party is to neutralize injure or 
eliminate the opposing party. What makes violent conflict its own category, is that it 
involves the use of armed force by two parties, of which at least one is the government of 
a state, that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (Payson Conflict Study 
Group, 2001). The use of armed force is considered to occur when a party in an active 
conflict uses arms against the other party. The use of arms is generally known as the use 
of anything material that is not corporal force (such as guns, nuclear weapons, or even 
sticks). While we generally associate the use of arms as resulting in deaths, it is not 




On Religion and Conflict 
In the last several decades more and more acts of violent conflict have been said 
to be done in the name of God, and yet religion never really played a dominant role in 
violent conflict, and when it did, literature and teachings set out to restrain it. For 
instance, Islamic traditions mandated for good treatment of prisoners and forbade looting 
and the killing of children (Pearse, 2007, p. 121); the church’s Christian Knighthood 
warriors were supposed to respect their enemy, defend the weak, honor women, refuse 
harm to noncombatants, and ensure that even when killing was necessary it was civilized 
(Pearse, 2007, p. 122-123); and Orthodox monarchs recognized that making war on co-
religionists was a sin, thus deterring them from doing so (Pearse, 2007, p. 121).  The 
question is, when did religion become the fundamental premise for violent conflict? 
If violent conflict has existed since the beginning of man, it can be said that it all 
began when Cain murdered Abel outside the gates of Eden.  This was the first incident of 
the fall of humanity and the consequent estrangement from the presence of God (Pearse, 
2007, p. 111). What is implicated further in this account is that violent conflict flowed 
from the first appearance of property (i.e., resources that one party had and the other saw 
an inequality). This only leads us to understand that religion is not a primary driver of 
violent conflict, but rather intermingles with a party’s justification to be involved in such 
acts so that others may follow in their footsteps with a sense of morality. 
Genocide 
Lemkin’s definition of genocide is the destruction of a nation or ethnic group. 
Genocide, according to Lemkin, does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of 




intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction 
of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves. 
One of the most notorious occurrences of genocide is that of the Holocaust, led by 
Adolf Hitler in Nazi Germany. “The Holocaust was the systematic, bureaucratic, state-
sponsored persecution and murder of six million Jews by the Nazi regime and its 
collaborators” (www.ushmm.org, 2016). During the era of Holocaust, Nazi authorities 
also targeted groups due to their perceived “racial inferiority” including, gypsies, the 
disabled, Poles and Russians; and other groups based on political and ideological grounds 
including communists, socialists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and homosexuals 
(www.ushmm.org, 2016).  Hitler wrote that he wanted a government for the people, and 
he was merely an instrument that would help Germany get there. The primary goal of 
Hitler was to destroy Germany as a nation by way of destroying specific ethnic groups 
that he found intrusive, and then rising as a global leader with unconfined measures of 
control. 
Explaining genocide in terms of why perpetrators begin can be boiled down to 
four questions. The first is that how does the machinery of destruction get set in motion?  
A common theory on how destruction sets in motion is largely dependent on the nature of 
the state (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 64). In theory when a state is unstable, the government is 
held responsible for the instability; therefore, they react by killing those who they see as a 
potential threat. For the case of Germany, post-World War I and the Treaty of Versailles, 
Germany was essentially told that they would have to take financial responsibility and aid 




to create his regime because he believed that if no one was going to help Germany as a 
nation, then he should be the one to lead the nation into helping itself. Another reason 
why the wheels of genocide begin to turn is that of the social and ethnic composition of 
the state; in other words, where there is large competition there will be death. A third and 
final reason behind the beginning is that of poverty. It is noted that “because the political 
and economic spoils are so meager, deadly struggle ensues” (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 65).  It 
is either kill or be killed in this scenario. 
The second question is that of why do some groups get targeted and others do not 
when they live in the same country? (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 64) The nature of this question 
leans more closely to that of a trick question. The reality is that the state’s leaders (or the 
perpetrators that are in power) are not necessarily hungry to kill masses of people because 
they are affiliated to that of a group. The motives behind the mass killing are ones to 
promote fear (so that they feed off of it to gain more power), to promote nation-building 
projects in their favor, or to lead that nation to war so that they may gain total power and 
control of that state. Therefore, ethnicity becomes more of a non-issue and it is really a 
matter of being in the wrong place at the wrong time.  
For instance, let us assume that the perpetrator decided to target the group of 
people with large noses in country X for their mass killings; had a group of people with 
small noses been in the place of the group with large noses, then they would have been 
killed instead. In other words, the perpetrator must target a specific group in order to 
ignite fear and the movement of genocide and in order to gain power through that terror – 
so whether a group has a large or small nose, it is irrelevant. This is notable in the 




just so happened that the resources that were being sought after was on land that did not 
belong to the perpetrators. 
The third question is when a group is slated for elimination, why is this 
(destruction of the group) chosen? The reason behind the destruction of people is the 
promotion of re-building or starting anew (Goldhagen, 2009, p. 68). The destruction of 
the weak allows people to feed of the energy of feeling victorious and triumphant. If a 
perpetrator happens to also be a state leader and that leader gives the people the euphoric 
feeling of being unstoppable, then it is likely that the perpetrator will be supported by 
those who do not suffer from the mass killing. 
In addition, there is the idea of mass killing in order to “start fresh.” Often a 
perpetrator sees their target group as the negative opposition.  As people who are trying 
to stop the growth and progression of their nation, thus, in order to be able to move 
forward, then that group of people must be eliminated. Once the people begin to believe 
in this idea of rejuvenation by elimination, then everything else becomes somewhat of a 
domino effect. 
The fourth and final question is why does the assault begin when it does – why 
not earlier or later?  There is no real explanation behind why genocide begins when it 
does. Genocide is does not have a real systematic process (Goldhagen, 1990. P. 68). The 
only thing we do know that is true to genocide is that it goes through a cycle of phases. 
Lemkin’s two phases of genocide: 
1. Destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group. The oppressor will 
attempt to destroy the cultural practices, religious beliefs, economic parties, 




synonymous with characteristics of the oppressed group. Imposition of the 
national pattern of the oppressor. Attempt to convey/replace previous national 
pattern (of the group) with new national pattern (of the oppressor). 
2. Assimilation is coded in the opportunity (although, there really isn’t an 
opportunity) to become part of the new population.  To become part of the 
social group of the oppressor to reap whatever benefits that may provide. 
Imposition of the national pattern does not always follow the extermination of 
a group of people (enforced assimilation). 
Lemkin’s eight techniques of genocide: 
1. Political: destruction of a local government and imposition of a new national 
pattern. Can be done by a) name changes, b) sabotage (fifth column), c) 
special privileges (to increase unity) 
2. Social: abolition of local laws, courts, clergy, and intelligence, and replace 
them with those of the oppressor 
3. Cultural: prohibition of speaking the native language (largely used as a 
genocide tool in African nations) and imposition of the oppressor’s language 
and educational system → everything ends up being regulated (all matters of 
aesthetics) 
4. Economic: affects all other techniques 
5. Biological: policy of depopulation through acts of euthanasia, abortion, and 
forced sterilization 
6. Physical: actual extermination/destruction of human lives a) racial 




7. Religious: destruction of religious buildings and artifacts, and destruction of 
forced migration of religious leaders 
8. Moral: “moral debasement” promotion drugs, alcohol, and prostitution → 
encourage violence to create more violence, in order to kill each other off. 
In the field of academia, there are five distinct terms that have been developed in 
defining genocide. These are as follows: 
1. Crimes against humanity (CAH): crimes that have willfully been directed to 
civilian populations (i.e., noncombatants – people that do not participant in 
war); this is devoid of intent 
2. Genocide: intentional destruction of group or nation 
3. War crimes: war has a standard of conduct – the idea of just war; a war crime 
is identified of a violation of that proper conduct in war. These crimes are 
classified as mala in se, “evil in themselves” 
4. Ethnic cleansing: attempt to purge or remove, either through extermination or 
forced emigration, civilians from their native lands 
5. Mass murder: deliberate killings of four or more civilians consecutively 
Terrorism 
One of the most contested terms of our time, terrorism and understanding how to 
define it is notoriously challenging (Held, 2004, 62). Widely known as a tool used to 
manipulate international relations, terrorism is a concept that has been increasingly 
difficult to define. In fact, it has been noted that the term “terrorism” is problematic to 
clearly define due to objectivity, its lack of connection to a specific ideology, and the idea 




leaders have managed to adhere the idea of terrorism to conflicts that are related to ethnic 
identity and the need for power between those individuals (or groups) in conflict. In fact, 
governments have defined terrorism as something that only their opponents could commit 
and something only those who seek radical change engage in (Held, 2004, 62). 
Over the years, terrorism has evolved and developed a new face. For the most 
part, today’s terrorism/terrorist factions lack hierarchical organization, where only the 
“architects” have full knowledge of the group, they maintain clear political goals, they 
have a high influence over public opinion, and they attempt to doctor terrorism into 
something that is justifiable, giving it a human face – “we are not terrorists, we are the 
victims of the state.” 
While terrorism certainly is violence, and generally violence that is intertwined 
with matters of political freedom, the reality is that the only real effect that terrorism has 
is that of increasing fear of the foreigner. In a globalized era, terrorism has taken a toll on 
international relations and has become a tool widely used in ethno-political conflicts, 
particularly the structural systemic conflicts that involve a competition for power. 
Theoretical Perspectives 
Theories Related to Human Behavior 
Social scientists have come to believe that, people do things in certain situations 
because those are the rational things to do. In other words, there is a reason behind 
actions or our human behavior (Mohr, 2009, p. 8). The question is, are humans’ rational 
actors? And, if so, does that mean that all actions are/should be considered rational? As a 




theories that follow can shed light as to why certain individuals act in the manner that 
they do. 
Social Theory 
In formulation of a theoretical perspective for studying the relationship between 
globalization and violent conflict, social theory provides a platform by which human 
behavior and patterns can be identified, that can later be utilized to foresee and prevent 
catastrophic consequences. Social theory as a basis for the comprehension of man was 
developed several hundred years ago, as civil societies developed and people were 
permitted to express their independent thinking (Lemert, 2010). Its foundation began as 
the attempt to account for what was different between modern societies and its preceding 
traditional ones (Lemert, 2010). 
Today, social theory is defined as “the normal accomplishment of socially adept 
human creatures figuring out what other creatures of the same sort are doing with, to, or 
around them” (Lemert, 2010). As children, we begin to formulate our own social 
theories, why do girls play with other girls, why don’t we talk back to adults, why do we 
have to listen to our parents when they tell us to do something – these are all questions 
that will eventually lead to our own understanding of race, gender, socioeconomic status, 
sexuality, poverty and occupation status. Indeed, it is social theory that leads to the 
understanding of a society that is observed and analyzed in all facets. But what is a 
society, and why should it be under the scrutiny of observation? 
Culture, institutions, land, religions, or artistic creations today can identify 
societies.  And a society that is drained of their essence is one that could potentially be 




means that at times it can cast a net that goes too far. As such, social theory’s effort to 
draw boundaries around social facts or generalizations has its limitations (Lee, 1999, p. 
551); this is because societies change as time progresses. 
Societal norms shift as societies develop; it would be infinitely impossible to form 
actual boundaries. The inability to form boundaries within societies is directly reflected 
on the current state of economic affairs, whereas countries (in particular developing 
countries) have become more dependent on other nations to fill in the gaps of missing 
resources, whether it is through imports, exports or aid. This highlights that economic 
communication has become more global, which leads to us to discuss what we have come 
to know as globalization, a theory that has fallen under a myriad of umbrellas to explain 
economy in our world, as we know it today. 
This, in turn, goes back to the central theme of social theory where we as humans 
attempt to decipher what others to do, and in this case, for gain of power economically 
and politically. As social theory is expanded, it is also important to remember that the 
theory is based on learning from historical events, and what nations or societies do to 
adapt and evolve from them (Lemert, 2010, p. 9). In fact, often, political leaders have 
used historical references to rally up people’s emotions and get them to understand their 
point of view. In doing so, a conflict can largely be emotionally driven based on an 
individual’s interpretation of the past. 
With, there has been a wrench to derail our own nature to learn from the past. 
Western societies have been flooded with social innovation, technological progress, and 
the explosion of social media that has brought about an ahistorical worldview. This 




history to become what it is, followed by the relentless importance of the “here and now.” 
It enforces the notion that historical references have become more mystified than actual 
reality and are dismissed as irrational occurrences that have no substantive weight on its 
lasting effects (Sardamov, 1998, p. 56). Phenomena such as these are the very reason why 
studies such as this one are critical to the fields of conflict resolution and international 
conflict. It is imperative that scholars in academia and politics have the tools that will 
allow our leaders make rational decisions based on hard evidence. 
Social Movements Theory and Social Revolutions 
Social movement theory began in the late 19th century and refers to the study of 
social mobilization, including its social, cultural, and political manifestations and 
consequences. Social movements are defined as “a persistent and organized effort on the 
part of a relatively large number of people either to bring about or to resist social change” 
(Defronzo, 2011, p. 9). Social movements are not necessarily classified as events that 
bring about violent conflict; but modern-day theorists that have taken social movement 
theory to explain modern day revolutions are aware and have noted that violent means are 
not exclusive. Social revolutions are “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and 
class structures, accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts” 
(Skocpol, 1993, p. 33). The concept of social revolution is different from other 
revolutions in that it makes successful sociopolitical transformation; in other words, it 
changes the state and its class structures, not necessarily for the better of that state, but 
nonetheless it is changed. Social scientists have attempted to classify revolutions into two 
types; the first is a left wing revolution, in which the central goal is perceived to change 




political relationships and the other is a right wing revolution, in which the primary aim is 
the restoration of traditional institutions (Defronzo, 2015, .p 12).  
Like conflict, there are several factors that contribute to the development of social 
revolutions, five of which have proved to be enough for the success of revolutionary 
movements. They are as follows (Defronzo, 2015, p. 13-14): 
1. Mass frustration resulting in popular uprisings among urban or rural 
populations. Here, a large portion of the population is unsatisfied with either 
the government or their socio-economic status, so much so that it leads to 
protests and mass rebellions. 
2.  Dissident elite political movements. Here we are dealing with the division 
among the elite groups within a society and are pitted against each other for 
power and control. 
3. Unifying motivations. As it is presented, motivations that cut across several 
classes within a society are among the more powerful factors behind a 
revolution. 
4. A severe political crisis paralyzing the administrative capabilities of the state. 
A state crisis can come in several ways, including defeat in war, natural 
disaster, catastrophic economic downturn, or withdrawal of financial or 
military support from allied states. Should a state become subject to a crisis, it 
only weakens the administration, giving more power to the population(s) that 
are seeking to make changes by way of social revolution.  
5. A permissive or tolerant world context. This is likely one of the more 




hand, we want to intervene when a nation is suffering because we know that a 
social revolution would only devastate that nation and likely affect others (that 
likely have economic partnership with them, which leads to an economic 
domino effect). On the other hand, we refrain ourselves from intervening 
when there is an uprising in a foreign country because we want to allow that 
nation to make claim to its sovereignty and allow it to exercise their authority. 
A myriad of theories has been developed to understand the drivers of social 
movements and revolutions, among them is relative deprivation, which is also 
a theory that assists in the understanding behind human behavior in violent 
conflict. 
Relative Deprivation 
First developed as a theory in psychology by Samuel Stouffer to explain the 
satisfaction of internal promotions of military police in different regions of the United 
States, relative deprivation is now widely used as a theory in political science to 
demonstrate its implications concerning the relationship between inequality and political 
stability. The theory of relative deprivation is concerned with the feelings raised by 
inequalities. There are four conditions for an individual to feel relatively deprived: (1) 
they do not have X; (2) they see some other person or persons as having X; (3) they want 
X (4) they see it as feasible that they should have X. the relativity of the concept come 
from conditions 2 and 4 and the feeling of deprivation is defined by conditions 1 and 3 
(Stark and Taylor, 1989, p. 2). 
Relative deprivation has been assumed to increase according to three different 




expectations remain stable but receive less and less. This is usually as a result of an 
increase in the difference of power between the actors (Korpi, 1974, p. 1575). For 
instance, when someone new comes into power of a nation state their power is 
subjectively weaker than when they are in office for a second or third term. Thus, in their 
first term of being president/dictator/ruler, the head of the nation will generally keep the 
citizens’ standard of living stable, and as they have an increase in power they would be 
more inclined to slowly chip away of the resources that the citizens may have.  
The second pattern of relative deprivation is aspirational deprivation, where an 
individual’s expectations rise while their achievements remain stable (Korpi, 1974, p. 
1575). This pattern is more visibly seen in relationships between peers (individuals of 
equal standing) or individuals that do not have high degrees of separation as it relates to 
power. For instance, if two colleagues performed the same duties, the expectation of 
reward has the same baseline, but there will come a point where one of the other has a 
higher expectation of reaping (more or better) benefits because they believe that their 
performance if superior to that of the other.  
The third pattern of relative deprivation is that of progressive deprivation. 
Progressive deprivation occurs when there is a relatively steady improvement on an 
individual’s social and economic condition, which leads to increased expectations, but is 
followed by a sharp reversal in that trend (Korpi, 1974, p. 1575). This pattern has the 
tendency to occur with individuals that fall under the low to low-middle class 
economically, have had a sudden improvement in their lifestyle, and then their new 
success is taken from them; either because they themselves have fallen into a financial 




same umbrella (i.e., when the real-estate bubble caused thousands of families to lose their 
homes). Regardless of the pattern, an increase in relative deprivation strongly affects the 
probability for collective violence. 
Relative deprivation theory is distinguished in two categories, egoistic and 
fraternal. Egoistic deprivation refers to a single individual’s feeling of comparative 
deprivation, whereas fraternal deprivation (also known as group deprivation) refers to the 
dissatisfaction arising from the status of an entire group (Victoroff , 2005, 101). As it 
relates to violent conflict, relative deprivation will largely fall under the category of 
fraternal deprivation, as an individual [intrinsically] cannot wage an act of violent 
conflict that would cause serious detriment to a nation’s economic welfare. 
Theories in Economics 
Economics is the social science that deals with tangible wealth, in general the 
goods that are produced by people (Foldvary, 2014, p. 6). Economics enables us to 
understand reality empirically, because wealth is not an end, rather it is a means by which 
utility is measured and then pursued by individuals. In order to understand economics 
(and its driving theories) it is important to consider the following universal principles 
(Foldvary, 2014, p. 8-9) (in no order): 
• Some natural resources are scare relative to human desires 
• Resources vary in quality 
• All human beings belong to the same species and have the same human nature 
• Humans haves ends (i.e., goals and needs) 
• Humans are able to rank their needs on importance 




• Human values are subjective 
• Humans beings economize 
• People tend to have time preference (desiring different goods at different 
times) 
• The future is uncertain 
These principles lay the foundation for an economic theory. “An economic theory 
is defined as a theory that has economic structures as its relational structures…” by which 
are distinguished by a set of rules (Klein, 1998, p. 7). An economic theory has a 
mathematical component where the theorist is concerned with an economic structure, for 
instance an individual consumer. Thus, an economic theory, in its classical sense, would 
explain the means by which a consumer would perform choices based on patterns and 
facing different budget situations. (Klein, 1998, p. 22). 
Theories in economics can be confined to strictly explaining phenomenon as it 
related to market prices, wages rates, and GDP.  History has taught us that our social 
lives have an inseparable relationship with its elements (i.e., economics). Therefore, 
human behavior goes beyond the economic doctrine. The theories below will explain the 
economic reality of individuals and allows us to make the connection between human 
behavior, economics, and conflict. 
Marxism 
In general, a theory is at the center of the economic realities of human culture; and 
with Marxism getting and keeping economic power is the motive behind all social and 
political activities (Tyson, 2006, p. 54). This would make economics the foundation of 




Marxism, a human event cannot be properly understood without the historical 
circumstances by which that event occurred; and in his Communist Manifesto Marx 
writes that the history of all existing society is [found within] the history of struggle 
(Love, 2006, p. 250). Thus, the history of economics is found within the web of societies 
arranged in orders and social ranks that have established modern-day’s bourgeoisie (Ibid, 
p. 251). 
Marx further notes that each development of today’s high-class society is 
accompanied by a responding political advancement of that class; which marks an 
important point in the relationship between economic globalization and large migratory 
movements. Let us take for instance the notion of the oppressor and the oppressed. If an 
oppressed class exists under the oppressor (in this case a class of high stature) and the 
oppressor wants to build a system of successful industry where the oppressed class 
resides, the oppressor has the upper hand by way of resources. Therefore, in finding the 
means to build this industry the oppressor forces the oppressed to relocate resulting in 
their likely economic ruin. The same is understood today. If a higher power (political or 
otherwise) wants to create an infrastructure where a society of low-income citizens 
reside, the high power has the upper hand and will essentially “buy” them out of their 
homes, or in some cases result in movement by force by way of violent conflict. 
Between 1975 and 1979, under the regime of Pol Pot, Cambodia lost 1.5 million 
people due to starvation, execution, disease, or over work. Pol Pot wanted a classless 
peasant society, espousing Marxist principles, and took particular aim at intellectuals, city 
residents, ethnic Vietnamese, civil servants, and religious leaders (www.history.com, 




were evacuated, and the remaining population was stripped of their possessions and 
forced to work in the fields as part of their reeducation. Under his regime, the state 
controlled all aspects of a person’s life. Money, private property, most reading material, 
and religion were outlawed; agriculture was collectivized; children were taken and forced 
into the military; and strict rules governing sexual relations, clothing, and vocabulary 
were laid down (www.history.com, 2016). 
The division between the haves and have-nots from a Marxists theoretical 
perspective is infinitely more significant that the division of race, religion, or gender 
(Tyson, 2006, p. 54). In fact, it is this frame of thinking that allows for the Joneses to rise 
in the global society.  It is the bourgeoisie that recognize that class is more important and 
the rest of the world that does not. Thus, the remaining global society will place a large 
significance of race, religion, and gender, causing them to create revolutions amongst 
themselves and leave the elite to watch them eliminate each other in their own battles. 
Globalization 
Over the last decade, the idea of globalization has grown to have several different 
interpretations. Some have deemed it as an economic concept that supports market 
forces; others have called it the gateway for international communication, removing 
borders and barriers to make for better negotiations, and reconfiguring the fundamental 
properties of the nation-state (Lemert, 2010, p. 625). At its core, globalization is an 
economic phenomenon whose implications are largely bound to a state’s welfare (Dunne, 
Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 283). The state’s welfare, in turn is associated and affected by 




Globalization has so many facets (encompassing themes of economics, politics, 
and society) one can say that it is challenging to gauge; but, economic flows, unlike other 
themes, can be recorded and quantified (Dunne, Kurki, and Smith, 2010, p. 289) to 
provide hard data to nations as to what direction they should take. Economists Hecklman 
and Young provides an in-depth statistical analysis on the social and economic 
dimensions of globalization, where they describe globalization as an “extension going 
beyond borders…” (Hecklman and Young, 2013, 2). The social dimension (which will 
not be further developed in this research) is comprised as personal contact, information 
flows, and cultural proximity (Hecklman and Young, 2013, p. 6). The economic 
dimension is comprised of two components actual trade flow and policy restrictions 
(Ibid.). The primary goal in their research was to determine whether globalization was 
indeed global. In gathering data from 129 countries, Hecklman and Young found that no 
matter what the economic status of a nation, whether it is a superpower or a third world 
country, globalization did exist; which further asserts that boundaries are indeed 
disappearing as societies economic needs shift. While globalization here is not applied to 
violent conflict on its face, this research is important in that it proves statistically that a de 
facto global economy exists, which means that if a country is lacking resources, they will 
find a way to fulfill that need – even if it is by violent means. 
In developing the notion of the role of a nation and economic globalization, 
Hashimov states that it is characterized by the application of economic policy tools to 
maintain growth. These policy tools are related to rate control, which we know as tariffs, 
quotas and subsidies (Hashimov, 2013, p. 6). For developing countries, however, where a 




a constant downturn, these policy tools may be acts of violence, which will be 
demonstrated later as particular countries are examined. 
In the 1950’s the “third world” referred to the nation-states who were reluctant to 
take sides in the Cold War. In the 1960’s, the term was cited as the European colonies in 
Asia and Africa. More notably at that time, third world countries were those regimes that 
formally allied with the USSR and had a political and economic path that was between 
liberal capitalism (“first world”) and state socialism (“second world”). Following the 
wars between Vietnam, Cambodia, and China in the late 1970’s, the term third world was 
used to represent the countries that struggled economically in a world-system that was 
continuously expanding (Berger, 1994, p. 261-263). 
Third world countries, or now more aptly known as developing nations, are the 
main construct of this study. With that being said, it is important to note that there have 
been several publications in the last decade by well-regarded economists, including 
Robert Zoellick (former President of the World Bank), who have made claims that third-
world countries are coming to an end. This is largely in part due to what he calls 
“sustainable globalization.”  
Globalization is largely driven by the free flows of goods and capitol, but if we 
pay close attention, we would notice that the consequences of the globalization are 
equivalent to those that would be attached to the free flow of labor (Daly, 2004, p. 41). 
What has been a common notion is that nations out-source for labor in order to obtain the 
best value (i.e., the cheapest wages); but what has actually been occurring in our current 




because even within borders companies have been managing to secure employees at a 
low cost. 
As per Zoellick (2010), globalization is not limited to the movement of 
populations to other countries for better opportunities. In fact, he claims that within the 
developing countries themselves there has been a shift in their economic growth 
internally, with an increase of nearly 10% in purchasing power lone in the last 30 years. 
While this number may appear to be small in the amongst the larger scales of the super 
powers (i.e., the United States, China, and Brazil); it is important to note that in the grand 
scheme of things that within that small percentage 60 million people were lifted out of 
poverty (www.worldbank.org, Zoellick, 2010). 
As it relates to this study, I will analyze and evaluate the reasons behind the 
economic growth of these developing countries. We must ask ourselves, how is it 
possible that millions of people on Africa who earn less than $2 a day can return that into 
their own country’s growth? The truth is, that they cannot, therefore, conflict occurs. 
Thus, globalization has been an accelerator of social change, and acts as a catalyst for 
conflict (Tidwell and Lerche, 2004, p. 47). 
Globalization and Banking with Developing Nations 
If a state is unable to make economic advancements independently, economic 
institutions are in place to alleviate debt and provide financial assistance as the institution 
see fit in accordance to the needs of the state. Three economic institutions in particular 
are well known in the context of economic globalization, these are the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 




and in return demand the nation to implement a structural adjustment program (Sterger, 
2009, p. 54). While the process is seemingly uncomplicated, the list of qualifiers in order 
to obtain the loan is extensive (Steger, 2009, p. 55), and it includes: 
1. A guarantee of fiscal discipline, and a curb to budget deficits 
2. A reduction of public expenditure, particularly in military and public 
administration 
3. Tax reform, aiming at the creation of a system with a broad base and effective 
enforcement 
4. Financial liberation, with interest rates determined by the market 
5. Competitive exchange rates, to assist export-led growth 
6. Trade liberation, coupled with the abolition of import licensing and a 
reduction on tariffs 
7. Promotion of foreign direct investment 
8. Privatization of state enterprise, leading to efficient management and 
improved performance 
9. Deregulation of the economy 
10. Protection of property rights 
Despite this, developing nations have been consistent in obtaining loans from the 
institutions, and yet often the political leaders do not follow through in complying. In 
fact, it has been recognized that large portions of the loans end up being pocketed by 
authoritarian political leaders or enriching local businesses that serve those political 




conflict because they do not have the enough wealth (liquid or otherwise) by which to 
support their citizens. 
Theories Related to Conflict 
Rational Choice Theory 
In his greed theory of conflict, Paul Collier writes that people will conduct civil 
war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of the rebellion (Denmers, 2017, 100).  
He further argues that wars are often not about winning but serve economic and political 
functions. As it relates to this study, Rational Choice and Greed Theory provide the 
framework by underlining that violent conflict is utilized as a tool by individuals or a 
group of individuals in order to highlight their economic injustice with the hope of 
establishing a form of equality and stability. Collier’s greed theory of conflict is now 
more commonly known as rational choice theory, where the premise is the same and the 
idea is that “people are rational agents, and have choice, [even] in settings of war.” Thus, 
violence is the product of a rational actor perceiving that the benefits of that violence 
outweigh its costs/consequences. 
There are two assumptions both theories share; the first is that the individual is the 
starting point for all social action and the second is that the individual’s objective is to 
achieve the maximum of their goals (otherwise the purpose of that violence is deemed 
irrational). Because this theory is largely based on the action of the individual Collier set 
out to study what people do and not what they say (Denmers, 2017, 102) – the “true 
cause…is not the loud discourse of the grievance, but the silent force of the greed.” 
Collier breaks down motivation of violent conflict into two categories; greed, where 




resources and grievance, where opposing parties set out to rid of each other or the unjust 
regime (Denmers, 2017, 102).  
The explanation that Collier provides as to why greed drives violent conflict is 
that individuals are utility maximizers and would be willing to put their lives on the line 
for a cause that is likely to benefit them (Denmers, 2017, 104). Consequently, Collier 
provides an economic perspective that violent conflict based on greed is like a market, 
whereas individuals make investment in violence and reap a return; and violent conflict 
based on grievance involves investments with no potential for returns.  Therefore, 
grievance-based conflict would not produce a ‘sufficient amount’ of violence (Denmers, 
2017, 105).  
In determining whether a violent conflict is driven by greed or grievance, Collier 
developed an empirical model quantifying such factors using proxies. Greed’s proxies are 
primary commodity exports in GDP, the proportion of young males within a total 
population, and the average years of education of a population (Denmers, 2017, 103). 
Grievance’s proxies are the extent to which a society is factionalized by ethnicity and 
religion, land ownership, levels of repression and autocracy, and variable growth rate in 
the five years prior to the outbreak of the violent conflict (Id.). While it is not of my 
opinion that grievances themselves are not sufficient to propel violent conflict, for the 
purposes of this study it is important to note that limited proxies from both categories will 
be examined in order to quantify the point in which a conflict becomes violent. These 
would include primary commodity exports in GDP, land ownership (as it related to 
economic inequality), and the variable growth rate (of which pre and post will be 




religion will briefly be discussed to debunk the myth that it is a primary driving force of 
violent conflict. 
Prospect Theory 
The prospect theory was developed by Kahneman and Tversky; it is a theoretical 
process that attempts to see what results will be based on what an individual has. The 
prospect theory analyzes how much we will gain or lose because of our decisions – it is 
decision making with a risk. Built on the concept with reference dependence, the ability 
make a decision that is contingent on reference, the prospect theory (a) emphasizes asset 
changes rather asset levels (posing the question of “if I get something then what will I 
lose?”), (b) analyzes asset changes pertaining to the gains and losses, and (c) considers 
reference points as the implications for our choices, as in our gains and losses reflect on 
some previous reference point. It is noted that specific behaviors pertain to decision 
making under risk, it is a form of behavioral theory that attempts to describe individuals’ 
behavior based on their decisions. As such, people respond differently to gains and 
losses, often overvaluing losses relative to comparable gains. For instance, if someone is 
offered a choice between a 75% chance of having $5,000 with a 25% chance of having 
nothing versus a 100% chance of having $3000 most people would choose the latter 
because there is a guarantee of no losses. More people are risk averse with respect to 
gains; this means that people will choose something with a guarantee as opposed to 
anything else. On the same token, if a person is offered the choice between a 100% 
chance of losing $3,000 or a 75% chance of losing $15,000, most people would choose 




would rather take a chance and not lose something as opposed to a guaranteed loss – even 
if that means that the risk would be greater. 
In light of these observations the prospect theory found that (1) people value 
things they have more than things that they do not, (2) it is more difficult to lose 
something than to gain something, this is known as the endowment effect – loss is a 
greater trauma than gain, (3) people are generally risk averse with respect to gains and 
risk seeking with respect to losses, (4) the change in choice is a consequence of a change 
in frame, in other words how our choices are framed will greatly influence our decision 
making – also known as the framing effect, (5) reference points are not always fixed and 
will be discussed with respect to X, and (6) reference point reorientation after gains occur 
faster than losses, it is often easier to “renormalize” or readjust after a gain than a loss.  
The prospect theory is comprised of two phases. The first is the editing phase, 
which is the assessment of options, outcomes, and valuations, all of which are compiled 
in the decision-making process. The second is the evaluation phase, which is a 
combination of value of possible outcomes with eight probabilities; this phase 
emphasizes guarantees (although there are thresholds) and places an emphasis on 
retention pertaining to losses. While the prospect theory is a useful tool in the analysis of 
our decision making with respect to gains and losses, there are also problems that come 
with its application, including (1) the prospect theory only applies to individuals and 
international relations is concerned with nation states (not individuals), 2) it is difficult 
for nations to adapt to economic deficiencies, which means that national renormalization 
would be the state adjusting to surplus, making it difficult to explain national 




assessment, there is a distinction in the logic of risk assessment between an individual 
and a group. 
Because of these difficulties with the prospect theory, there are numerous state 
implications that follow. The first is that the state will always attempt to preserve the 
status quo, in other words they will always try to preserve what the current government 
norm is. The second is that in the application of prospect theory, territorial defense 
receives greater weight than territorial acquisition or encroachment, which makes it 
difficult to assess which party is the risk seeker. The third implication is that states 
maximize their security by aiming to preserve the status quo in the international system; 
this is also known as defensive realism. The fourth is that political candidates are more 
concerned with the avoidance of alienating key constituents rather than strengthening the 
support among those groups. 
The idea of maintaining and preserving political relationships that already exists 
is something that politicians should stay away from because “democrats will vote for 
democrats” anyway. The fifth state implication is that framing of the issue is essential in 
attaining public support, as framing issues is directly correlated to the public interest. The 
sixth and seventh note that frames above the status quo define the status quo as a loss (for 
example, the national education expenditure) and frames below the status quo define the 
status quo as a gain (for instance, pre-social security America), respectively. The eighth 
implication asserts that the decline in relative power is typically framed as a loss with a 
reference point in the past as goal from power. This means that incremental increases in 
power are avoided for a return to the original reference point, going back to the instant 




and the final implication is that in dyadic bargaining, concession aversion leads to a 
greater tendency on both sides to risk the consequences of a non-agreement or deadlock, 
and hence a lower probability of a negotiated agreement. 
Parable of the Tribes 
The Parable of the Tribes (“parable”) notes that if we have different ethnic groups 
living in close proximity and one becomes an aggressor, then the use of force transforms 
the state of affairs of the relationships between all of the ethnic groups in that proximity, 
causing them all to become aggressive. The parable demonstrates this: ethnicities A-D 
live in proximity, if D goes into war with C, then C has two options, to refuse to right or 
to fight back. If C refuses to fight, then one of four things could happen, (1) they can 
withdraw from the region, or be cleansed from the land, (2) they can allow themselves to 
be destroyed or if C is pacifist then it would be genocide, (3) they become tributary, in 
other words, permit to remain but become members of D, or (4) they can completely 
assimilate, which often times is done by mass rape by the opposing group. In refusing to 
fight, C in one form or another will lose its identity as C and disappear, or become D. If C 
decides to fight back, because the possibility of winning does exist, then the conflict 
becomes the ambition to preserve identity. Because of this notion, the parable concludes 
that identity preservation requires conflict. 
One of the worst ethnic related conflicts on the 20th century is that of the genocide 
in Rwanda, where nearly 500,000 Tutsi were killed (Parsons and Totten, 2009, p. 483). 
The Hutu and Tutsi shared the same language and culture, the same clan names, the same 
customs, and symbols of kinship served as a unifying bond between them (Parsons and 




people to believe otherwise. The truth is that ethnic conflict began for the Hutus and Tutsi 
decades before, when Belgian politics shifted within Rwanda, provoking Tutsi who had 
maintained higher authority to press their claim. In response, the Hutu-led, Belgian 
assistance coup forced into exile nearly a quarter million Tutsi into surrounding countries 
(Parsons and Totten, 2009, p. 485). The ethnic conflict here was manifested by a third 
party who saw an economic opportunity in mineral resources and created a system of 
apartheid where Hutus came to accept the physical dissimilarities and started to view the 
Tutsis as foreign immigrants (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 50). 
People with the same identity share common alliances and common enemies 
(Ross, 2001, 160), however, when ethnicity and identity are linked with social 
uncertainty, it can escalate conflict to levels of violent actions (Brown, 2001, 128). It has 
been proposed that in collectivist cultures, terrorism is more likely to be carried out 
because the only morality that they have is the one for their “in-group,” their identity 
(Victoroff, 2005, 21). Usually preservation of identity is linked to the collective fear of 
losing the ability to protect one’s own group, and often the weaknesses of other groups 
are sought after in order to maintain preservation. Thus, in order preserve their identity 
the factors that embody identity are those often placed in the frontlines of justification for 
igniting and escalating conflict. Some of these factors include emotions, attitudes and 
perceptions (of one another), and dehumanization and deindividuation.  
Emotions have a powerful effect on human behavior; one of the emotions that are 
commonly identified in conflict related to identity is that of image threat. A threat to a 
party’s image is a great source of escalation, as having power, resources, and status are 




collective will feel the need to defend itself by developing an image that sends out a 
message of being ready to fight (Pruitt and Kim, 2004, 104).  The attitudes and 
perceptions of each group is also an identity factor that can lead to the escalation of 
conflict. Attitudes and perceptions can often take form of stereotypes (Pruitt and Kim, 
2004 107), and once in a state of conflict there is no gray area to negotiate.  Negative 
attitudes will invoke negative ones, and positive attitudes will invoke positive ones. 
Looking at conflict de-escalation through the lens of the parable, one can assume 
that ethnicities in proximity have at least one overlapping common bond. This bond can 
be political, social, economic, or religious. Once a common bond is formed, then the 
groups can further de-escalate their conflict by learning more about the other and learning 
to accept each other’s limitations through compromise and negotiations.  
For instance, let us assume that ethnicities A-D are land locked communities, in 
proximity, in an arid region of Africa and water resources are often scarce. Commonly, 
each of the ethnicities would get in conflict with each other so that the winner takes the 
water from the loser. The better solution to this dilemma is to acknowledge the fact that 
they all need water to survive (the common bond), and instead of wasting time and other 
resources on war, they should work together on building a plan where they could each 
have water in equally distributed amounts. Now, this example of course is not pragmatic, 
but it scratches the surface on what could erupt to be a very complicated conflict. 
Drivers Behind the Cause of Ethnic Conflict 
There is a myriad of theories that have specific premises that lead to a certain 
number of conclusions or consequences that can explain conflict, including ethnic 




acknowledged. These include insecurity, greed, social-psychological motivations, and the 
dynamics of the international dimension. Generally, it has been posed that insecurity is 
heightened when segments of an ethnic group are geographically isolated or vulnerable to 
small bands of armed forces that are willing to commit acts of violence at a moment 
notice (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 26). These small bands are usually formed in 
response to fear, so that an ethnic group is ready to act. To dig deeper, this fear is 
produced by government breakdown, geographic isolation or vulnerability, changing 
balances of political or demographic power, redistribution of resources, and forced or 
voluntary arming (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 27). There are three dilemmas that arise on 
the basis of these fears; the first is that of information failure (the opposing parties are 
either lacking or misinformed, thus, causing unnecessary conflict); the second are 
problems of credibility as it relates to commitment (one party is not reassured by the 
other that they will not defect from the accorded agreement); and the third is that of pre-
emptive use of force, which is essentially derived from the former dilemmas (Cordell and 
Wolff, 2010, p. 28). 
Greed explains that ethnic conflict is more economically motivated than 
traditionally believed. The primary argument here is that conflict occurs of the economic 
incentive is sufficiently great in relation to the costs (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 32). 
The findings behind this argument is that violent conflict is largely: 
• A phenomenon of low-income countries (where military labor costs are low), 
• Where the presence of natural resources is a lootable commodity of which is 




• Said countries have higher populations (which often are those that are low-
income) have a higher risk of violent conflict,  
• And a high degree of ethnic division exists (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 33). 
With social-psychological motivations, the conflict is perceived by the individual 
who places themselves in that conflict. Here, the basic assumption is that people strive for 
a positive social identity. Social identity is derived from membership in groups; therefore, 
a positive social identity would be one where the membership enhances an individual’s 
self-esteem and develop loyalty for that group. This, in turn, develops a strong “band of 
brothers” should a violent conflict erupt. 
The dynamics of the international dimension essentially explains that ethnic 
conflict isn’t confined to the limits of the opposing ethnicities (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, 
p. 41). Rather, outside minorities, surrounding states, and in some cases international 
organizations may see it as appropriate to become involved in order to prevent or deter 
serious violent conflict or a degree of economic sabotage that would be detrimental to 
that nation and nations that are involved in importing or exporting good to them.  
On Globalization and Culture, as it Relates to Identity 
Cultural globalization refers to the expansion of cultural flows across the globe; 
concerned with the symbolic construction, articulation, and dissemination (Steger, 2009, 
p. 71). Individualism, consumerism, and religious discourse now circulate more freely 
and widely thanks to easier access to technologies such as the Internet that facilitate 
world-wide communication. There are two ends to cultural globalization spectrum as it 
relates to conflict. On one end, there are the theorists that believe that cultural 




religion, ethnicity, tradition, etc. Some proponents advocate that this is a good thing, 
because finding “sameness” amongst each other will allow conflict to subside. Others say 
that having “sameness” will strip us from our heritage and mean that we will have no 
identity at all. On the other end of the spectrum there are theorists that believe cultural 
globalization is forming a unified front because it allows us to learn about the differences 
that exists in the world; therefore we will be more educated on all the elements of 
different cultures, which would subside conflict because we know the rationale behind 
why cultures act as they do. I believe that whether cultural globalization is depicted as a 
positive or negative notion, it is something that is undoubtedly here to stay, and it is 
important to accept the fact that our modern world is becoming more and more 
intermingled as technologies become more advanced. 
Current Conflict Regulation Tactics 
Conflict regulation today is comprised by three elements: prevention, 
management, and settlement (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 79). Conflict prevention refers 
to “a set of policies adopted at an early stage in a conflict, before violent escalation or 
after a ceasefire has been negotiated to prevent the resumption of violence” (Cordell and 
Wolff, 2010, p. 79).  Generally, this would take place in either the emergence phase of a 
conflict or de-escalation/termination phases of a conflict. The primary aims for conflict 
prevention is provide incentives for peaceful means of negotiations; for instance, making 
the costs of violent conflict high so that the opposing parties are not inclined to engage in 
violent conflict. Conflict management is “the attempt to contain, limit, or direct the 
effects of an ongoing…conflict” (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 79). Conflict management 




willing to do so, in order to minimize the costs of both lives and resources lost during a 
conflict. Finally, conflict settlement aims at “establishing an institutional framework in 
which the opposing parties…can be accommodated to such an extent that incentives for 
cooperation and the non-violent pursuit of conflicts of interest through compromise 
outweigh any benefits that might be expected from violent conflict” (Cordell and Wolff, 
2010, p. 79). Conflict settlement takes place in the post-termination phase of conflict 
(should both parties continue to exist after a violent conflict).  Because of the elements of 
conflict regulation is that of settlement, as research scientists we would need to 
determine: (a) the concerns and demands of the conflict parties; (b) the relevant actors at 
the local, state, regional, and global levels; and (c) the factors that shape their opportunity 
structure and motivations (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 81). 
The condition for violent conflict often deals primarily is preservation (of the self, 
resources, or surroundings). This means that individuals and groups alike will have 
concerns that deal with the conditions that they are living in and normally fall into the 
categories of security political participation, cultural identity, and economic opportunities 
(Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 81).  When presenting claims that fall under these categories 
concerns and demands can look like the need for more liberal political rights (i.e., the 
inclusion of women of people of color to vote), or the need for more territory to reap the 
benefits of natural resources (i.e., land for agriculture, so that the farmer will not only be 
able to feed his or her family by what they produce but also by what they sell). 
Once these claims are properly recognized, the relevant actors must be established 
in order to address the claims and avoid conflict (or prevent violent conflict). For 




relevant parties can either be in a state or regional level, or a combination of the two – 
depending on what the rights call for. In the case of accessing more land for agriculture, 
the potential relevant parties could be at a local level (land from another individual) at a 
state level (land within the nation) or a global level (land from a neighboring nation that 
is necessary to acquire in order to fulfill the needs of the individual(s)). 
When the relevant parties are clearly identified, then (and only then) can the 
parties begin to set structures that will motivate everyone involved equally so that 
conflict is evaded. Again, taking the example of political rights; if what the people are 
asking for is the right to vote by women or another minority, then a potential politician 
coming into office can make those changes so that in their next term they are guaranteed 
those votes by the minorities and, therefore, secure a second term in office. In the case of 
acquiring land for the ability to produce goods for self-use or sale, a city (county, state, 
nation) can potentially provide this land to an individual at a low-cost and then collect 
taxes on everything they produce and then an additional tax when items are sold (much 
like a state and federal tax). This way the individual can provide the basic necessities for 
their family and the government is reaping the benefits financially. 
Having the elements of settlement determined, the settlement itself follows a 
process, which is the negotiation of the terms, the implementation of that settlement, 
followed by the actual operations (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p. 89). The negotiation of the 
settlement is often interlaced with the identification of the elements, which depending on 
the number of factors involved can be a short or lengthy process. The idea behind the 
negotiation is to attempt to put into writing terms that all relevant parties are partial to in 




implementation phase begins. Implementation is the process of putting those terms into 
place, which often runs parallel with operation. At times, this could mean that the 
implementation process is not fully complete because the terms are being placed in a 
more “trial and error” situation where the relevant parties would have to go back and re-
negotiate terms that are not necessarily working for either of them.  In doing so, the 
agreement can be designed in several phases or packages until the implementation period 
is complete and the phase of operations is one of stability and predictability. 
It is important realm of conflict (violent or otherwise) and conflict regulation is 
not confined to the finite processes that have been delineated in this chapter. Perspectives 
behind what constitute violent conflict and political regulations are constantly changing 
based on the needs of the individual. What can be deduced is that no matter the 
circumstances, individuals will be involved in violent conflict if they are driven to do so; 
and the following chapter will provide the methods in which this study will be done so 







Current theories and studies have been limited in the realm of globalization as it 
relates to violent conflict, and in turn its effects on mass migrations. These studies have 
examined only the nexus between violent conflict and voluntary movements from one 
country to the next or the economic pull factors of migration (with the exclusion of the 
push factors). Here, I will provide an empirical analysis to bridge the gap and 
demonstrate the relationship of economics and mass migrations while simultaneously 
formulating a tool would serve as indicator of when violent conflict will erupt on a large 
scale. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the research design 
and explain the rationale behind the methodologies that will be utilized. 
Quantitative Research: An Overview 
Quantitative research is the attempt to summarize data and describe relationships 
using numbers (Crammer and Howitt, 2004, p. 134). Quantitative inquiry requires 
evidence that is observable and testable, where researches must give explanations for 
their conclusions (Balnaves and Caputi, 2001, p. 31). Quantitative methods are focused 
on highly specific problems and the ways to deal with them (Vogt, 2011, p. 5).  
Quantitative research and its designs are more commonly known by the methods 
used in which data is extracted and then manipulated by formulations in such a way that 
the data is no longer actually what it once was. In fact, often, it is a practice where words 
are turned into numbers so that it can be utilized as hard data to prove or disprove 




be comprised of what is known as archival research, which will be further explained in 
the methodologies section of chapter.  
Research Design 
The central research question that this study aims to answer is, what is the 
relationship between migration, globalization (as an economic theory), and violent 
conflict? Recent empirical studies have demonstrated that poor economic infrastructure is 
associated with higher incidence of violent conflict (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 32); 
but what does that mean for the national that have an established economic 
infrastructure?  Why has violent conflict occurred there? In attempt to answer these 
questions, this study will follow the structure of two research designs. The first is that of 
causal research design, where the phenomenon will be understood in terms of conditional 
statements that take the form of “if X, then Y.” The second is that of case study research 
design, where an in-depth study takes place and is then used to narrow down a broad field 
of research. The idea of using a combination of the two designs is two make broad 
numerical assumptions while still having the ability to apply it to a specific number of 
countries that can serve as representatives for a more global perspective. The overarching 
hypothesis that will be examined in this research is: if there is a causal link between 
economics and violent conflict, then we can make assessments on the emigration and 
immigration of international populations. More specifically, if violent conflict is 
economically driven, then we can conclude that mass migration is inevitable. 
Causal Design 
A casual law is a statement that a change in the value of one variable is sufficient 




universal causation, where a cause is said to be the cause of another (Mill, 1875, p. 375). 
Thus, “between phenomena…there is an invariable order of succession where the 
invariable antecedent is termed the cause and the invariable consequent is termed the 
effect…” (Mill, 1875, p. 377). In this first systematic analysis of a causal relationship, 
Mill further argues that three fundamental conditions must be meet; the first is that the 
cause must precede the effect, the second is that the cause must be statistically associated 
with the effect, and the third is that there has to be no other plausible alternative 
explanation for the effect other than the cause (Rutter, 2007, p. 3). 
Causal research designs assist researches in understanding why the world operates 
in the manner that it does through the process of proving a causal link between variables 
and through the process of eliminating other possibilities. In order to identify the causal 
link, there must be an empirical association (a valid conclusion based on the association 
between the independent and dependent variables), and appropriate time order to 
conclude that causation was involved, and a demonstration that the relationship between 
the two variables was not caused by a variation in a third variable that is not within the 
study (www.usc.edu, June 2016). 
As mentioned in Chapter One, when man is suffering economically, there will be 
a point in which man will find a solution in order to overcome their economic dilemma. 
Thus, the causal relationship in this study posits is that poor economic infrastructure will 
lead to conflict. This relationship is depicted in a study on the economic crisis, violent 
conflict, and human development.  Where as far as drivers of conflict are concerned, “one 
of the most robust findings in literature is that many economic conditions (low income, 




conflict…” (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). Considering this causal relationship, a 
self-reinforcing cycle from conflict to low human development illustrates that conflict 
destroys physical and human capital, forcing replacement of labor, and deteriorating 
institutional capacity. 
 
Figure 1. Conflict – Low Human Development Cycle (Kim and Conciecao, 2010, p. 32) 
In exploring the theory behind the outbreak of conflict, there are several models 
that have been studied; and, a distinct model that is consistent with the nexus of human 
development and conflict is that of the contest model. The contest model provides 
framework where two competing parties allocate resources to be produced and 
appropriated, predicting that if human development is low, the resources will not be 
allocated efficiently, which in turn could potentially be exploited by skillful revolutionary 
leaders, only to increase the incentive to organize and rebel or create conflict, (Kim and 




This research will further assert should violent conflict erupt, then populations 
will begin to migrate (as depicted in the chart above) to places that are safe for 
themselves and for their families – asserting that poor economic infrastructure is also a 
driver for movements of large populations. 
Limitations 
Indeed, causal effect occurs when variation in one phenomenon, an independent 
variable, leads or results to variation in another phenomenon, the dependent variable. 
This is essentially the relationship between cause and effect, whereas as X caused Y. One 
of the most provoking assertions in causal relationships is the idea that they can be used 
for change, where the manipulation of the cause will inevitably result in the manipulation 
of the effect (Reiss, 2009). The problem here is that not all causal relationships are 
permeable to manipulation where the effect will change in that manner. Furthermore, 
with causal research design it is assumed that the causal links are automatic (i.e., because 
X will always affect Y in manner Z).  This is not the case; Reiss writes of three instances 
that are not automatic: 
1. Knowing that X makes a difference to Y, does not automatically allow the 
inference that there is a continuous process between X and Y. Here, Reiss 
discusses that while X and Y have a possible causal relationship, the omission 
of X will negate that automatic relationship (Reiss, 2009).  
2. Knowing that X and Y are connected by some causal process does not 
automatically allow the inference that X raises the probability of Y. This 
instance lends itself to statistical data as it relates to cost benefit ratios. Reiss 




provide for, thus a decline in wealth.  However, it does not consider the 
contribution that those additional household members can potentially make to 
increase wealth (Reiss, 2009).  
3. Knowing that X raises the probability of Y does not automatically allow the 
inference that we control Y via X. This inference is the most controversial as 
it relates to this study; as the primary function for this study is to bridge the 
gap in the relationship between globalization and violent conflict, to then 
make a measurable tool to prevent and deter violent conflict through the 
knowledge that a state’s economic welfare is a primary driver of that violent 
conflict. 
Case Study Design 
In approaching case study research, there is no one ideal methodology; it all 
comes down to the questions the researcher is seeking to answer. Case studies are an in-
depth analysis of one or multiple cases that are often used for teaching to further explore 
topics. Due to the uncertain nature of case study research, the researcher must justify their 
work, and then that could be used to generate new theories. Case studies can be used as a 
method to examine contemporary real-life situations and provide the basis for the 
application of theories and ideas. It also allows an empirical inquiry to investigate a 
complex phenomenon where the parameters are not clear (Yin, 1984). To date, much of 
the studies that have been conducted are qualitative and have been related to the political 
aims that violent conflict stems from. In utilizing case studies, we will examine the 
effects of violent conflict of Rwanda, Colombia, [former] Yugoslavia, and Cambodia 




politically fueled will be debunked. In addition, it will allow for exploring new territories 
of conflict prevention.  
There are six types of case studies. The first is known as single exploratory, a 
single case study aimed at defining questions and hypothesis of a subsequent study. The 
second is single descriptive, a single case study presenting a complete description of a 
phenomenon within its context. The third is single explanatory, a single case study that is 
used to present data on cause and effect relationships (explained which cause produced 
which effect). The fourth, fifth, and sixth types of case studies are the same as the first 
three (respectively) only using multiple case studies as the foundation for the research. 
Each of these case studies can be further classified as particularistic, naturalistic, 
thick descriptive data, inductive and heuristic. This case study in this research is 
inductive, where “generalizations, concepts, or hypotheses emerge from the examination 
of data grounded on the context itself” (Willis, 2007, p. 239). Furthermore, due to the 
nature of the data the variation of this case study design is considered to be interpretive, 
where the data will be used to develop conceptual theories (Ibid, p. 243) and provide an 
understanding as it relates to economics, violent conflict and its relationship to mass 
migration.  
A case study research design excels in bringing and understanding of complex 
issues through the analysis is limited events or conditions and their relationships. 
However, utilizing a small number of cases offers little basis for establishing the 
generalization of wider theories. What is more interesting about this research design is 
that it does not facilitate the assessment of cause and effect relationships (www.usc.edu, 




limitation found in case study design research is that the use of unique criteria to decipher 
a study will more than likely be applicable only to that particular case (www.usc.edu, 
June 2016), which can depict the research to be an invalid contribution to that field. 
Correlational Research 
A correlational study is a method in which there are two or more variables within 
a group and the researcher is attempting to determine whether those independent 
variables have a direct relationship (correlation) with the dependent variable. In this study 
the dependent variable is violent conflict and independent variable is economics.  
Correlations can be either positive or negative; whereas if X increases, then Y 
increases, or if X increases than Y decreases, respectively. The degree of correlation is 
calculated by obtaining what is known as a correlation coefficient, known as the Pearson 
Correlation Coefficient, and would be found in the range between -1 and 1, where 1 
would be the perfect positive correlation (which rarely occurs). While correlation does 
not necessarily prove causal relationship, in this study it will be utilized as a tool for 
prediction to support the hypothesis that globalization is a primary driver of violent 
conflict, thus opening the doors for mass migration. 
Variables and Target Populations 
A variable is a concept, which can have two or more values, and is defined in a 
way that one can tell what those values are. The simplest kind of variable is one that has 
two values, which is often represented by a one or zero. The most complex of variables 
are continuous, and those must be consistently observed so that it is connected to a single 
value. In using quantitative methods, a nation-states economic stability in relation to 




predictions to deter or prevent devastating consequences for the future. While there are 
not target populations per say, there are several countries that will be analyzed, and they 
include Rwanda, Colombia, Nazi Germany, Cambodia, and [former] Yugoslavia. These 
countries were selected because not only are they geographically located in different 
hemispheres of the world, but they are also representative of different governing bodies 
that have ultimately led their own nations to catastrophic events.  
As it relates to economics the independent variables that will be analyzed includes 
GDP, of which will be examined pre and post conflict. This will be examined to explain 
the relationship with the dependent variable of violent conflict; length of time (of 
conflict) and the death toll (if any) will be factored in (see Figure 1). As it relates to the 
populations that have migrated, both economic infrastructure and violent conflict serve as 
the independent variables, whereas the number of individuals that have relocated will be 
considered the dependent variable (see Figure 2). For this study, it would be important to 
include what the socio-economic status was pre-conflict for those populations that have 
migrated to determine whether that could have been a push factor. 
 











DV1: Violent Conflict 
IV2: Housing  
IV3: Education 





The data that will be gathered throughout this research will largely be sourced 
from publications of government entities, such as the US Department of State. These 
publications will represent the best sources of data because they have previously 
demonstrated their integrity, as a nation’s administration is highly dependent on the 
published data. For instance, an International Narcotics Control Strategy Report is 
published annually by the Department of State covering drugs and chemical control 
activities, money laundering, and financial crimes. Reports such as these are useful in the 
case of Colombia (which will be analyzed in Chapter Six). 
 
Figure 3. Variables 
Data Operation and Analysis Plan 
Multiple Linear Regression 
The statistical test that will be used in this study will be multiple linear regression. 
Multiple linear regression is often used in studies to make predictions that are based on 
causal design. It is a statistical method used for studying the relationship between one 
dependent variable and multiple independent variables. Within this study, there will be 
two linear regressions: the first to illustrate the relationship between globalization and 
migration, the second to illustrate the relationship between violent conflict and mass 
migration. To date, there have not been any published studies that quantify the 
relationship between violent conflict and mass migration; however there have been 




and publications that have quantified mass migration movements based on factors other 
than violent conflict. 
In 2010, a multiple linear regression study was published on the economic crisis 
and violent conflict, with the framework that low human development leads to conflict, 
which in turn destroys that nation’s economic system (Kim and Conceicao, 2010). The 
study showed a positive correlation, whereas the higher the political stability, the higher 
the human development index became (as obtained from the World Bank in 2008).  
 
Figure 4. Migration 
From 2005 to 2012 a migration study was developed to highlight the motivation 
behind migration in the European Union, in particular movements from East to West. In 
this study, the independent variables included GDP, unemployment, minimum wages, 
and childbirth (Molnar, 2013) and the dependent variable was net migration. After 
calculating the standard deviations within each of the independent variables, the study 




and emigration) was unemployment (Molnar, 2013).  This was largely seen in the 
countries that are considered to be under in Europe. The table below (as extracted from 
the study) demonstrates a net migration forecast in the thousands in 2010, 2011, and 2012 










Austria 21.9 33.3 -18.7 
Belgium  -2.7 72.6 
Denmark 10.8 11.8 -75.3 
Finland 13.7 9.8 63.6 
France 72 70.5 57.8 
Germany 152.6 150.4 80.5 
Greece -0.9 2.3 -34.8 
 
Based on those previous studies, below is a brief overview that would depict the 
relationship between GDP and mass migration during the time period in which conflict 
erupted in the selected sample. 


























World          
Africa          
Eastern Africa          
Rwanda     20 -    20 -    20 -    50     30 
-   
1348    1210 -    73 -    75 
Asia          
South-Eastern 
Asia          
         Cambodia 
-    
225 
-    
125 -    85 -    89 -    78     409     348 -    35 
-    
296 
Europe          
Southern 
Europe          
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
-    
100 -    75 -    75 -    30 -    56 
-    
748 
-    
160     35     4 
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean          
South America          
Colombia 
-    
281 
-    
290 
-    
287 
-    
274 
-    
254 
-    
224 
-    
190 
-    
159 











Sample Country X (mass migration) Y (GDP Index) 
Colombia (1975-1980) 287 2 
Rwanda (1990-1995) 1348 -42 
Cambodia (1965-1970) 225 5 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient Formula 
 
Table 4 
Correlation Coefficient Data 
X Y XY X^2 Y^2 
287 2 574 82,369 4 
1,348 -42 -56,616 1,800,000 1,764 
225 5 1,125 50,625 25 
 
r = [3(-54917)-(1860)(49)]/sqrt[3(2,560,000,000)-(1860)^2][3(3,200,000)-(-35)^2] 
  = [-164,751-91,140]/sqrt[(7,680,000,000-3,500,000)(9,600,000-1,225) 
  = -0.94 
This coefficient indicates a near perfect negative relationship where was the higher GDP 






Figure 6. Linear Regression 
y =  + x 
where: 
 is the y-intercept 




The slope for this sample is -0.033, which means that the deviation between the 
relationship of GDP and mass migration is nearly null. 
Threats to Validity 
The primary threat to the validity to this study is that there are no current studies 
that can be used as primary sources to cross check the statistical analysis. This means that 
this study is largely based on historical figures that will be manipulated to project 






















measures of association between variables, which can trace causal relationships but 
cannot assert them (Healy, 2012, p. 308). However, “measures of association…are 
amongst the most important and powerful tools for documenting, measuring, and 
analyzing cause and effect relationships (Healy, 2012, p. 30). 
Ethical Procedures 
“Social research is a dynamic process that often involves an intrusion into 
people’s lives...central to this is ethical responsibility…[whereas] a mutually respectful 
relationship is established, valid results are obtained, and the community considers the 
conclusions constructive” (Miller and Brewer, 2003, p. 96).  This is especially important 
when social research is being conducted with live subjects (i.e., people) and requires 
researchers to extract data or information from people via interviews or surveys. 
However, for the purposes of this study, the data that will be utilized is largely 
archival; this means that data will be extracted from public records and scholarly articles 
that provide the economic state of countries that have been inflicted with violent conflict. 
This means the ethical rules that would normally be applied when dealing with live 
subjects will not necessarily be effective here. Yet, it does not mean that ethical 
implications are negated. This is because ethics within social research does not rest on the 
relationship between the researcher and participant alone (Miller and Brewer, 2003, p. 
99). For studies such as these there is an ethical responsibility upon the researcher to their 
academic community. Ethical violations in that respect involve the following: (a) 
falsification of results, including the inappropriate analysis and reportage of findings, (b) 




as their own, and (d) criticizing other research studies on the basis of personal bias 
(Miller and Brewer, 2003, p. 100); all of which will be avoided. 
Methods Summary 
As this chapter comes to a close, it is important to consider that there are a myriad 
of research methods that can be implemented for the analysis of this data, but only a 
select few have been chosen to accurately highlight the relationship between variables 
and confirm the underlying causal relationship. Doing so will provide findings to 
establish a reliable tool that can be utilized in the realm of international relations to 
prevent or deter violent conflict, or at the very least start a conversation that will motivate 







In this chapter I will provide the overarching background on the countries that lay 
the groundwork for this research. I will examine Rwanda, Colombia, [former] 
Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and [former Nazi] Germany as they were in there most turbulent 
eras. In doing so, we will be able to put the theory of quantitative measures into practice. 
For each case study, I provide a brief introduction, the historical context and background, 
an abbreviated synopsis on the violent conflict that shifted the country’s future along with 
notable current affairs and highlight the underlying economic lens. With each data set, 
the variables that will be examined are structural balance (which serves as the index to 
quantify the impact of violent conflict), purchasing power (which serves as the index to 
quantify the economic state for each case study), and a nation’s population in a specific 
year (which demonstrates the influx or efflux compared to other years). As the chapter 
ends, each case study will conclude with the data operation at work, with statistical tables 
and charts demonstrate the accuracy of my overall hypothesis: if economics is the driver 
to violent conflict, then mass migration is inevitable. 
Rwanda 
Rwanda is a small landlocked country in Eastern Africa, bordered by the 
Democratic of Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, and Burundi (www.worldbank.org, 2016). 
Traditionally, Rwandan society was comprised of three ethnic groups, Twa, and more 
notably Hutu and Tutsi (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 9). All three groups shared the same 




which juxtaposes the subsequent documentation of the country’s ethnic polarization 
(Kimonyo, 2015, p. 9). 
Historical Context and Background 
The first inhabitants of Rwanda are said to be the Twa, hunters and gatherers, who 
were followed by the Hutu and then the Tutsi (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 10). In the 17th century 
Rwanda was divided and ruled by kings, and from then on, the monarchy was given its 
essential government institutions (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 13). The centuries that followed 
were ruled by Tutsi kings with varying clans living in harmony until the 1900’s, when it 
was colonized by Germany (www.gov.rw, 2016).  
The first elected president of Rwanda, President Gregoire Kayibanda came into 
power in 1924, replacing the Tutsi monarchies and asserting a Hutu majority 
(www.gov.rw, 2016). It has been said that the Hutus had long been resentful of Tutsi 
power and were encouraged by the Belgians (who ruled the territory) to campaign against 
the Tutsi and emancipate their freedom. The three decades that followed caused 
thousands of deaths and led to the creation of militarized political parties who desired 
immediate independence.  Although on its face, it was an independence of the two tribal 
nations, the reality that had it not been for the German infiltration and their influences it 
would have been moot. 
Known as the Hutu Emancipation Movement that began in 1959, is the violent 
uprising that led to the fall of the Tutsi monarchy (www.un.org, 2016), and where the 
cycle of ethnic conflict that would swallow an entire nation began. In a matter of months, 
there were hundreds of deaths and refugees in the tens of thousands, with several hundred 




leaders presented the UN with a report that would dissolve the monarchy and give 
Rwanda independence. Independence did indeed follow, but with constraints. 
Upon gaining independence, the UN instituted that as a part of the agreement the 
UNAR (Rwandese National Union), led by the Tutsi, would have two ministerial posts, 
two posts of secretary of state, two prefect (chief officer) and two sub-prefect posts, and 
one post in the Refugee Commission (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 33). Waves of violence 
followed and nearly 300,000 refugees were registered with the UNHCR by 1964. 
Between 1963 and 1966 about twelve rebel attacks took place, marking the beginning of 
genocidal massacres in Rwanda (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 34). President Kayibanda took 
advantage of this, as the ideal moment to promote is anti-Tutsi ideology; up until then the 
racist anti-Tutsi propaganda was primarily the work of party officials, but soon spread to 
state institutions and schools (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 35-36). It was at this time that Hutu 
political affiliations usurped any Tutsi political parties and abolished any political 
influence that remained in place. After the Tutsi’s were forced to exile, President 
Kayibanda realized that his plan went beyond ethnic conflict and seeped over into an 
open and brutal regional conflict. Unable to restore peace, President Kayibanda’s 
administration was overthrown in July of 1973. 
Major-General Habyarimana led the Rwandan National Guard in a coup in 
response to the hatred, injustice, and regionalism that President Kayibanda had instilled 
in the previous 50 years (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 45). That October, the first circulator was 
sent out, regulating the return for refugees and the repossession of their property 
(Kimonyo, 2015, p. 47), any property that went unclaimed by 1975 was to be considered 




property was left to be redistributed). It was clear from here that the largest battle that the 
Rwandan had to climb post-civil war was the refugee crisis.  
In 1976, President Habyarimana’s sent out a directive that asked for “systemic but 
discreet census of refugees living in neighboring countries…the return of refugees must 
be strictly controlled and only encouraged when those applying to return are useful to the 
country…embark in a…campaign to persuade Rwandan nationals to remain in their host 
country…[and] those without steady employment, and undesirable elements should be 
prevented from entering the country…” (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 51). In short, the policy read 
that the only refugees allowed to return were those elites who had only recently left and 
were seen as harmless to the new political regime.  
After having made this position public, President Habyarimana went on to justify 
the achievements of the revolution in 1959 and followed by putting in place an ethnic and 
regional quota system for access to education and employment as part of his policy of 
“ethnic balance” (Kimyono, 2015, p. 55). During attempting to enforce these rigid ethnic 
quotas, it had become apparent that identifying people was not as easy feat. This was 
mainly for two reasons: the first was that indications of the ethnicity of individuals in 
government positions would have proven problematic for other family members and 
secondly, there was an influx of Tutsis that falsified documents their documents to pass 
as Hutus (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 56). Considering this, falsifying identification became crime 
in the Rwandan penal code punishable by one to five years in prison and/or a fine of 
50,000 francs.  
In 1978, the people of Rwanda officially elected President Habyarimana into 




himself into every aspect of the citizens’ lives, creating a regime of totalitarianism. Every 
year he crafted a theme for his national campaign, in which everyone had to participate; 
this created a blanket for the economic and social crisis that did not trail far behind 
(Kimonyo, 2015, p. 64).  Towards the end of the 1980’s, given the rapid deterioration of 
the nation’s socio-economic status, the defiance of authority was inevitable (Kimonyo, 
2015, p. 70). By 1990, Rwanda was only doing slightly better than the “worse off” states 
in Africa (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 67) socio-economically, and would soon take a turn for the 
worse only four years later. 
In October of 1990, The Rwandan Patriotic Front, comprised of Rwandan 
refugees living in Uganda and neighboring countries infiltrated Rwanda demanding the 
rule of law, the abolition of discrimination policies, and the right of return for refugees 
(Kimonyo, 2015, p. 80). Authorities responded to this with massacre and the 
imprisonment of those affiliated with the enemy. The following year President 
Habyarimana publicized the new constitution and had a new action plan, which included: 
“negotiate peace with the opposition party, enhance efficiency and neutrality, revive the 
economy, organize the opportunity for a national conference, resolve the refugee 
problem, and organize general elections” (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 82). From then until his 
assassination in 1994, President Habyarimana would be faced with protest after protest 
comprised of thousands of people and the continuation of killing citizens in mass 
numbers.  
Organizers of the genocide used racist ideology to bring the Hutu to fear and hate 




killing that comprised the genocide. Among the false ideals promulgated by the regime 
included (www.hrw.org, 2016): 
• Tutsi were foreign to Rwanda and had no right to live there 
• Despite the first revolution (and the thousands of lives lost) the Tutsi 
continued to enjoy higher status and greater wealth than Hutu and were 
[somehow] responsible for the ongoing Hutu poverty 
• Tutsi posed a danger to Hutu, who were always the victims, therefore the 
Hutu had not only the right, but a duty to defend themselves 
“The regime [had] established arm caches, distributed weapons to militia, set up a 
rapid communication network between the commanders of the militia, and drew up lists 
of sympathizers designated as the first to kill” (Kimyono, 2015, p. 87). Nearly one 
million people died in the genocide, including nearly 75% of the Tutsi residents living in 
Rwanda (Kimyono, 2015, p. 88). 
Social Theory 
Social theory is defined as “the normal accomplishment of socially adept human 
creatures figuring out what other creatures of the same sort are doing with, to, or around 
them” (Lemert, 2010). Culture, institutions, land, religions, or artistic creations today can 
identify societies.  A society that is drained of their essence is one that could potentially 
be wiped out (Lemert, 2010). Following the coup that overthrew President Kayibanda in 
1973, Rwanda was seemingly at its lowest point, where “The government feared its 
whole environment…The inhabitants were inward looking and bore the country’s slow 
shrinkage in silence…To the generalized lack of trust, rumor, secrecy, lack of breathing 




and lacked almost everything – was added something like mental paralysis” (Kimyono, 
2015, p. 38).  
In this state, it was only “natural” for the people to stand up and attempt to gain 
what was one lost, including pieces of their culture, religious beliefs, and the little 
political drive they had left. While many were left with no other option but to seek refuge 
in neighboring countries, the Rwandan citizens that were left, both Hutu and Tutsi took 
whatever measure they saw fit in order to maintain their social identity – which drives to 
the Parable of the Tribes.  
Social identity begins to develop at the earliest stages of life (Ross, 2001, 160), 
where it explains why people are the way they are and why they do the things they do. 
People with the same identity share common alliances and common enemies (Ross, 2001, 
160), and when ethnicity and identity are linked with social uncertainty, it can escalate 
conflict to levels of violent actions (Brown, 2001, 128). The theory of the parable of the 
tribes illustrates this idea by linking the preservation of identity with the ability to protect 
one’s own group, and when there are various groups of different ethnicities living in 
close proximities, if one becomes an aggressor, the others will follow suit. 
Government officials, soldiers and militia who had participated in the genocide 
fled, along with over one million civilians (mostly Hutu) with the threats that they would 
be killed if they remained. Genocide trials began in 1996, and by 2000 over 100,000 
suspects were awaiting trial (www.un.org, 2016).  As this was going on Rwanda’s 
military entered the Democratic Republic of Congo to extradite Hutu extremists who had 
used the country as a safe haven after the genocide. During this time the conflict 




was to protect the Tutsi group from discrimination and violence, and the second was to 
prevent genocide from happening within their borders (Cohen, Herman J., 1999, p. 33). 
While the Rwandan forces were present, they also controlled the major provinces in 
Kivu, which had extensive mineral and timber resources for the Congolese. Thus, in 1998 
The Rwandan forces were asked to leave, to which they complied, but then returned for a 
second time, and grew to what is known as the Great of War of Africa. After four years, 
the invading troops ultimately pulled out and peace deals soon followed.  In 2006 the 
Rwandan government implemented a restructure of the administration, replacing twelve 
chief officers with five larger multiethnic provinces with the intention to promote power 
sharing and reduce ethnic conflict (www.britnnica.com, 2016). 
The Economic Lens 
In 2006 the Human Rights Watch published a report stating that the genocide in 
Rwanda had several circumstances that surrounded it, including poverty, land scarcity, a 
population of two groups that faced a power struggle, and a history of colonial rule (that 
never provided the opportunity for freedom). It is critical to understand that the racist 
ideologies that were used as propaganda were a mask that justified the more fundamental 
goal of regime survival under the conditions of a severe economic crisis (Hintjens, 2016, 
p. 242). 
While there is no raw data for the early 20th century, during the early years of 
colonialism, when workers were forced to migrate to the mines in Congo, the country’s 
limited resources caused an unprecedented famine (Kimyono, 2015, p. 21). When 
Rwanda gained pseudo independence in the mid-1960’s, the nation was hit with waves of 




negatively, particularly in the area of agriculture, where commodities such as coffee was 
the country’s main foreign exchange earner (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 37). From 1974 to 1981, 
the country experiences a growth rate of over 5% per year, and this was in large part due 
to the growth in international aid that followed the regime of President Kayibanda. The 
years that followed corresponded with long period of drought and famine, and by 1990 
the GDP growth was 1% (Kimonyo, 2015, p. 63). 
Intense demographic pressure, the shortage of land for agriculture, and the lack of 
access to a seaport were always major issues of contention for Rwanda’s economy; but, 
after the murder of hundreds of thousands of Rwandan citizens, the economy was 
devastated. The effects of a poor economic infrastructure and violent conflict are cyclical 
and undoubtedly entangled. 
Data Operation 
The variables presented in this dataset (and the datasets throughout this study) are 
populations, enumerated in the thousands, the purchasing power during that year with 
that population, and the government structural balance in that same time frame. The 
government structural balance refers to the political, social, and economic structures that 
are in place at the time. For all of the data sets, the study examines a thirty-five-year 
period, from 1980-2015, in large part because further historical data has not been made 
available to provide a more in-depth analysis. All of the datasets presented in this 
research were extracted from data reports as provided by the International Monetary 
Fund, and are the most recent and accurate datasets available for this dissertation (World 





Data Subset Rwanda 
Y (Population) X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) X2 (Structural Balance) 
4.654 0.016 8.346 
4.825 0.016 8.623 
5.006 0.016 11.921 
5.195 0.017 11.936 
5.321 0.018 13.038 
5.502 0.018 12.335 
5.691 0.018 11.789 
5.89 0.018 11.723 
6.097 0.017 10.781 
6.304 0.015 9.986 
6.453 0.015 9.403 
6.652 0.014 9.789 
6.656 0.013 11.71 
6.247 0.012 12.637 
5.79 0.007 7.084 
5.468 0.008 15.616 
5.406 0.009 15.027 
5.66 0.009 13.44 
6.176 0.01 12.659 
6.843 0.01 13.18 
7.495 0.01 13.314 
8.013 0.011 13.747 
8.361 0.012 13.551 
8.578 0.012 13.897 
8.711 0.012 15.008 
8.833 0.012 15.764 
9 0.013 16.572 
9.2 0.013 18.632 
9.5 0.014 23.654 
9.7 0.015 23.055 
10 0.016 22.691 
10.2 0.016 22.907 
10.5 0.017 25.394 
10.739 0.017 26.517 
11.003 0.018 25.302 




As we consider the data, it is important to consider the primary aim of this 
research, which is identify the nexus, between globalization (i.e., economics) and violent 
conflict and what are those implications on the migration in masses. As it relates to 
Rwanda, you will notice that R Square (see Table Nine) demonstrates a 77.8% 
probability of the connection between its population Y with purchasing power X1 
(globalization) and structural balance X2 (whose presence is directly impacted on 
whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square demonstrates a 
probability of a nexus being present at a slightly lower rate of 76.5%, in likelihood of a 
small sample size that is available given the data. Significance F, at approximately 1.60, 
illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater than 0 and we should 
not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and X2.  Therefore, as it 
relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low and structural balance 
is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is further evidenced with the 
P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being greater than the alpha 0.05, 
which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration of populations is directly 
impacted by a country’s economic outlook and whether or not they have endured violent 






Summary Output Rwanda 
Summary Output       
       
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 
0.882236
789      
R Square 
0.778341
752      
Adjusted R Square 
0.764907
919      
Standard Error 
0.985148
461      
Observations 36      
 
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F 
Significan














49    
Total 35 
144.48854
22        





























































Figure 7. Line Plot Structural Balance for Rwanda 
 
 
Figure 8. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Rwanda 
As charted, the dataset demonstrates its correlation with the independent variables 
individually. Table Ten shows that Rwanda’s population was directly impacted by violent 
conflict. The center of the chart has the population both increasing and decreasing in a 
short period of time, and this is large part due to the genocide happening in the time 
frame, where both masses of individuals were either murdered or pushed out, and other 
populations came into power. However, Table Eleven shows more uniformity in the data 






Residual Output Rwanda 
Residual Output    
Observation Predicted (Population) Residuals Standard Residuals 
1 5.08352995 -0.42952995 -0.449023241 
2 5.174247531 -0.349247531 -0.365097378 
3 6.254343498 -1.248343498 -1.304996878 
4 6.217851559 -1.022851559 -1.069271473 
5 6.537352438 -1.216352438 -1.271553973 
6 6.307119732 -0.805119732 -0.841658357 
7 6.128304572 -0.437304572 -0.457150698 
8 6.106689553 -0.216689553 -0.226523541 
9 5.83958872 0.25741128 0.269093336 
10 5.662034874 0.641965126 0.67109933 
11 5.471102203 0.981897797 1.026459113 
12 5.63892176 1.01307824 1.059054613 
13 6.309454267 0.346545733 0.362272965 
14 6.654451482 -0.407451482 -0.42594279 
15 5.042864572 0.747135428 0.78104256 
16 7.79569263 -2.32769263 -2.433329945 
17 7.561390514 -2.155390514 -2.253208268 
18 7.041647548 -1.381647548 -1.444350645 
19 6.744465376 -0.568465376 -0.594263952 
20 6.915093028 -0.072093028 -0.075364815 
21 6.958978068 0.536021932 0.560348133 
22 7.059381251 0.953618749 0.996896681 
23 6.95378675 1.40721325 1.471076591 
24 7.067101852 1.510898148 1.579467006 
25 7.430954677 1.280045323 1.338137422 
26 7.678544899 1.154455101 1.206847558 
27 7.901760692 1.098239308 1.148080532 
28 8.576411296 0.623588704 0.651888933 
29 10.17971333 -0.679713325 -0.71056065 
30 9.942136206 -0.242136206 -0.253125036 
31 9.781521656 0.218478344 0.228393513 
32 9.852261719 0.347738281 0.363519634 
33 10.6253505 -0.125350505 -0.131039267 
34 10.99313333 -0.254133334 -0.265666628 
35 10.55381603 0.449183966 0.469569212 






Figure 9. Residual Plot Structural Balance Rwanda 
 
Figure 10. Residual Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Rwanda 
Residual data in linear regression allows us to analyze the dataset with 
standardized values to show the accuracy in the relationship between the variables. Like 
Table Eleven, Table Thirteen is less predictable by way of violent conflict (though 
violent conflict as it is an unpredictable phenomenon), and Table Twelve and Table 






Ravaged by decade long violent outbreaks lead by armed groups, political leaders, 
and drug cartels, Colombia has been making significant progress towards its national 
security (www.bbc.com, 2016). With 47.5 million inhabitants, Colombia is the fourth 
largest country in South America and is one of the economic leaders among Latin 
American countries, trailing just behind Brazil and Argentina. Today, 14% of the 
Colombian population identifies themselves to be ethnically different than the mestizo 
majority or European Whites (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 23).  Even with a 
comparatively large indigenous populations, Colombia as a nation has continued to show 
strength in their economic growth. 
Historical Context and Background 
Colombia was a nation-state that was at peace until 1932, when they engaged in a 
brief war with Peru. Circumstances surrounding this violent conflict included labor and 
land, as coffee was a major agricultural resource. When the Great Depression spread to a 
global level after the First World War, the demand for coffee and other agricultural 
commodities took a downward spiral (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 83). This led to the 
expulsion of thousands of poor, rural residents from their lands and the pressure of the 
government to react. These two factors culminated in the mass migration into ecological 
regions that were easily impacted by human residency (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 25). 
The war with Peru was short lived, but it was not an indication that the violence in 
Colombia had come to an end. 
Jorge Eliercer Gaitan Ayala was the popular candidate for the Colombian 




attacking its own workers in Peru and worked towards improving the lives of 
impoverished citizens (www.ic.galegroup.com, 2016). However, the unrest that he had 
ensued with his public opinion led to his assassination in 1948 and a decade long civil 
war known as La Violencia followed, a destructive phenomenon that was purely social 
and had no regard for race or economic status. 
La Violencia was given its name, not because of the property or resources that 
were lost, but because the methods of the actual killings were brutal and widespread. In 
some cases the techniques were give nicknames, including “picar picar tamal” which 
consisted of cutting up the body bit by bit; “bocachiquiar” which was a process involving 
hundreds of small punctures for the victim to be bled out; and “corte de mica” which was 
a form of beheading (Bailey, 1967, p. 563). “Crucifixions and hangings were 
commonplace, political prisoners were thrown from airplanes inflight, infants were 
bayoneted, schoolchildren…were raped in masse, unborn infants were removed by crude 
caesarian and replaced by roosters, ears were cut off, scalps removed…to indicate…a 
phenomenon of unparalleled ferocity” (Bailey, 1967, p. 563).  President Mariano Ospina 
Perez won the election and remained in control of the military during the violent conflict. 
President Ospina attempted to suppress the violence with dictator like policies that were 
deemed ineffective. Considering his populist politics, Laureano Gomez won the 
uncontested election in 1950 (President Gomez ceded his presidency to Roberto Urdaneta 
Alvarez due to illness, but then resumed until 1953 when he was overthrown by a 
military coup) (Bailey, 1967, p. 565). Outside of the capital, La Violencia was 
predominantly rural, transforming itself from a politically driven conflict to one that was 




organized rural bandits (Bailey, 1967, p. 568).  In 1957 (nearing the end) leaders of both 
political parties overthrew General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla with aims to restore national 
unity (Bailey, 1967, p. 566). 
After the loss of so many lives Conservatives and Liberals agreed to form a 
National Front and banned all other parties. The time period between La Violencia and 
the mid 1960’s is not notable in history. This is not because Colombia as a nation was 
stagnant, but rather it was during recovery and unknowingly bracing itself for guerilla 
warfare and a new economy that would be dominated by cocaine. 
The Revolutionary Armed forces of Colombia (FARC) was formed by survivors 
of the government’s crackdown on a communist-inspired peasant collective in the 
mountainous area of Marquetalia (www.nytimes.com, 2016). During that time, the 
Colombian government made a $30 million dollar investment to the isolated region that 
would include military occupation and build new roads, schools, and health centers. This 
was in response to the guerilla violence that had grown in the area. What is known as 
“Operation Marquetalia” no longer marks a program of support, but rather a clash of the 
powers between government and rebels. Leaders Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas 
met with communities and unified approximately 350 local guerillas that codified 
themselves as the Southern Bloc (later renamed FARC) calling for land reform and better 
conditions for those in the countryside of Colombia. Their strategy at first was to defend 
their communities of followers from the Colombian government, largely by responding 
with acts of violence with Colombian military infiltrated the area. This soon changed and 
FARC started providing educational and medical services to loyal communities, trained 




“provide these services” largely by kidnapping for ransom. In the 1970’s, FARC began 
trafficking cocaine for funding, and with its newfound wealth the number of members 
increased, nearly tripling in size. 
As the members increased, so did the number of kidnappings (disappearances) 
and systemic killings. Systemic conflicts are few and far between, as they usually involve 
a high number of deaths and last for an extended period of time in light of the fact that it 
is multi-polarity (by way of several guerilla groups); and the FARC was a prime example 
of this. Despite the peace accords in the 1980’s, and the attempts of President Alvaro 
Uribe in 2002 to dismantle FARC.  FARC continues to coexist among the Colombian 
populations; and with peak numbers nearing 20,000 members, FARC is a forced to be 
reckoned with. 
In Marxism, a human event cannot be properly understood without the historical 
circumstances by which that event occurred; and in his Communist Manifesto Marx 
writes that the history of all existing society is [found within] the history of struggle 
(Love, 2006, p. 250). Thus, the history of economics is found within the web of societies 
arranged in orders and social ranks that have established modern-day’s bourgeoisie 
(Love, 2006, p. 251).  
The division between the haves and have-nots from a Marxists theoretical 
perspective is infinitely more significant that the division of race, religion, or gender 
(Tyson, 2006, p. 54). In fact, it is this frame of thinking that allows for the Joneses to rise 
up in the global society – because it is the bourgeoisie that recognize that class is the 
most important and the rest of the world that does not. Thus, the remaining global society 




revolutions amongst themselves and leave the elite to watch them eliminate each other in 
their own battles.  
In the case of Colombia, Marxists have identified La Violencia as a movement 
representing the class struggle (Bailey, 1967, p. 569). The problem with this theory is that 
the rebellion did not exclude anyone from death, regardless of race or socio-economic 
status. The killing that took place had no scale (Bailey, 1967, p. 570). Thus, it was not the 
elite watching the murder of those in despair; it was a case of full-on participation on all 
sides. However, the notorious guerilla group, FARC, was very much a Marxist group, 
founded to overthrow the Colombian government. Many FARC leaders sought 
inspiration from leftist social movements around the world, opposing the privatization of 
natural resources and claiming to represent the rural poor against the Colombian elite 
(www.cfr.org, 2016). 
Born in 1949, Medellin Cartel kingpin, Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria, played a 
large role in the formation of Colombian politics and its economy, as we know it today. 
Escobar was born into a lower-middle class family, and as a young man became involved 
with crime when he began stealing cars. This, of course, is clouded in comparison with 
his path to wealth through drug trafficking. In 1975, when Escobar was 26 years old, he 
stepped into power after the death of Fabio Restrepo, a local Medellin drug lord. In less 
than ten years, Escobar made billions, murdered hundreds, and was elected to Colombia’s 
Congress. Escobar’s methodology was simple, following one paradigm “plata o plomo,” 
money or lead. Much like the movement of La Violencia, Escobar’s victims were not 
exclusive to race or social and economic status; he ordered assassinations of presidential 




Narco-violence further ensued when drug lords like Escobar, took advantage of 
poverty and hired sicarios (assassins), mostly teenage boys from the slums, to assassinate 
people for $100 a head. Among the murders, car bombings, and kidnappings became part 
of the daily life in Colombia (LaRosa and Mejia, 2016, p. 91).  By the mid 1980’s, 
Escobar was one of the most powerful men in the world, with the ability to order the 
murder of anyone, anytime, anywhere. The government and elite feared him, and the 
common people of his country loved him; he spent millions on parks, schools, stadiums 
and housing for the poorest of the poor in Medellin. In 1991 the Colombian government 
and Escobar came up with a prison arrangement in response to the U.S. pressure to 
extradite him.  Essentially, Escobar would turn himself in and serve a five-year sentence, 
so long as he could build his own prison and select his own guards – and so it was. Living 
in a resort like Fortress, Escobar ran his empire from the inside, but after word spread that 
he tortured and killed traitors the Colombian government ordered for him to be 
transferred. Escobar escaped without hesitation and went into hiding until his death in 
1993.  
The number of deaths, kidnappings, and displaced persons that is marked by 
Colombia’s last 50 years is staggering. In fact, by the early 2000’s there were so many 
kidnappings held for ransom, that a weekly radio show was established to allow relatives 
to broadcast messages to those who have been kidnapped (Foreign Policy, June 2011, p. 
27). When President Uribe was elected in 2002, he pledged to expand Colombia’s 
military and police in order to demobilize any paramilitary and officials involved in 
narco-trafficking. By the following year, the homicide rate in Medellin alone fell 46% 




In the years that followed Colombia underwent a crucial social and political 
transformation. High-quality, public infrastructures were built in the poorest 
neighborhoods, digitized maps noting where drug gangs operated were created, the 
thousands that were previously demobilized were reintegrated into society and introduced 
to new social [welfare] programs (Foreign Policy, June 2011, p. 28). Hundreds of 
millions dollars were invested in the “new Colombia,” and while there have been some 
upticks in crime along the way, the nation has been on a steady path of renewal and the 
odds of it being controlled by crime and drug driven leaders is not in the horizon.  
Inspired by the Cuban revolution, FARC believed that popular forces could defeat 
national armed forces in a war, that a revolution could be launched, and that the 
revolutionary effort had to be initiated from the countryside (Lee, 2012, p. 30). After over 
a decade of violence, FARC first participated in peace negotiations in the 1980s and 
formed a political party in 1985 the Patriotic Union (UP) in hopes of legitimizing their 
role in Colombian politics (Lee, 2012, p. 31). Despite these efforts, the experiment failed, 
and FARC members responded once more with crime and the escalation of military 
action. In the 1990s, FARC asked for official control of a territory in southern Colombia. 
The administration at the time ceded this request to solidify peace talks, but this action 
only confirmed what FARC believed all of these years, that they are powerful enough to 
alter or overthrow the government. By 1998 FARC’s power had grown tremendously 
(Lee, 2012 p. 31,), and used this territory to train members and as a site for narco-
trafficking. In 2002, Colombia seized the territory, which resulted in an increase of 




In 2008 it was reported that hundreds of thousands of Colombians flooded the 
streets of the capitol to protest FARC, the people of Colombia had finally had it. The 
supporters that FARC thought they once had been no longer at their platform, they no 
longer had territory to control, and they were losing members by the hundreds. This was 
followed by the death of many high-level leaders, including FARC leader Manuel 
Marulanda. Losses like these demoralized FARC and demonstrated that their reign was 
nearing its end. Soon after, peace talks with the Colombian administration began. 
On December 10th 2016, president Juan Manuel Santos of Colombia accepted the 
Nobel Peace prize for helping to end his country’s 50 year long civil war 
(www.theguardian.com, Dec 10 2016). Dedicating his prize to all Colombians, including 
the 220,000 killed and 8 million displaced during the conflict, President Santos won the 
award for reaching a deal with FARC earlier that year. To the surprise of many around 
the globe, voters in congress rejected the peace agreement, noting that it was too soft on 
the members responsible for war crimes. But, after the modifications of more than 50 
points outlined in the agreement, congress approved the new deal, and FARC began the 
process of demobilization and handing their weapons to the United Nations. 
Relative Deprivation 
Relative deprivation is now widely used as a theory in political science to 
demonstrate its implications concerning the relationship between inequality and political 
stability. The theory of relative deprivation is concerned with the feelings raised by 
inequalities. There are four conditions for an individual to feel relatively deprived: (1) 
they do not have X; (2) they see some other person or persons as having X; (3) they want 




from conditions 2 and 4 and the feeling of deprivation is defined by conditions 1 and 3 
(Stark and Taylor, 1989, p. 2).  
Scholars have argued that the history and the depravity of the Colombian system 
have been the primary drivers for FARC to have a powerful, armed resistance; being a 
movement that was willing to participate in the mass struggle without abandoning its 
demands for radical changes on land tenure, property ownership, and foreign trade (Lee, 
2012, p. 29). The reality was that political movements like FARC and people like Pablo 
Escobar had a Robin Hood air about them. They claimed that they were against the 
national government because the national government was exclusionary of those who 
lived out on the countryside, those who were predominantly of mixed races, and those 
who were predominantly of lesser mans. This gave them a rise to power that no one 
would have ever anticipated. 
For nearly half a century Colombia as a national and its government was not 
stable, constantly cleaning up after FARC’s terror attacks, utilizing resources to rescue 
those who have been kidnapped, and attempted to recuperate an economy that was deeply 
penetrated by narco-trafficking. This was largely because those targeted factions truly 
believed that they were the have-nots, and FARC and Pablo Escobar were the iconic 
heroes that were going to rescue them from the depths of their despair by providing what 
the Colombian government had not been able to. FARC and Escobar had acquired wealth 
through the drug trade, they built schools and hospitals for the people, and supplied food 
and clothing to community when they needed to gain notoriety. The truth of what was 




into a deeper hole, of which took the nation over 50 years to get out of and continues to 
recover in present day from all of the damage that has been done. 
The 21st century marked the beginning of a new Colombia. President Pastrana 
(elected in 1998) implemented what he called “Plan Colombia” and gained nearly $1 
billion dollars in support from the United States to fight drug-traffickers and rebels who 
profited from the illegal trade (www.bbc.com, Nov 15 2016). This marked the renewal of 
peace talks with FARC rebels, which failed until the second term of the president that 
follows, President Alvaro Uribe. President Uribe was highly praised for his ability to 
work with FARC members to release hostages and declaring cease-fires while conferring 
peace talks. In 2012, President Juan Manuel Santos was elected and in his first term he 
successfully implemented a peace plan that is said to stabilize a nation. 
An Economy on Drugs 
While the drug cartels and rebels have been at the forefront of Colombia’s history 
for decades, it is important to note that both its infrastructure and economic health have 
also been impacted and followed the waves of highs and lows. The reality is that FARC 
and Escobar’s motives were never really to support their base, but rather to gain power 
and overthrow a government so that they can continue to accrue wealth and land. 
Unfortunately for the Colombian people, this had a tremendous impact on their natural 
resources and international trade of goods. Among its other natural resources and 
agricultural exports, Colombia was famously known for its coffee industry. The 
expansion of coffee laid the groundwork for its economic power after world war two, and 
continued to experience sustained growth until the 1980s, which is no coincidence that it 




the demand for cocaine grew, so did the need for land, labor, and structures that would 
support the industry. Coffee growers were no longer meeting the needs for their families, 
and soon were forced to provide labor and their territory to the more profitable resources, 
cocaine. The effects of the drug trade were now intertwined with most aspects of 
Colombian life and took nearly 20 years of economic growth away from a country that is 
now recorded to have one of the highest GDP’s in the world. 
Data Operation 
Table 8 
Data Sheet Colombia 
Y (Population) X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) X2 (Structural Balance) 
28.447 0.592 0 
29.08 0.595 0 
29.718 0.599 0 
30.36 0.594 0 
31.004 0.588 0 
30.794 0.585 0 
31.433 0.598 0 
32.092 0.607 0 
32.764 0.605 0 
33.443 0.603 0 
34.125 0.604 0 
34.834 0.604 0 
35.53 0.566 0 
36.208 0.586 0 
36.863 0.599 0 
37.49 0.608 0 
38.1 0.598 0 
38.6 0.594 0 
39.2 0.582 0 
39.7 0.539 0 
40.296 0.529 -3.721 
40.814 0.525 -3.153 
41.329 0.523 -2.384 
41.849 0.522 -1.159 
42.368 0.523 0.09 
42.889 0.522 0.571 
43.406 0.529 -1.328 
43.927 0.537 -2.02 




44.979 0.547 -2.16 
45.51 0.542 -2.535 
46.045 0.559 -2.789 
46.582 0.563 -1.542 
47.121 0.57 -2.67 
47.662 0.577 -3.185 
48.203 0.574 -3.598 
 
Table 9 





As the dataset relates to Colombia, you will notice that R Square (see Table 
Sixteen) demonstrates a 62% probability of the connection between its population Y with 
purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly 
impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square 
demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a slightly lower rate of 59.7%. 
Significance F, at approximately 1.16, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all 
values are greater than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly 
correlated to X1 and X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic 
performance (X1), is low and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements 
(Y) increase.  However, the data tells us to reject the notion of population having a 
relationship to both violent conflict and globalization as the P-values of both independent 
variables (X1 and X2) are less than the alpha 0.05. This means that while the data 
demonstrates that violent conflict is economically driven, thus causing migration 
movements, it also tells us that the probability of it being accurate is low, making the 
hypothesis null. 
 




























Figure 12. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Colombia 
Despite the P-values being low in test value, both Tables Seventeen and Eighteen 
tell us that violent conflict and globalization have an impact with Colombia’s population, 





























Residual Output Colombia 






1 34.72515765 6.278157651 -1.692555618 
2 34.49855162 5.418551621 -1.460810718 
3 34.19641025 4.478410248 -1.207353948 
4 34.57408696 4.214086964 -1.136093893 
5 35.02729902 4.023299024 -1.084658548 
6 35.25390505 4.459905053 -1.202365052 
7 34.27194559 2.838945592 -0.765363595 
8 33.5921275 1.500127503 -0.404425848 
9 33.74319819 0.979198189 -0.263986266 
10 33.89426888 0.451268876 -0.121659524 
11 33.81873353 0.306266468 0.082567699 
12 33.81873353 1.015266468 0.273710069 
13 36.68907657 1.159076574 -0.312480456 
14 35.17836971 1.02963029 0.277582474 
15 34.19641025 2.666589752 0.71889744 
16 33.51659216 3.973407841 1.071208169 
17 34.27194559 3.828054408 1.03202171 
18 34.57408696 4.025913036 1.085363271 
19 35.48051108 3.719488917 1.002753071 
20 38.72853084 0.971469159 0.261902564 
21 48.34349853 8.047498533 -2.169559863 
22 47.29324515 6.479245147 -1.746767664 
23 45.61334476 4.284344759 -1.155034995 
24 42.77218366 0.923183658 -0.248885067 
25 39.72280843 2.64519157 0.713128612 
26 38.65309399 4.235906015 1.141976185 
27 42.64582132 0.760178684 0.204939852 
28 43.68917444 0.237825561 0.064116419 
29 41.34522422 3.105775778 0.837299497 
30 43.26715774 1.711842256 0.461502942 
31 44.53770072 0.972299282 0.26212636 
32 43.85836796 2.186632037 0.589503568 
33 40.58714866 5.994851342 1.616177847 
34 42.74414296 4.376857038 1.17997578 
35 43.44159855 4.220401446 1.137796241 





Figure 13. Residual Output Structural Balance Colombia 
 
Figure 14. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Colombia 
However, Tables Nineteen and Twenty show the dataset as more dispersed 
without concrete evidence that the variables have a connection. 
Yugoslavia 
“With the end of the first world war and the fall of the Austria-Hungary and 
Ottoman Empire, the conditions were met for proclaiming the Kingdom of Serbs Croats, 
and Slovenians in December of 1918” (www.kosovo.net, 2016). Yugoslavia, literally 




politicians alike, and soon came to fruition after the assassination of King Aleksander I, 
as he hoped to curb separatist tendencies and mitigate nationalist passions.  
Yugoslavia as a sovereign state is known to have one of the most troubled and 
violent histories in Europe, having been dismantled and reincarnated on more than one 
occasion. While there were periods of stability, the demise of Yugoslavia as a republic 
that was inhabited by people of differing political, economic, religious, and social 
traditions was bound to fall apart.  These differences were rooted in their experience of 
conflict. Today, there are four major principles that explain the Yugoslavia’s collapse. 
The first is that of the ancient hatred between the Serbs and Croats; that because the 
ethnic hatred was so deeply rooted a united front was never viable (Lane, 2004, p. 3). The 
second holds that a combination and economic weakness and strategically motivated 
international prying have prevented the evolution of a unified nation, because it would 
not allow for a tangible balance of power (Lane, 2004, p. 3). The third argument for the 
fall of Yugoslavia is the clash between cultural roots and the political ideology.  The 
communist rule repressed the variety of languages, religions, and cultural identities, but 
did not eliminate them; causing groups to constantly attempt to claim their dominance as 
the single defined entity (Lane, 2004, p. 4).  The fourth and final principle highlights the 
failure of major powers giving enough attention to the existence of external threats to 
Yugoslavia, leaving the “little guy” to fend for itself (Lane, 2004, p. 3). The reality is that 
the dissolution of Yugoslavia was the response of a fractured community that is 
comprised of bits and pieces of all these principles and a nation tried too hard too soon to 





Historical Context and Background 
The identity of the South Slav was the notion to preserve a distinct cultural and 
political identity that would preserve a measure of independence. This was during the 
time where European political legitimacy was tied to the strength of a nation who had 
solid foundations to identity (Lane, 2004, p. 8). The problem with the Balkan Peninsula 
(not yet established as Yugoslavia) was that the people were largely migrants that had no 
real affinity to the territory, therefore creating a “loosely structured multi-ethnic empire” 
(Lane, 2004, p. 8). This led to the production of societies within a society, with no strong 
leadership, poor communication systems and the continued existence of feudal traditions 
that rivaled the great powers of neighboring Germany, France, and Italy. 
The events that transpired in the century preceding the First World War only 
further defined the separation of a nation by its religion (Orthodox vs. Muslim vs. 
Catholic) and their socioeconomic class (well-educated and poor vs. the oligarchy of the 
aristocrats). The Balkan Peninsula was dismembered and put back together at least a half 
dozen times before 1914 through treaties, uprisings, the Balkan Wars and local political 
movements that led to assassinations of monarchs and politicos. Furthermore, it was a 
major player territorially speaking in the First World War, which consequently further 
weakened their economic, national security, and sovereign power. 
Three weeks following the first cease-fire of World War I, the Kingdom of the 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later named Yugoslavia) was created (Lane, 2004, p. 34). 
The Serbs were quick to create a united political front with three distinct, but ethnically 
related people with the desire for stability and security. However, the kingdom did not 




recognize the SCS Kingdom for what it was (or for what it was trying to become) and 
continued to engage in dispute over territory. Considering this, King Alexander renamed 
the region Yugoslavia in attempt to remain above factionalism and soon followed with 
the introduction of a new constitution that allowed for the return of a partial 
parliamentary government (Lane, 2004, p. 60). 
Less than five years later, King Alexander was assassinated as he was on his way 
to France to discuss alliances. Leaving the crown to his eleven- year old son, a senior 
regent, Prince Paul was appointed until the heir came of age (Lane, 2004, p. 64). Prince 
Paul, an inexperienced but cultured young man, looked largely to others for political 
advice and appointed a rather radical prime minister to do implement what he saw fit. 
The problem here was that World War II was in the horizon and alliances needed to be 
made with the right countries for the still unstable Yugoslavia to survive any sort of 
warfare. Unfortunately for Prince Paul, after demonstrations broke, he was overthrown in 
a coup that brought the eighteen-year old heir, Peter to the throne. King Peter’s first 
cabinet only lasted three weeks, and soon after Hitler’s Germany invaded, causing Peter, 
Paul, and any cabinet members to flee into exile.  The years that followed the invasion 
destroyed any sort of political structure that was in place.  Yugoslavia was in crisis yet 
again. 
Josip Broz Tito was a Yugoslav revolutionary and statesmen that held various 
political positions that began in 1939, just a few years before World War II. Tito was the 
head of the Yugoslav communist party, who helped liberate parts of the country, 
successfully obtained military aid from America, and above all defied Stalin and the 




Stalin’s death in 1953 marked the end of tension and uncertainty, and Tito was able to 
cultivate the perception of a unified front comprised of Serbian and Croatian nationalists 
(Lane, 2004, p. 115). Over the next several decades Tito experimented with communism 
in Yugoslavia and was able to preserve the country’s independence, preserve the 
country’s unity, create new types of socialism, foster a decentralized economy, and lead a 
nonaligned movement that gave Yugoslavia the power to influence world affairs 
(Campbell, 1980, p. 1049). By the 1960’s a new generation of political parties emerged, 
revealing that the divisions among the people where not eliminated but rather covered up 
by the communistic ideal. A fresh constitution was later adopted in 1963 (Lane, 2004, p. 
131) to support the reform of the Yugoslav economy that included the reduction of 
federal powers. This marked the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. 
Yugoslav ideologists claimed that the nation was comprised of three tribes, Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes; and while they had nearly identical ethnic origins, a common 
majority language, and complementary economies, because state integration was more 
important than social integration.  Thus, it was only a matter of time before the nation 
was faced with division. The problem here was that the country was held together more 
by military police, political, and administrative power than it was by economic, religious, 
cultural, and civilization links (Stojanovic, 1997, p. 74).  After the death of Tito in 1980, 
growing nationalism among the republics threatened to split their union apart 
(www.history.com, 2016). The language problem was revived, student demonstrations 
ensued, and groups could choose flags to show their autonomy. By 1990, Yugoslavia 
“was a multi-ethnic sovereign state without a functioning center of power…[and] none 




did not attempt to supply he necessary power until the process of dissolution was already 
beyond the point of no return.” (Lane, 2004, p. 172). 
Yugoslavia’s collapse began in 1991, when the republics once again descended 
into war in times of declaring independence. That year Slovenia and then Croatia 
declared independence. The Yugoslav regime responded by sending an army composed 
largely of Serbs to Croatia (under the guides of protecting ethnic Serbs) and carrying out 
mass executions of hundreds of men. In 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina followed with 
their declaration of independence, which was again followed by the same military 
response as Croatia. The remaining republics that comprised Yugoslavia, Slovenia, 
Macedonia, and Montenegro also declared their independence in the same time frame. 
However, their independence was not succeeded by mass murder and terror, as they were 
seen as minority countries that did not pose a threat that could not have been easily 
controlled by the other republics of the regime. The war launched in Bosnia, which lasted 
for nearly three years, is noted as the largest massacre that occurred in Europe following 
World War II. Mass executions, concentration camps, rape and sexual violence, and 
forced displacement were prevalent in this ethnic cleansing that resulted in the death of 
nearly 100,000 and the displacement of 4.4 million (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 509). 
What makes the campaign of violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina unique is the 
level and kind of atrocities that were committed, even in the safe areas. Girls and women 
were raped, often in front of family members as a tactic of terror; they were later sold to 
other soldiers or killed when no longer deemed useful (Totten and Parsons, 209, p. 511). 
In a matter of less than one week, 7,000 boys and men were systematically slaughtered. 




taken to Muslim controlled territories that were bound to face violence.  When Serbian 
forces refused to comply with the United Nations, NATO stepped in and proceeded with 
bombing Bosnian Serb positions. Not two months after, in 1995, a federalized division 
with Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia was created. 
Scholars and political leaders alike have argued that at the core of the genocide in 
the Balkan lands is that of the ancient hatreds. In fact, a theory known as parable of the 
tribes notes that if we have different ethnic groups living in close proximity and one 
becomes an aggressor, then the use of force transforms the state of affairs of the 
relationships between all of the ethnic groups in that proximity, causing them all to 
become aggressive. 
People with the same identity share common alliances and common enemies 
(Ross, 2001, 160), and when ethnicity and identity are linked with social uncertainty, it 
can escalate conflict to levels of violent actions (Brown, 2001, 128). It has been proposed 
that in collectivist cultures, terrorism is more likely to be carried out because the only 
morality that they have is the one for their “in-group,” their identity (Victoroff, 2004, 21). 
Usually preservation of identity is linked to the collective fear of losing the ability to 
protect one’s own group, and often the weaknesses of other groups are sought after in 
order to maintain preservation. Thus, in order preserve their identity, the factors that 
embody identity are those often placed in the frontlines of justification for igniting and 
escalating conflict. The reality is, that the wars that ensued after the death of Tito were 
bound to happen whether the ethnic factors were present or not. This is because during 
the time of Tito, Yugoslavs enjoyed the highest standard of living and that they ever had 




entire economic “infrastructure” collapsed and people in power had to find a means by 
which to convince their citizens to fight for what was rightfully theirs; and nothing is 
more powerful than the unification of identity and the protection of that individualism. 
Here, we will demonstrate that in removing the element of ethnic identity, and solely 
using the economic history of Yugoslavia, a war would have still erupted and could make 
projections as to how to deter history from repeating itself. 
Following the war, the Yugoslav nation was tasked with major economic 
reconstruction. The damage was largely covered by UN aid the future was now mapped 
out by Five Year Plans, prepared by the chairman of the Economic Planning Council. The 
first Five Year Plan was raising output by accelerating rates of agriculture and feeding the 
rapidly expanding army that Tito had created (Lane, 2004, p. 111). While the plan was 
successful in meeting its goals (by the end of the five years, 25% of the national income 
was reinvested in the state) it was deeply flawed in part because Yugoslavia was a 
comparatively a small nation and unable to compete with the world powers at the time, 
and because it only focused on one industry, leaving everything else to fall behind on the 
wayside. Considering this, when a succession of bad harvests occurred, the economic 
crisis began to emerge (Lane, 2004, p. 113). 
The economy during this period largely focused on rapid industrialization. By 
1953 Yugoslavia recovered, retaining control of the exchange rate and monetary system, 
and was ready for their second installment of a Five-Year Plan. The new plan was 
implemented in 1961 (after receiving $275 million in aid from the United States), which 
marked the beginning of economic reforms. But, after the cost of living spiked 30%, the 




the dinar, the plan had to be abandoned. Economists believed that this time around the 
plan would work, as they had a structure that would revise the plan every year, but the 
emphasis on short-term solutions and poor strategic planning is what caused its failure 
(Lane, 2004, p. 127). 
A new constitution was adopted in 1963 along with the implementation (and 
failure) of the third and fourth five-year plans take us to yet another economic crisis. By 
the 1970s two problems had become prevalent, the first was that of the growing 
bureaucracy in the economic system and the second was the regime’s inability to control 
inflation. This means that there were thousands of self-managing units, each support by 
one of the two million self-managing bureaucrats who had essentially their own bank for 
each of their enterprise and borrowed funds at interest rates that would lead to an 
investment boom (Lane, 2004, p. 145).  The fifth Five-Year Plan was implemented in 
1971, with the aims of promoting greater unity of the state through economic 
cooperation. By 1979 the regime had received nearly 1 billion dollars in aid and by 1980, 
Yugoslavia was regarded as an economic catastrophe. 
In 1981, foreign debt had piled up, inflation took off, and standards of living 
plummeted 40%. International lenders were no longer motivated to provide economic 
support (unless terms were punitive) and there was no one element strong enough to 
provide direction or enforcement.  Each of the Yugoslav entities were now running their 
economies as their own republic with its unique, modern industries (Lane, 2004, p. 158). 
In the decade that followed Yugoslavia was trapped in a cycle of price freezes, 





In 1987, Prime Minister Branko Mikulic admitted that over half of the loans were 
used for consumption or ill-advised projects. In 1989 Mikulic was replaced by Ante 
Markovic and executed the last attempt for economic reform with the aim of turning 
Yugoslavia into a market economy. (Lane, 2004, p. 160). Self-management was 
immediately abolished, and the banking system was given independence. A balanced 
budget was introduced, a six-month wage freeze imposed, and promissory notes were 
cancelled. International response was positive, as relationships with lenders were 
restored, but this sentiment was not shared within the country.  Markovic was seen as a 
communist that undermined socialism and was ruining the nation (Lane, 2004, p. 161).  
Yugoslavia is now known by its separate sovereign nation-states: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.  While 
international response was present in the later years of the atrocities that occurred, the 
process of establishing what actually occurred during the Yugoslav wars has been a 
cumbersome one (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 525), and what has been even more 
challenging is the rebuilding of several powers simultaneously while its citizens were still 
recovering from the scars left behind. As evidenced by the data operations below, it is 
clear that there has been an increase in the economic stability of all of the affected 
nations, and with that increase in stability was an accompanying growth in immigration. 
However, the data also demonstrates that violent conflict continues to be a living 
underlying factor whose fear has not completely dissipated. 
Despite the qualitative historical data that is widely published on former 
Yugoslavia, datasets as it relates to migration, economics, and violent conflict are not as 




nation as it is now, comprised of not one, but several sovereign nations. For the purposes 
of this research, I will be using datasets for three of the countries that comprised former 
Yugoslavia – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia all of which endured 
violent conflict. Furthermore, it is important to note that the datasets, because of their 
“newness” in nature (as these nations did not ‘exist’ as independent powers prior to 
1991), the correlations may be skewed. 
Table 11 
Data Sheet Bosnia & Herzegovina 
Y (Population) X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) X2 (Structural Balance) 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
7.597 0 0 
7.568 0 0 
7.54 0 0 
7.516 0.092 0 
7.503 0.095 0 
7.5 0.098 0 
7.481 0.099 0 
7.463 0.102 0 
7.441 0.107 1.548 
7.412 0.107 -1.762 
7.382 0.108 -2.201 
7.35 0.111 -4.114 
7.321 0.109 -3.859 




7.237 0.102 -4.678 
7.201 0.098 -5.488 
7.167 0.098 -5.231 
7.132 0.093 -4.991 
7.095 0.091 -2.999 
 
Table 12 
Summary Output Bosnia & Herzegovina 
 
As it relates to Bosnia and Herzegovina one will notice that R Square (see Table 
Twenty-Three) demonstrates a 69.7% probability of the connection between its 




presence is directly impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R 
Square demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a similar rate of 67.9%. 
Significance F, at 2.77, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater 
than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and 
X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low 
and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is 
further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being 
greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration 
of populations is directly impacted by a country’s economic outlook and whether or not 
they have endured violent conflict at any level. 
 
Figure 15. Line Plot Structural Balance Bosnia & Herzegovina 
 




While both data tables depict the correlation between migration with violent 
conflict and globalization Table Twenty-Five does so with more clarity, as the slope has a 
more tangible increase in growth. 
Table 13 
Residual Output Bosnia & Herzegovina 






1 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
2 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
3 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
4 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
5 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
6 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
7 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
8 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
9 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
10 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
11 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
12 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
13 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
14 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
15 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
16 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
17 1.152389731 1.152389731 -0.560188701 
18 1.152389731 6.444610269 3.132792452 
19 1.152389731 6.415610269 3.118695249 
20 1.152389731 6.387610269 3.105084156 
21 6.881112495 0.634887505 0.308625456 
22 7.067918672 0.435081328 0.211497584 
23 7.254724849 0.245275151 0.119230816 
24 7.316993575 0.164006425 0.079725239 
25 7.503799752 0.040799752 -0.019833186 
26 7.888550857 0.447550857 -0.217559152 
27 7.731587841 0.319587841 -0.155354992 
28 7.773038813 0.391038813 -0.190088057 
29 7.869128903 0.519128903 -0.252353989 




31 7.43922285 -0.14822285 -0.072052678 
32 7.281965012 0.044965012 -0.021857962 
33 6.99447922 0.20652078 0.100391911 
34 7.006666378 0.160333622 0.07793985 
35 6.706703754 0.425296246 0.206740953 
36 6.676628638 0.418371362 0.203374695 
 
 
Figure 17. Residual Output Structural Balance Bosnia & Herzegovina 
 






































With a residual analysis of the dataset, we see a tremendous drop in correlation 
with both violent conflict and globalization, both of which negate the premise that 
migration (population) is impacted by either variable. 
Table 14 
Data Operation Croatia (Data Sheet) 
Y (Population) X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) X2 (Structural Balance) 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
4.73 0.116 0 
4.624 0.105 0 
4.524 0.108 0 
4.453 0.111 0 
4.494 0.113 0 
4.572 0.116 0 
4.501 0.115 0 
4.554 0.11 0 
4.381 0.109 0 
4.305 0.11 0 
4.305 0.113 0 
4.306 0.114 0 
4.439 0.113 0 
4.442 0.112 0 
4.44 0.112 0 
4.436 0.111 0 
4.434 0.111 0 
4.429 0.103 0 
4.418 0.096 0 
4.281 0.092 0 
4.268 0.087 0 
4.256 0.084 0 
4.238 0.081 0 






Summary Output Croatia 
 
As it relates to Croatia you will notice that R Square (see Table Thirty) 
demonstrates a 97.6% probability of the connection between its population Y with 
purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly 
impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square 
demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a similar rate of 97.4%. 
Significance F, at 2.33, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater 
than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT      
Regression Statistics      
Multiple R 
0.987766
706      
R Square 
0.975683
065      
Adjusted R Square 
0.974209
312      
Standard Error 
0.339644
202      
Observations 36      
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184    
Total 35 
156.55016
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X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low 
and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is 
further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being 
greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration 
of populations is directly impacted by a country’s economic outlook. 
 
Figure 19. Line Plot Structural Balance Croatia 
 



















































While both datasets demonstrate the correlation between migration and the 
variables of violent conflict and globalization, the trend of clarity around globalization in 
this region continues in that a more distinct increase in population aligns with an increase 
in healthy economics. 
Table 16 
Residual Output Croatia  






1 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
2 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
3 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
4 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
5 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
6 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
7 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
8 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
9 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
10 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
11 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
12 0.082444271 0.082444271 -0.249870583 
13 4.822990157 0.092990157 -0.281832859 
14 4.373455633 0.250544367 0.759345266 
15 4.496055958 0.027944042 0.08469229 
16 4.618656282 0.165656282 -0.502068018 
17 4.700389832 0.206389832 -0.625522513 
18 4.822990157 0.250990157 -0.760696358 
19 4.782123382 0.281123382 -0.852023583 
20 4.577789508 0.023789508 -0.072100802 
21 4.536922733 0.155922733 -0.472567755 
22 4.577789508 0.272789508 -0.82676543 
23 4.700389832 0.395389832 -1.198340242 
24 4.741256607 0.435256607 -1.319167731 
25 4.700389832 0.261389832 -0.792215503 
26 4.659523057 0.217523057 -0.659264887 
27 4.659523057 0.219523057 -0.66532645 
28 4.618656282 0.182656282 -0.553591306 




30 4.291722083 0.137277917 0.416059389 
31 4.005654659 0.412345341 1.249728686 
32 3.84218756 0.43881244 1.329944685 
33 3.637853685 0.630146315 1.909835878 
34 3.515253361 0.740746639 2.245041311 
35 3.392653036 0.845346964 2.562062054 
36 3.351786261 0.852213739 2.582873749 
 
 
Figure 21. Residual Output Structural Balance Croatia 
 










































With the residuals for Croatia, it is striking that a jump in structural balance 
would lead to an influx of immigration, but an increase in purchasing power shows an 
increase in emigration – both of which are conflicting with the plotted data in tables 
Thirty-Four and Thirty-Five. 
Data Operation Slovenia 
Table 17 
Data Sheet Slovenia 
Y (Population) X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) X2 (Structural Balance) 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
1.999 0.067 0 
1.989 0.068 0 
1.989 0.07 0 
1.989 0.07 0 
1.99 0.07 0.622 
1.987 0.07 -1.033 
1.985 0.071 -0.336 
1.978 0.072 -0.584 
1.988 0.071 -1.048 
1.99 0.072 -0.822 
1.994 0.072 -1.005 
1.995 0.072 -0.665 
1.996 0.071 -1.292 
1.998 0.07 -1.383 
2.003 0.07 -2.2 
2.01 0.072 -2.73 
2.01 0.072 -3.284 
2.032 0.067 -4.551 
2.047 0.064 -4.825 
2.05 0.062 -4.386 




2.059 0.056 -1.519 
2.061 0.056 -2.303 
2.063 0.055 -0.912 
 
Table 18 
Summary Output Slovenia 
 
As it relates to Slovenia you will notice that R Square (see Table Thirty-Seven) 
demonstrates a 97.8% probability of the connection between its population Y with 
purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly 
impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square 
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0.988840
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demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at near duplicate rate of 97.6%. 
Significance F, at an astounding 5.17, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all 
values are greater than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly 
correlated to X1 and X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic 
performance (X1), is low and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements 
(Y) increase. In fact, with the Significance of marker being so high, this dataset not only 
demonstrates that the correlation is present, but that the accuracy of this study is high. 
This is further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) 
being greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of 
immigration of populations is directly impacted by a country’s economic outlook. 
 




























Figure 24. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Slovenia 
In this last sample dataset for former Yugoslavia, the pattern of having a clearer 
picture between the nexus in migration and globalization is again outlined in Table 
Thirty-Nine of the line plots. In light of the dataset available for this region being so 
limited, there is a high possibility that perhaps that missing data is one of the reasons for 
the repetition in outputs. 
Table 19 
Residual Output Slovenia 






1 0.026264987 0.026264987 -0.183342717 
2 0.026264987 0.026264987 -0.183342717 
3 0.026264987 0.026264987 -0.183342717 
4 0.026264987 0.026264987 -0.183342717 
5 0.026264987 0.026264987 -0.183342717 
6 0.026264987 0.026264987 -0.183342717 
7 0.026264987 0.026264987 -0.183342717 
8 0.026264987 0.026264987 -0.183342717 
9 0.026264987 0.026264987 -0.183342717 
10 0.026264987 0.026264987 -0.183342717 
11 0.026264987 0.026264987 -0.183342717 


























13 1.909420509 0.089579491 0.625309546 
14 1.937527308 0.051472692 0.359305076 
15 1.993740905 0.004740905 -0.033093885 
16 1.993740905 0.004740905 -0.033093885 
17 1.962831623 0.027168377 0.18964883 
18 2.045074167 0.058074167 -0.405386665 
19 2.03854468 -0.05354468 -0.373768583 
20 2.078975437 0.100975437 -0.704858935 
21 2.073926367 0.085926367 -0.599808915 
22 2.090802462 0.100802462 -0.70365148 
23 2.09989635 -0.10589635 -0.739209364 
24 2.083000601 0.088000601 -0.614288104 
25 2.086051552 0.090051552 -0.628604764 
26 2.06246685 -0.06446685 -0.450010783 
27 2.103066342 0.100066342 -0.698512999 
28 2.185617432 0.175617432 -1.2258973 
29 2.213147564 0.203147564 -1.418071364 
30 2.135575083 0.103575083 -0.723005762 
31 2.064870673 0.017870673 -0.124746215 
32 1.986841681 0.063158319 0.440876578 
33 1.78882283 0.26617717 1.858049458 
34 1.675729967 0.383270033 2.675416073 
35 1.714689577 0.346310423 2.417419551 
36 1.617459286 0.445540714 3.110096496 
 
 
























Figure 26. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Slovenia 
With residual outputs, while the plotted chart seems lacking in any real trend, 
Table Forty-Two depicts the contradictory premise that with an increase in a positive 
economic outlook, there would be an increase in emigration (rather than an influx in 
immigration to Slovenia). 
Cambodia 
Officially known as the Kingdom of Cambodia, Cambodia is a country located in 
Southeast Asia that is border by Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. Today, Cambodia has a 
population of nearly 15 million with a reestablished monarchy that has provided almost 
20 years of stability following the horrors of the Khmer Rouge. For years an entire nation 
was kidnapped; “freedom of the press, movement, worship, organization, association, and 
discussion all completely disappeared… [as did] everyday family life” (Totten and 
Parsons, 2009, p. 341). The aim was to eradicate Buddhism (among other things), but Pol 
Pot was unsuccessful, as Buddhism remains the primary religion in Cambodia and what 






















Historical Context and Background 
Buddhism was first introduced to Cambodia over 800 years ago, before Phnom 
Penh was founded. This was also around the time that the construction for Angkor Wat 
began – now noted as one of the largest religious complexes in the world. Up until the 
1400s the city of Angkor was recognized as the capitol city of the Khmer Empire, a city 
that was established on the taxes of the people and where the kings lived. What followed 
in the next several hundred years for Cambodia was nothing short of catastrophic. It was 
attack followed by invasion, conquest, and mass murder. Cambodia today is a true 
reflection of the strength and resiliency of people.  
In 1432 Cambodia faced a major turning point in their history, they were captured 
by the Siamese (Thailand) after the kingdom developed closer ties to China for trade 
(Corfield, 2009, p. 11). Two years later, the capitol of Phnom Penh was erected, largely 
due to its location; specifically, farther from Thailand and with easy access to China on 
boat. While there were no serious attacks over the century that followed, Europeans 
began to take notice when traders entered the port of Phnom Penh (Corfield, 2009, p. 11). 
Waves of Spanish and Portuguese conquistadors arrived first, marrying locals and finding 
positions on the royal court. The Dutch arrived for trading in the 1600s and the British 
followed around 45 years later with plans to settle. In the 1700s the Scottish arrived, and 
documented that Cambodia produced gold, raw silk, and ivory, with meat and fish 
available at low prices (Corfield, 2009, p. 14).  
While Phnom Penh was becoming a central hub for tradable goods, the reality 
was that a large part of the population still resided in the rural villages and it was very 




not have much of an effect on everyday life. The real threat to Cambodia during this time 
period was Vietnam, as the Vietnamese gradually extended their boundaries outward, to 
the south, to settle in what they claimed was their land. This, of course, opened the door 
of opportunities for Thailand.  Cambodia was weak, it was their chance to attack and 
claim the land that was rightfully theirs as well. By 1848 both Vietnamese and Siam 
soldiers were exhausted by the Cambodian guerillas and retreated. For the first time in 
over fifty years Cambodia would have peace and live without outside military forces 
(Corfield, 2009, p. 20).  
With Vietnam and Thailand on either side of the country, the primary concern for 
the kingdom in the late 19th century was to ensure an alliance with a country that was 
more powerful than either one of its neighbors. Crowned king in 1860, when he was only 
26, King Norodom I established the French Protectorate, a “Treaty of Friendship, Trade, 
and French Protection” (Corfield, 2009, p. 23). At the time that the treaty was signed, 
there were already several French missionaries in Cambodia, so the French were not 
unfamiliar with the country or with the attacks that had transpired just years before. 
Terms for the treaty among European powers were fairly standard: the Catholic Church 
gained special privileges (although Buddhism remained the state religion), a French 
representative was appoint to the Cambodian Royal Court, and France would be able to 
trade freely throughout the kingdom (Corfield, 2009, p. 23-24).  
Despite the revolts that occurred intermittently, the treaty was a success, at least 
temporarily. Vietnam and Thailand were in such disdain of the decision that the kingdom 
made that there were periods that their monarchy offered their throne just to work in 




gunpoint when he signed the revised agreement that would annex Cambodia to be run as 
a colony of France (Corfield, 2009, p. 27). The following year, war erupted. Cambodians 
attached the French, and unable to compromise, the French resorted to burning in the 
villages and launching reprisal attacks. Six years later Cambodia was at peace once more, 
but 30% of its population was dead.  
After Norodom’s death, his brother Sisowath became king in exchange for his 
support of the French. Indeed, the support was present; when the First World War broke 
out in1914, Cambodia did its part for France by enlisting 2,000 men for the infantry 
(Corfield, 2009, p. 30). In light of this, rebels began to demonstrate and protest against 
the decisions that Sisowath was making, and now it was not just against the French, but 
also the Cambodian middle class. Sisowath died in 1929, and was succeeded by his eldest 
son, Monivong (Corfield, 2009, p. 34). The events that surrounded the death of Sisowath 
and the eventual departure of the French were global incidents that affected Cambodia. In 
the 1930s the Great Depression hit the global economy and Communist ideology began 
to emerge. Ten years later World War II erupted, where Germany took France and Japan 
deployed 8,000 soldiers to Cambodia (Corfield, 2009, p. 38) ensuing the support for 
Japan and opposing French rule. In 1945 Japan seized Phnom Penh, nullifying any 
Franco-Cambodian agreements, and while there was French resistance, Cambodia was 
granted autonomy in 1946. Democracy and socialism were introduced, and violence 
erupted. Democracy had failed in a nation that had been under a monarch for thousands 
of years. 
Full independence was gained in 1953. With a serious fear that Cambodians on 




King Sihanouk (Norodom’s grandson) appointed himself as Prime Minister and abolished 
Democracy. Sihanouk was triumphant. The newly appointed leader of Cambodia made it 
a point to be a “good international citizen,” treating visitors with hospitality, befriending 
international scholars, and finding an ally in the United States (Corfield, 2009, p. 51). In 
1955 he shocked the nation when he gave the throne to his father to rule as king, while he 
would remain the political leader as Prime Minister. As Sihanouk continued to focus on 
increasing Cambodia’s international prestige, Communism was brewing within its 
borders. Dubbed the Red Cambodians, Khmer Rouge, by Sihanouk himself, the 
Communist movement was held together with the belief that they would be able to take 
over the country, and they were right. 
January 1925 “…Pol Pot was born Saloth Sar, the youngest in a family of six 
boys and a girl. His parents owned nine hectares of rice land, three of garden-land, and 
six buffalo…Rich or poor, everyone tilled the fields, fished the river, cooked tasty soups, 
raised children…they were the most deeply Cambodian…But the Saloth family were 
Khmer peasants with a difference. They had royal connections” (Totten and Parsons, 
2009, p. 342). Pol Pot had a strict upbringing, spending a year in the royal monastery, 
followed by Catholic School. He later moved to Phnom Penh to attend high school, just 
as his cousin, King Sihanouk was taking the throne. Pol Pot later received a scholarship 
to study radio-electricity in Paris, where he became a member of the Cambodian section 
of the French Communist Party (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 342). When Pol Pot 
returned to Cambodia, he found that his closest brother joined the Cambodian and 
Vietnamese Communists and went along. They taught him that they had to work with the 




In the 1960s a group of young French educated communists, by the name of 
Communist Party of Kampuchea, rose against the Sihanouk government and later 
proclaimed the Democratic State of Kampuchea (DK, which was comprised of members 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kampuchea).  Pol Pot was their 
secretary general. Pol Pot and his members fled to the countryside after they failed to 
seize Phnom Penh, but this was only the beginning. As Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge 
were growing in power and numbers, the Vietnamese were at war against the United 
States. The United States viewed Vietnamese communism as an international threat and 
proceeded to bomb not only southern Vietnam, but also parts of eastern Cambodia, where 
Vietnamese communist members were said to be in hiding. Tens of thousands on 
Cambodian peasants died in a four-year period, and when U.S. military forces ousted 
Sihanouk, he joined Pol Pot. All of this destabilized a centralized country and opened the 
doors for a full-on take over. 
Like the other nations that were presented in this study, Pol Pot’s paradigm was 
primarily concerned with national and racial grandiosity (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 
346). This meant that national impurities, including the foreign-educated (with the 
exception of Pol-Pot and his Paris educated group), hereditary enemies like the 
Vietnamese, Chinese, and Muslim Cham had to be abolished, and Buddhism had to be 
eradicated to purify Cambodia and eliminate the old society. Khmer Rouge propaganda 
proclaimed, “what is rotten must be removed,” and they did just that during Pol Pot’s 
reign of terror.  
Pol Pot’s first step was sealing off Cambodia both internally and externally. 




expelled, local newspapers and televisions shut down, radios and bicycles confiscated, 
and telephones suppressed…[Cambodians] quickly learned that any display of 
knowledge or skill…” especially if it was contaminated by foreign influence, it was their 
certain death (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 344). Logistically, DK was divided into major 
zones and 32 regions throughout Cambodia that were then comprised of districts, 
subdistricts, and villages. The purging had a common pattern of plowing through 
districts, subdistricts, and then the villages (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 345).  
Calling it “year zero” Pol Pot was swift in his plan for his new country. The 
wealthy, educated, police, doctors, teachers, and former government officials and their 
families were killed. Monks were massacred in masses, eliminating Buddhism from the 
country in just one year. The U.S. expelled half of the Vietnamese (during the Vietnam 
war), and Pol Pot’s regime drove out another 100,000, murdering the ones who remained 
(eliminating nearly half a million Vietnamese). The Chinese population was reduced to 
half and seen as prisoners of war, and around 100,000 Muslims Chams were massacred. 
20,000 Cambodians that were an enemy of the state were tortured and jailed, and others 
who were considered to be suspects were shot on the spot. In the last six months of the 
regime, murders reached 100,000, and numbers total in the arena of 2.5 million deaths by 
1979 (Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 350). To date, it is one of the most horrifying events 
in modern history. 
Rationale Behind the Violence 
Even after his death in 1998, scholars cannot properly identify the motives behind 
Pol Pot’s desire to cleanse Cambodia. Perhaps it was because he raised on the 




the rest of the lower-middle class that there was more out there, and in order to see that 
he had to remove those who he thought where in his way. This train of thought parallels 
what is known as rational choice theory, where Pol Pot’s war was not about winning, but 
rather served his economic and political functions. As it relates to this study, this theory 
provides that framework by underlining that violent conflict is utilized as a tool by 
individuals or a group of individuals in order to highlight their economic injustice with 
the hope of establishing a form of equality and stability. 
With this theory, the motivation of violent conflict into two categories; greed, 
where violent actions arise because opposing parties aspire to acquire wealth by capturing 
resources and grievance, where opposing parties set out to rid of each other or the unjust 
regime. In determining whether a violent conflict is driven by greed or grievance, an 
empirical model was developed to quantify such factors through the use of proxies. 
Greed’s proxies are primary commodity exports in GDP, the proportion of young males 
within a total population, and the average years of education of a population (Denmers, 
2017, 103). Grievance’s proxies are the extent to which a society is factionalized by 
ethnicity and religion, land ownership, levels of repression and autocracy, and variable 
growth rate in the five years prior to the outbreak of the violent conflict (Denmers, 2017, 
103). While grievance’s proxies are currently highlighted as the primary drivers for the 
genocide that occurred in Cambodia, it is important to consider the economic health of 
the nation and what those conditions were prior to the loss of so many lives.  
Perhaps Pol Pot was driven by the idea of power and wealth, as he had familial 
ties with royalty. With Marxism, getting and keeping economic power is the motive 




peasant society, espousing Marxist principles, and took aim at intellectuals, city residents, 
ethnic Vietnamese, civil servants, and religious leaders. The division between the haves 
and have-nots from a Marxists theoretical perspective is infinitely more significant that 
the division of race, religion, or gender (Tyson, 2006, p. 54). It is this worldview that 
allows for the elite to rise in the global society.  It is the bourgeoisie that recognize that 
class is the most important and the rest of the world that does not. Thus, the remaining 
global society will place a large significance of race, religion, and gender, causing them 
to create revolutions amongst themselves and leave the elite to watch them eliminate each 
other in their own battles. In short, under the Marxist theory Pol Pot’s cleverly placed the 
significance of race and religion at the forefront to gain support of the masses and then 
allowed them to eliminate who they thought were less worthy on their own accord.  
International response did not make itself present as the thousands of Cambodians 
were being slaughtered. Finally, in 1979 Vietnamese soldiers invaded and drove out the 
Khmer Rouge. The people who were once seen as enemies and ethnically infected were 
now the pseudo heroes to the repressive nation. Vietnamese troops remained in 
Cambodia until 1989, after they trained a new Cambodian army (Totten and Parsons, 
2009, p. 352). October 31, 1991, peace agreements were signed in Paris making both the 
United States and Cambodia signatories of the Genocide Convention. Between 1999 and 
2006 the United Nations negotiated with the Cambodian government and established a 
joint tribunal in Phnom Penh to ensure legal accountability for the Khmer Rouge’s crimes 
(Totten and Parsons, 2009, p. 356). 
Shortly after the peace agreements were signed, several political parties began to 




those who were exiled during the reign of Pol Pot (Corfield, 2009, p. 112). As this was 
happening, Pol Pot was preparing himself for more bloodshed since the UN officials were 
unsuccessful in disarming him. The Khmer Rouge took it upon themselves and attacked 
small villages in Vietnam, killing several hundred and expelling hundreds of thousands.  
Elections took place in 1993, the first since 1972. The royalist party won, but the 
Cambodian People’s Party did not take the defeat well. Considering not breaking up the 
freshly unified country, both parties created a joint constitution that involved power 
sharing. For Cambodia, the road towards a democratic government was awkward. As the 
first term came to an end, the CPP had set themselves up for total political control for the 
elections in 1998; this was also the time that the Khmer Rouge was rumored to be split. 
When the royalist party realized what the CPP had planned, they sought a political 
alliance with the Khmer Rouge and a coup d’état launched in Phnom Penh (Corfiled, 
2009, p. 120). By spring, the national was at a stalemate; nevertheless, elections took 
place in the summer and the CPP won most of the seats. That same year, Pol Pot died, 
marking the end for the Khmer Rouge. 
At this point, Cambodia was a pseudo peaceful nation – there were no major 
attacks present, but the wealthy and famous continued to be assassinated. The 2003 
elections came, and the CPP won the majority once more. Alarmed after their second 
victory, the throne decided that it was best for the country to join forces with CPP and re-
create a power sharing institution that remains today. Cambodia is now constitutional 
monarchy, where the king serves as the head of state, has a bipartisan legislature with an 






Cambodia had one of the most underdeveloped economies in Southeast Asia, 
having only rice and rubber as strong commodities. The Europeans, the French, were 
fully aware of this and therein began the symbiotic relationship between the two nations. 
Cambodians needed France for protection and the French needed Cambodia for its 
rubber. Because of this relationship Cambodia was largely self-sufficient, famine was 
low as most families lived in the countryside cultivating the produce and raising the 
livestock they ate. However, the economy took a fall when Pol Pot came into power and 
deemed foreign investment as toxic. Of course, the removal of any foreign investment 
was not the only reason for the collapse of the Cambodian economy; the mass killings, 
the burning of villages (and their land) and the seclusion from communications and 
trading all had major impacts as well. 
In 1979, when the Vietnamese invaded with the aim to bring down the Khmer 
Rouge, the economy was in complete disarray. Food shortages were widespread, a large 
part of the population was relocated, no central currency existed, and electricity and 
transportation services were non-existent (Than, 1992, p. 271). Economic reforms were 
finally introduced in 1985, the private sector grew, government industries were granted 
autonomy, and international support for the country’s economic freedom was reignited 
(Than, 1992, p. 271). The agricultural sector, except for droughts and floods, became 
nearly self-sufficient once more.  
Humanitarian aid from the international community was implemented in the 
reconstruction of the economy, highlighting that Cambodians must assume their 




peace in a nation that been involved in decades of war, mass destruction, and economic 
downfall was seen as more difficult than the actual economic reconstruction. For several 
years after the reconstruction and rehabilitation plan was signed, Cambodian nationals 
and foreigners were killed that demonstrated the political uncertainty. Despite everything, 
Cambodia rose from the ashes and is now paving its way to success domestically and as 
an international partner. 
Data Operation 
Cambodia has been a country that has long suffered the consequences of violent 
conflict and overall governmental instability for decades. Considering this, the dataset for 
this case study does not include structural balance, as the information that is currently 
published has been unable to quantify such measures. Like Yugoslavia, the results to 
these outcomes will inevitably be skewed against those countries that have the complete 
dataset available. 
Table 20 
Data Sheet Cambodia 
Y (Population) X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) X2 (Structural Balance) 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
7.99 0 0 
8.228 0.02 0 
8.467 0.021 0 
8.724 0.021 0 
9.009 0.02 0 
9.324 0.021 0 
9.659 0.02 0 
10.007 0.021 0 
10.43 0.022 0 




11.091 0.023 0 
11.396 0.023 0 
11.685 0.023 0 
11.96 0.025 0 
12.223 0.026 0 
12.473 0.028 0 
12.709 0.029 0 
12.934 0.03 0 
13.149 0.032 0 
13.356 0.034 0 
13.555 0.036 0 
13.747 0.038 0 
13.941 0.039 0 
14.144 0.039 0 
14.365 0.039 0 
14.605 0.041 0 
14.78 0.042 0 
15.026 0.044 0 
15.27 0.045 0 







Summary Output Cambodia 
 
Despite its missing links, as it relates to Cambodia, you will notice that R Square 
(see Table Forty-Four) demonstrates an 88.9% probability of the connection between its 
population Y with purchasing power (globalization). Adjusted R Square demonstrates a 
probability of a nexus being present at a similar rate of 88.3%. Significance F, at 
approximately 1.63, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater 




Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low and 
structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is further 
evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables X1 being greater than the 
alpha 0.05, which indicates that the emigration of immigration of populations is directly 
impacted by a country’s economic outlook. 
 
Figure 27. Line Plot Structural Balance Cambodia 
 
Figure 28. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Cambodia 
Again, the dataset for Cambodia is unique in that it is impossible to demonstrate 
the correlation between migration and violent conflict by way of quantitative measures. 
However, Table Forty-Five clearly demonstrates the nexus between the two variables, as 





Residual Output Cambodia  
RESIDUAL OUTPUT   
Observation Predicted Y (Population) Residuals 
Standard 
Residuals 
1 2.152221419 2.152221419 -1.278582217 
2 2.152221419 2.152221419 -1.278582217 
3 2.152221419 2.152221419 -1.278582217 
4 2.152221419 2.152221419 -1.278582217 
5 2.152221419 2.152221419 -1.278582217 
6 2.152221419 2.152221419 -1.278582217 
7 2.152221419 5.837778581 3.468081777 
8 8.651808765 0.423808765 -0.251774444 
9 8.976788132 0.509788132 -0.302852687 
10 8.976788132 0.252788132 -0.15017526 
11 8.651808765 0.357191235 0.212198595 
12 8.976788132 0.347211868 0.206270097 
13 8.651808765 1.007191235 0.598347731 
14 8.976788132 1.030211868 0.612023727 
15 9.3017675 1.1282325 0.670255393 
16 9.3017675 1.4672325 0.871647019 
17 9.626746867 1.464253133 0.86987705 
18 9.626746867 1.769253133 1.051070106 
19 9.626746867 2.058253133 1.222757952 
20 10.2767056 1.683294399 1.000004119 
21 10.60168497 1.621315031 0.96318369 
22 11.2516437 1.221356297 0.725577967 
23 11.57662307 1.132376929 0.672717497 
24 11.90160244 1.032397562 0.613322195 
25 12.55156117 0.597438827 0.354923826 
26 13.20151991 0.154480093 0.091772853 
27 13.85147864 0.296478642 -0.176130725 
28 14.50143738 0.754437376 -0.448192832 
29 14.82641674 0.885416744 -0.526004478 
30 14.82641674 0.682416744 -0.405407132 
31 14.82641674 0.461416744 -0.274116426 
32 15.47637548 0.871375478 -0.517662905 
33 15.80135485 1.021354846 -0.606761986 
34 16.45131358 -1.42531358 -0.846744011 
35 16.77629295 1.506292947 -0.894851877 





Figure 29. Residual Output Structural Balance Cambodia 
 
Figure 30. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Cambodia 
Like many of the other datasets in this research, the residuals for Cambodia do not 
numerically exemplify the thesis. While the standardized residuals in this case study have 
















































Having the largest landmass of any European nation (www.europa.eu, 2016), 
Germany shares its borders with nine different countries and has access to both the North 
and Baltic Seas.  It is no wonder that every Reich tried for global domination. Germany 
was and continues to be one of the epicenters of Europe, having one of the highest GDPs 
and where 16% of the European Union’s population resides (www.europa.edu, 2016). 
Today, Germany is part of the G8, one of the eight most industrialized nations in the 
world, and a power player in global economics. This, however, was no easy feat. The 
German Republic comes from nearly a century of social and political division and has 
survived one of the most notorious acts of genocide in history. What follows is the 
history of a torn nation, what led to its ultimate demise, and its extraordinary rise to the 
top. 
Historical Context and Background 
Created in 1871, the German Empire was governed under the constitution 
designed by Otto von Bismarck, the Prussian Prime Minister (Berghahn, 2005, p. 178). 
The constitution by design would grant the Kaiser (“Holy Roman Emperor”) primary 
decision power, which by definition means that the decisions on whether to go to war or 
stay at peace would be left to the hands of one person (Berghahn, 2005, p. 178). In 
principle “the Kaiser had, at his disposal, the use of military force and could set in motion 
a violent solution to any domestic political conflict…” (Berghahn, 179, 2005). To this 
end, Bismarck launched a cultural struggle, Kulturkampf, a campaign to destroy political 




campaign, this time with socialism as his target. This campaign also failed, and when the 
new emperor, Wilhelm II began his reign in 1888, he asked Bismarck to resign.  
It is important to recognize that the constitution and the founding of the German 
Empire was made possible after years of war and pseudo liberalization from the Kingdom 
of Prussia (which then constituted present day Germany Poland, Russia, Lithuania, 
Denmark, Belgium, and the Czech Republic). Thus, it was [almost] natural for Bismarck 
to be in constant state of fear of losing his power. For Bismarck, giving into political 
parties with opposing views would have been letting his years of work in foreign policy 
go in vain and destroying what he considered the unification of a German nation. The 
most interesting note what of what comprised Bismarck’s constitution was the little was 
written on economics, party structures, political systems, and anything that involved the 
growth of German infrastructure. In fact, 80 to 90 percent of the Reich’s expenditures 
(Berghahn, 2005, p. 190) were marked for military spending. This alone is an indicator 
that the only concern for Bismarck and his political cronies was military stability and 
control – which in history has shown is not enough for the growth and stability of a 
nation.  
The dismissal of chancellor Bismarck was surrounded by a short disruption of 
political power, as Wilhelm II attempted to steer the Reich government in a direction of 
peace (Berghahn, 2005, p. 248). The new emperor’s aim was to be beloved by all by way 
of improving laws that surrounded the Reich’s economic welfare; however, was not taken 
lightly by anyone. Wannabe politicos, like Otto von Volderndorff, wrote, “We must limit 
ourselves to securing the country…[pursue] a re-founding of the Reich…our industry is 




poorly’…” (Berghahn, 2005, p. 248). People of influence (and affluence) such as 
Volderndorff were part of the group that planted that first seed of deep-seated hatred in 
the events that followed decades later. Wilhelm II’s need to be the emperor of the people 
is what led to his comparatively short-lived reign; he was forced to give up his throne 
after WWI in 1918. 
Triggered by the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria by a 
Yugoslav nationalist, the ‘war to end all wars’ pitted the Central Powers (Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire) against the Allied Powers (Great Britain, 
France, Russia, Italy, and Japan). Named after German General Alfred on Schlieffen, the 
military strategy known as the Schlieffen Plan was implemented to destroy the enemy in 
one swift move, weakening its economic power and destabilizing military capability 
(Berghahn, 2005, p. 274). The idea behind this plan was to have a ‘lighting war’ by 
attacking France through the West and Russia through the East; this, was undoubtedly 
one of the most jeopardizing military strategies deployed by the German government and 
to their own surprise were defeated in France and came to a stalemate in Russia. German 
forces suffered over two million casualties in a period of four years, but this only marked 
the beginning of the horrors that were to follow. 
Born in 1918, The Weimar Republic was Germany’s first attempt at a 
parliamentary democracy. The newly indoctrinated constitution provided for an election 
of a popular president (to hold office for a seven-year appointment), policy design by 
majority leaders, and a creation of a socioeconomic framework that would serve as the 
charter for the next thirteen years (Pachter, 1978, p. 86). The Weimar Republic is made 




class, the wealthiest of the wealthy, and the rise of political parties who would be in 
opposition (i.e., peasant parties). Germany became highly politicized (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 
25) and polarized. This newfound democracy was met with political violence, frequent 
assassinations, coup attempts, strikes, and demonstration in its first four years (Fulbrook, 
2014, p. 27). It was a combination of these acts, a sense of passive resistance, and poor 
socioeconomic conditions that led to the election of Paul von Hindenburg in 1925, a 
‘tolerable’ president (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 50). 
Heinrich Bruning was elected chancellor in 1930, into a government relied more 
and more on the sole authority of the president (Pachter, 1978, p. 191). Refusing to take 
any measures on Germany’s economic distress, Bruning reduced wages, prices, and 
social services, while increasing taxes. As this was occurring, the Nazi Party had already 
been active for ten years and was only increasing in power when they joined communist 
forces, and eventually create a cohort of anti-capitalist forces (Pachter, 1978, p. 197). 
Fearing the worst, Bruning handed the office to an aristocrat who was later replaced by 
Adolf Hitler as a chancellor – this was the beginning of the end of the German Reich.  
Born in 1889, Adolf Hitler was one of six children to working class parents. 
Growing up, Hitler had strong interests in the fine arts, but his father, who died when 
Hitler was fourteen, rejected this idea. Hitler struggled as a young man in school, 
particularly after his youngest brother died not long after the passing of his father, so his 
mother allowed him to drop out when he was sixteen so that he could pursue his career in 
the arts. The following year, in 1907, his mother died. That year Hitler moved to Vienna 




would leave to live a life without a home and filled with political ideology that planted 
the seeds of anti-Semitism. 
Though he was born in Austria, when World War I began, he was able to enlist in 
the German army and fought in the some of the bloodiest battles in the war. It is believed 
that Hitler had a strong hatred in the multi-culturalism that was found in Austria at the 
time and proving his loyalty with Germany would be his answer – he was right. Hitler 
became a well-regarded and decorated solider for his bravery in action, taking everything, 
he learned at the front lines to create his national party. Because of the serious impact that 
WWI had on Germany, it was made clear to Hitler that he needed to create a party for the 
people, a party that would allow Germany to rise up once again and become the powerful 
nation that he wanted it to be. This led to the formation of the German Workers Party 
(that we now know as the Nazi Party) and the period in which Hitler launched himself 
into politics, shaking hands with other national leaders that had similar ideals. And, 
despite his setbacks in school during his youth, Hitler had tremendous oratory skills; 
skills that would bring in crowds in the thousands to listen to what he had to say, creating 
one of the largest support bases in history at the time. 
In 1925, Hitler published Mein Kampf (“My Struggle”), outlining his political 
ideology and future for Germany. For Hitler “the state was not an economic entity but 
racial. He declared the superiority of a white Aryan race, with particular vitriol reserved 
for the Jews he viewed as ‘parasites.’ Their elimination, he said, ‘must be necessarily a 
bloody process’” (www.bbc.co.uk, 2017).  This of course, keeping in mind the fact that 
Hitler believed that Jews (among others) betrayed the German Army, which lead to their 




Chancellor, and with swift political moves, by March he was able to pass laws without 
approval, and the only thing he has left to do to fulfill his vision was to build an army. 
In 1934, as Hitler was preparing himself to transform Germany into a racially 
pure community, he was whipping the military votes with the reminding officers that the 
Jews had a large part in the humiliation and defeat of Germany. He then would obligate 
officers to swear into policies that some morally rejected. Those who did not comply 
were exterminated, and the Nazi reign of terror began (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 62). By 1938, 
Hitler was well underway in the expansion of Nazi Germany, starting with Austria, then 
Czechoslovakia, and finally Poland. It was at Poland when the rest of the world began to 
notice that there might be some trouble coming their way. In 1939, France and Britain 
declared war, leaving Germany to form an alliance with fascist Italy and Japan. Upon the 
invasion of USSR, WWII became the largest land war in history; German troops had 
spread to over six countries in less than a five-year period and Hitler had no plans to stop, 
no matter the cost. 
In the early 1940s the war was starting to take a toll on the German citizens 
themselves. Women and children were living through air raids and surviving in ruined 
cities; millions were uprooted from their homelands (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 84) – it was clear 
that a ‘normal’ life was far from reach. The war ended in 1945, when Berlin was captured 
by Soviet troops and Germany was forced to surrender. 11 million lives were lost, and 
millions more were injured in a war that was led by one of the most notoriously 
dangerous men on Earth. 
The first concentration camp was established in 1933, the year that Hitler first 




not for the imprisonment of Jews. Introduced in 1935, The Nuremberg Laws were set in 
place to “protect” German blood, which meant that Jews and other minorities were 
reduced to second-class citizens due to their impure blood (www.bbc.co.uk, 2017). By 
1939, a systemic extermination program was underway, needing to weed out those who 
were hereditarily diseased. Incorporating eugenic ideas, those who were deemed 
worthless were sterilized, the mentally ill and handicapped were executed, children with 
abnormalities were taken for experimentation for medical advancement, and groups 
including Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals and gypsies were brutally killed without 
mercy (Pichot, 2001, p. 176). Then there was the mass genocide of the Jews, Hitler’s 
“Final Solution.” 
Concentration camps, as we know them today, were overcrowded, poorly 
maintained, and cruel and harsh treatment often resulted in death. “Disease, starvation, 
torture, shooting, and hanging were all common, and violence, brutality and murder were 
weapons which had been employed by the Nazis throughout their period of power” 
(Fulbrook, 2014, p. 90). Despite this horror, physical extermination of the Jews (in the 
camps or otherwise) was not an order until 1941. This operation essentially consisted of 
gathering Jewish communities in herd, taking them to the woods (or camps), having them 
dig their own graves and then shooting them on site so that their bodies would fall in their 
burial site (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 98). By the end of 1945, the lives of 6 million Jews were 
lost, and the man responsible to bringing the world to the brink of destruction took his 
life upon defeat. 
One of the most interesting things about Hitler his political ideology was very 




friends, by society.  The notion that he could create a unified front based on his ideals, 
and in a country where he was not born citizen, is truly what drove him to become who 
he was. That said, Hitler’s persona and the events that transpired during his time of power 
could astutely be explained with social theory. Social theory as a basis for the 
comprehension of man was developed several hundred years ago, as civil societies 
developed and people were permitted to express their independent thinking (Lemert, 
2010). Its foundation began as the attempt to account for what was different between 
modern societies and its preceding traditional ones (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 98).  
Today, social theory is defined as “the normal accomplishment of socially adept 
human creatures figuring out what other creatures of the same sort are doing with, to, or 
around them” (Lemert, 2010). One such branch that stems from modern social theory is 
that of cultural trauma [as a social theory], where as individuals feel as though they have 
been subjected to a (or several) horrendous events that leaves marks on their 
consciousness; therefore, changing their identity and fundamental ideals forever 
(Alexander, 2012, p. 6). This suggests, then that in light of Hitler’s traumatic experience 
(i.e., the consecutive deaths of 3 family members in a time of his life that known to be 
challenging for a young man), what could have been a somewhat normal politician, 
turned into a monster because his identity was changed. Traumas are said to be naturally 
occurring events that shatter an individual’s sense of wellbeing (Alexander, 2012, p. 7), 
“…it is a blow to the psyche that breaks through one’s defenses so suddenly and with 
such brutal force that one cannot react to it effectively…” (Alexander, 2012, p. 9). Based 
on this, it can be deduced that Hitler was never able to overcome the traumatic 




men (including the Jews) when he laid down the law that anyone who was considered 
impure or unworthy should be killed. I am not suggesting that Hitler or his actions are 
forgivable simply because he was [clearly] a sick man, but rather am providing a possible 
baseline that could stipulate an explanation as to why he did what he did.  
What was left after the war was a demoralized nation in ruins. Husbands and sons 
were gone, food and clothing for those who remained were scarce, and a general 
emptiness was the only thing that filled the air. Allies were unsure on what to do with the 
Germany that remained; they had to administer a war-torn country while being cautious 
of those who were in position to rattle cages.  
By 1949, two German states were founded, one free dictatorship and communism 
(west) and the other who was attempted to gain new order under the auspice of Stalinism 
(east). The decades that followed became the true indicator on how different the divided 
nation had become; West Germans industry and economy flourished, while East 
Germany underwent a major dismantling campaign headed by the Soviet Union. In 1961, 
the division was literally cemented with the Berlin Wall. The difference in industry, 
economy, and population were staggering. West Germany was urbanized, with less than 
6% of the population living in small cities, with high number of advance white-collar 
works, and a population that grew from 43 million to 61.6 million (despite the terror 
attacks that happened in the 1970s and 1980s); East Germany, on the other hand, had 
24% of their population living in rural areas, where work was largely blue collars, and 
whose population remained identical (16.7 million) in a forty-year period (Fulbrook, 
2014, p. 188-189). The disparity in education, policing, and politics was just as apparent. 




process of the dismantling of the Iron Curtain and destruction of the Berlin Wall between 
the two republics and paving the way for a Germany as a unified front.  
The year that followed gave way to rapid reunification and introduction to a 
unified Germany. Currency union was in effect July 1, 1990; East German shops were 
stocked with a wide range of goods, subsidies were removed, properties were re-
appropriated, a common political administration was planned and institutionalized, and 
the by end of 1990 Germany had their first free election since 1932, and the division of 
the European superpowers had finally come to an end (Fulbrook, 2014, p. 287-289). 
Data Operation 
Table 23 
Data Sheet Nazi Germany 
Y (Population) X1 (GDP/Purchasing Power) X2 (Structural Balance) 
76.843 6.536 0 
76.988 6.435 0 
76.933 6.365 0 
76.664 6.303 0 
76.355 6.21 0 
76.166 6.128 0 
76.219 6.063 0 
76.233 5.924 0 
76.697 5.881 0 
77.463 5.895 0 
78.949 5.987 0 
79.973 6.14 -5.067 
80.5 5.617 -4.019 
80.947 5.454 -2.755 
81.148 5.424 -2.367 
81.308 5.315 -2.839 
81.467 5.164 -2.888 
81.51 5.052 -2.436 
81.446 5.016 -2.294 
81.423 4.939 -1.685 
81.457 4.85 -4.791 
81.518 4.816 -3.405 
81.579 4.671 -3.599 
81.549 4.456 -2.681 




81.337 4.116 -2.375 
81.174 4.057 -1.944 
80.993 3.963 -0.926 
80.764 3.889 -1.023 
80.483 3.681 -1.056 
80.285 3.643 -2.662 
80.276 3.636 -1.403 
80.427 3.54 0.003 
80.647 3.439 0.607 
80.983 3.397 1.163 
81.687 3.344 1.182 
 
Table 24 





As it relates to Germany, you will notice that R Square (see Table Fifty-One) 
demonstrates a 80.6% probability of the connection between its population Y with 
purchasing power (globalization) and structural balance (whose presence is directly 
impacted on whether or not violent conflict has occurred). Adjusted R Square 
demonstrates a probability of a nexus being present at a slightly lower rate of 79.4%, in 
likelihood of a small sample size that is available given the data. Significance F, at 
approximately 1.81, illustrates the overall test, which tells us that all values are greater 
than 0 and we should not fail to reject the premise that Y is directly correlated to X1 and 
X2. Therefore, as it relates to our hypothesis, when economic performance (X1), is low 
and structural balance is high (X2), then migration movements (Y) increase. This is 
further evidenced with the P-values of both independent variables (X1 and X2) being 
greater than the alpha 0.05, which are also indicators that the emigration of immigration 
of populations is directly impacted by a country’s economic outlook and whether or not 
they have endured violent conflict at any level. 
 




























Figure 32. Line Plot GDP/Purchasing Power Nazi Germany 
Given the history of Germany, the dataset in both Table Fifty-Two and Table 
Fifty-Three are the most accurate depiction of the central premise to the research, 































Residual Output Nazi Germany 






1 76.6817768 0.161223203 0.178880802 
2 76.82029222 0.167707784 0.186075592 
3 76.916293 0.016706999 0.018536795 
4 77.00132227 0.337322268 -0.37426671 
5 77.12886617 0.773866168 -0.858622073 
6 77.24132423 1.075324231 -1.193096634 
7 77.33046782 1.111467817 -1.233198763 
8 77.52109795 1.288097947 -1.429173901 
9 77.58006986 0.883069858 -0.979786046 
10 77.5608697 0.097869701 -0.108588654 
11 77.43469724 1.514302759 1.680153273 
12 80.63014972 0.657149723 -0.729122529 
13 80.64310321 0.143103211 -0.158776259 
14 80.01717534 0.929824656 1.031661554 
15 79.79756272 1.350437277 1.498340802 
16 80.26425776 1.043742235 1.158055694 
17 80.50427567 0.962724325 1.068164484 
18 80.35410985 1.155890152 1.282486353 
19 80.30805043 1.137949572 1.262580871 
20 80.00437219 1.41862781 1.573999745 
21 82.21382095 0.756820954 -0.839710021 
22 81.32898712 0.189012876 0.209714075 
23 81.6582238 0.079223801 -0.087900604 
24 81.33614047 0.212859527 0.236172475 
25 81.62649159 0.169491591 -0.188054766 
26 81.59678237 0.259782374 -0.288234438 
27 81.38804331 -0.21404331 -0.237485909 
28 80.83281066 0.160189339 0.177733706 
29 80.99948616 0.235486159 -0.261277237 
30 81.30692332 -0.82392332 -0.91416162 
31 82.43835205 -2.15335205 -2.389192962 
32 81.60183983 1.325839832 -1.471049379 
33 80.78859425 0.361594248 -0.401197023 
34 80.52119082 0.12580918 0.13958814 
35 80.2051309 0.777869103 0.863063421 





Figure 33. Residual Output Structural Balance Nazi Germany 
 
Figure 34. Residual Output GDP/Purchasing Power Nazi Germany 
In this final overview of residuals, again the plots in Tables Fifty-Five and Fifty-
Six do not make the argument that migration is in fact impacted by other variables. If, for 
the purposes of this research, residuals were to be taken into consideration, the numerical 
data would negate the hypothesis and the reasons for which this research is created could 








































As our world has become more internationally integrated, the concept of 
globalization (to explain economy in an interconnected world) naturally came to light in 
order to dissect the new fear that nations have as a whole – the fear of coming up short. 
Because of this, it appears as though there have been more acts of violence in the last 
century than there ever was; in fact, since the end of World War II, 236 conflicts have 
been active in 150 locations. 
The question of nationalistic survival is one of the haves versus the have-nots, and 
those who have more, will ultimately survive. Scholarly research has only begun to 
scratch the surface where globalization and violent conflict come together. There is an 
undeniable gap in the connection between the economic performance of a nation to its 
resulting upheavals that are often followed with violence. Considering the lack of 
scholarship on this subject, this study provides a baseline that explains the phenomenon 
that we are largely faced with today – international migration. This historical examination 
provides numerical patterns that allow scholars to see if history repeats itself, and if it 
does, what are the conditions in which it can be deterred or prevented, should the 
outcomes be of serious detriment. The lack of accountability of a nation’s economic 
infrastructure is the driving force behind this study. Completely rejecting the notion that 
economics does not have an impact on violent conflict and its consequences is what will 
continue to push large populations into foreign countries, further fueling tensions. The 
only real hypotheses that have been studied are those involving violent conflict and 




The purpose of this section is to offer some concluding thoughts, to comment on 
the contribution of my research, as well as to identify areas for further exploration. What 
does the above analysis tell us about the phenomenon of migration, a premise that has 
been part of our humanity for centuries? What areas of theoretical constructs can be used 
to understanding these complex relationships? Can social science provide a new platform 
in which we can better understand the causal effects behind violent conflict without 
diminishing the underlying vulnerabilities of humanity? These are some of the 
overarching questions that emerged throughout the development of this research and 
questions that academia needs to ask itself as it moves forward in creative alternative 
frameworks as they relate to the internationalization of our world. 
Throughout this research I have made the case for the inevitable linkage between 
mass migration, globalization, and violent conflict, in that: economic performance is a 
driver for violent conflict, and consequently migration (in masses) will occur. Indeed, 
history, and each of the highlighted case studies in this research, has shown us time and 
time again in that the three are undeniably interconnected. This is because all three 
factors are bound to the welfare of a state.  While each unit of analysis represents a casual 
affect, the world context today challenges us in that they are not exclusive from one 
another. In large part this is because the fear of losing resources and opportunities to gain 
financial power has become more tangible, bringing premise nationalistic survival to the 
proverbial table.  
In creating the foundation for this research, much of the studies that have been 
previously presented are related to the political rationale behind violent conflict, as 




names that armed groups deliberately targeted marginalized populations to migrate, but 
no concrete evidence has been provide as it why it was the case. Thus, one of the goals of 
this study was to provide the hard numbers that not only are economic breakdown and 
violent conflict are related, but to expand their relationship to mass migration. 
Furthermore, this research, with relevant historical context, to an extent debunks that 
violent conflict is solely politically fueled, but rather it occurs because the political 
agenda is driven by economics. 
A New Model for Preventative Measures? 
As it relates to human nature, conflict usually unfolds because of crisis related to 
identity.  We can even put that theory to the test today, given our current administration 
and the general anti-black/brown communities sentiment that has been spreading like 
wildfire. Violent conflict specifically is the struggle over values or claims to status, 
power, and scares resources, where the goal is to essentially eliminate the opposing factor 
(usually people) that presents a roadblock. In large part, however, scholars and 
policymakers alike have not been able to anticipate when a violent conflict would erupt; 
this is especially true when a leader of a nation tacks on a faith-based agenda to their 
politics.  On its face, this almost seems illogical, but because violent conflict has not 
historically been analyzed with an economic lens, it is easy to understand why this last 
century has been one of the most violent in human history.  
This research provides the foundational groundwork for shifting the way that we 
think about how to implement preventative measures for countries that are seemingly 
stable from a 30,000-foot view, and also provides the data that quite literally tells us what 




general knowledge that the genocide that occurred in the mid 1990’s was driven by 
ethnicity and the need for identity preservation. While this may be true on the surface, if 
we dig deeper, history shows us that the two conflicting populations (Hutus and Tutsis) 
where in fact provoked by an economic opportunity that was led by foreign nationals.  
Social science has taught us that people behave in a certain manner because they 
believe it is the rational thing to do. The question is, should all acts be considered 
rational? Social theory tells us that societal norms shift as societies develop; therefore, it 
would be infinitely impossible to form actual boundaries, making what is rational then 
irrational today (or vice versa). However, the inability to form boundaries is directly 
reflected on a nation’s current state of economic outlook, in that when countries are 
developing and are heavily reliant on other countries to fill their gaps societal boundaries 
have the tendency to be more fluid. 
This fluidity has also spread to our consciousness of history. Our societies have 
been flooded with social innovation, technological progress, and social media, skewing 
out worldview, which means that we are allowing for history to repeat itself despite its 
detrimental impact. While this last century of genocide has resulted in regime change, 
social movements, and an increase of people power to challenge the status quo, it stills 
begs the question on how can we make change differently, and perhaps how can we do it 
better? Rational choice theory tells us that we are rational agents, and we have a choice, 
even in setting of war – so why do we continue to use violence as the catalyst for change? 
The assumption here is that violent conflict will give us the greater rate of return by way 
of power and resources, thus debunking the myth that ethnicity and religion are the 





“One of the most robust findings in literature is that many economic conditions 
(low income, slow growth, and severe economic downturns) are correlated to the 
outbreak of conflict…” (Kim and Conceicao, 2010, p. 31). Indeed, empirical studies have 
shown us that poor economic infrastructure is associated with a higher incidence of 
violent conflict, but quantitative measures around the impact to migration have not been 
at the forefront of social science research. In this research, five countries (case studies) 
have been identified and its respective data has been extracted and utilized in casual 
design, where one variable is directed impacted by one or more other variables. The 
driving rationale for choosing this research design is that one of the most provoking 
assertions in casual relationships is the theory that it can be used for change. The 
limitation with this research in particular is that literature supporting the thesis that 
economics, violent conflict, and mass migration are interconnected is limited; and, 
because some of these case studies did not exist as nations in their own right until the fall 
of the previous regime, hard data is also scarce, skewing the measurements. 
As debates continue over the causes and outcomes of violent conflict, the 
economic lens remains underutilized in academic studies, and therefore we are missing 
the mark field of conflict resolution. This research has shown us that, yes, history indeed 
does repeat itself and that we have lacked the creativity to think outside of the confines 
that we hold ourselves in. Violent conflict continues to serve as a tool of social 
destruction and economic reconstruction, and it is economic factors that predispose 





To date, much of the studies that have been conducted are qualitative and have 
been related to the political aims that violent conflict stems from. But, what if we strictly 
use a gender lens? This argument allows us to explore new territories of conflict 
prevention. While, this design in particular excels in bringing and understanding of 
complex issues through the analysis is limited events or conditions and their 
relationships. What is more interesting about this research design is that it does not 
facilitate the assessment of cause and effect relationships (www.usc.edu, June 2016); 
which is why a combination of the two was used here. Furthermore, this research design 
is not necessarily limited to large-scale violent conflicts that had international impact. 
This sort of tool can be broken down and simplified for the use of analysis of local 
communities; this is even more true if we are taking about preventing conflict. For 
instance, in the United States there is deep-seated frustration, resentment, and anger in the 
African American community (that can be traced back to the Civil War era) that has 
largely been created by unemployment and underemployment, extreme poverty, 
segregation, and the lack of economic and educational opportunities, among other factors. 
This is because the African American community has long been looked as a group of 
individuals that is less than, and generally speaking they are the target population (along 
with other black and brown communities) of the Anglo communities in spaces where the 
Anglo [man] is flexing their muscles to gain power. Power here goes back to material 
goods, and today that could be money, real estate, or property that has access to goods 
that are profitable. If we looked to the Detroit Riots, for example, one of the most 




(along with other factors) to that violence. Despite the fifty-year time lapse, in a first 
world nation, Detroit is still rebuilding itself from that catastrophic event. 
As academics in the field of conflict resolution it is important to look at history 
with a different lens so that the cycle of destruction is disrupted. For decades non-
government aid organizations, like USAID, IMF, and the World Bank, have provided 
billions of dollars of foreign assistance, and to what end? On January 3, 2020, fears 
around a third world war surfaced, the question is why? Why do we in the field of 
conflict resolution continue to examine these phenomena with the traditional frameworks 
time and again? The fear of losing [economic] power continues is one of the most 
palpable forces in a world where the aim to be a global power has become fiercely 
competitive. If the tool in this research was put into practice, large public and government 
conglomerates that provide aid, such was the World Bank, IMF, or USAID can identify 
the needs of a country (as it relates to resources) so as to inject that country with the 
support it requires to sustain that need and work with international policy makers on a 
higher level in order to create preventative measures for any conflict that may be 
looming; thus, reducing the catastrophic impact drastically. 
Despite the shortage in numerical data, every one of the case studies confirmed 
that in fact violent conflict and globalization have a direct impact on migration. Without 
fail, the quantitative tests utilized herein demonstrated a probability of more than 60% in 
accuracy throughout and a significant indicator that vetted that probability to be true. This 
tells us that these variables should not be confined for individual analysis, but rather in 
concert in order to make powerful strides in social science. The importance of history 




violent conflicts that have opened the door for this study, but we can do better. While the 
bridge between economics, violent conflict, and mass migration has not been widely 
made, ongoing research will make a tremendous contribution in moving the needle for 
the field of conflict resolution. The notion of using a different lens, and perhaps creating 
difficult discussions with other fields, is crucial in this field of study, particularly as new 
and challenging power dynamics continue to present themselves. These power dynamics 
are still dominated by economic growth, and the inability to maintain positive growth will 
continue to threaten the security and stability of a nation. To that end, sustained research 
in terms of economy (for both global and domestic players) is imperative. As academics, 
researchers, policymakers, and leaders, it is our responsibility to continue to examine 
conflict with untraditional lenses so as to develop measures that can be easily quantified 
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